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ABSTRACT
During the past three decades, economic growth in Thailand has been 
marked by the growing dominance of the manufacturing sector. The share of 
manufacturing in GDP and in total exports has increased markedly. At the 
same time, there has been a sluggish increase in the share of manufacturing 
employment in the total labour force. Consequently, the gap between output 
per worker in agriculture and the manufacturing sector has widened. 
Concurrently, the distribution of income in Thailand has become more 
unequal.
The role of industrial protection in industrial development is well- 
known. Many studies have estimated the degree of industrial protection in 
Thailand during the past three decades. Many have also attempted to 
establish the impact of a move from an import substitution regime towards 
an export promotion regime. However, no previous studies have examined 
the impact of trade liberalisation on income distribution, which is very 
important in policy decisions.
Based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, this thesis 
attempts to answer the question: ’What would be the income distribution 
impact of a move from the 1987 system of industrial protection towards free 
trade?’ The answer to this question contributes to empirical knowledge in the 
area of protection and income distribution in Thailand.
This thesis also offers methodologies to estimate the size distribution 
of income, and to incorporate income distribution into a general equilibrium 
framework. The methodologies enhance the analysis of poverty incidence, as 
well as income inequality. The methodologies are applied to analyse the 
income distribution impact of a move from the 1987 system of industrial
protection towards free trade, at the national, community, and regional 
levels.
As part of the database construction, the thesis also constructs a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Thailand, and estimates a system of consumer 
demand. SAM provides some important information for the CGE model, 
such as production technology and a factor ownership matrix. The estimation 
of consumer demand consists of demand for ten commodities by ten types of 
households, enriched by price information. This is the most detailed 
estimation of consumer demand everdone for the Thai economy.
Results from simulations using the CGE model confirm the argument 
in support of free trade. They show that while the move towards free trade 
would lead to a more equal distribution of income, it would also lead to a 
government budget deficit. The government might choose to borrow or raise 
more revenue, through an across the board increase in indirect tax rates or 
direct tax rates, to finance its budget deficit. The decision of the government 
has important consequences for income distribution.
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1- CHAPTER 1 -
INTRODUCTION
Higher productivity and economic growth are not the only objectives of 
industrialisation. Industrialisation is a means of achieving at least four more 
basic objectives (United Nations, 1974, quoted in Meier, 1976). First, it is 
viewed primarily as a means of improving working conditions and living 
standards for the poor. Second, it has to be closely involved with the 
development of all other sectors in the economy. Third, the income generated 
by economic growth has to be distributed sufficiently widely to promote 
perceptible improvements in general living standards. Fourth, it should also 
promote a greater sense of confidence and self reliance of the country.
The arguments for protection in industrial development are well 
known. Temporary protection may assist a young industry to compete with 
foreign industry and develop its latent strength. It also allows the transfer of 
resources from agriculture to the manufacturing industry required for 
industrialisation. In addition, industrial protection turns terms of trade 
against agriculture. It, therefore, maintains low manufacturing wage rates by 
providing cheap food for the manufacturing workers.
On the other hand, protection allows domestic industry to produce at 
a higher cost and be inefficient. Because prices are distorted by protection, 
resources are redirected away from more productive uses. Subsidy or special 
priviledge for export also affects firms' decisions to sell in domestic or world 
markets. Because industrial protection attracts productive resources out of
2agriculture, the development of agricultural technology and productivity are 
hampered. As a result, differences in the productivity of the two sectors do 
not converge and spatial income distribution is not improved.
The problem of income distribution can be viewed in both absolute 
and relative terms. In relative terms, income inequality is primarily 
concerned with the income position of individuals or households in relation 
to each other. Changes in income inequality indicate how the benefits of 
economic growth are distributed among individuals and households. 
Changes in inequality are socially subjective, however, and are tolerable as 
long as the process of change involves Pareto improvement - absolute gains 
for all - and does not preclude future and more desirable distributional 
changes (Adelman and Robinson, 1989). Poverty incidence is primarily 
concerned with the minimum level of income needed to maintain a given 
standard of living. Increases in poverty incidence incur hardship. When 
income becomes so low that people cannot survive or maintain normal 
activity, their poverty indirectly creates problems for those who are not poor, 
and becomes a cost to the whole community.
1.1. Background of the Problem
The last three decades have witnessed impressive economic growth in the 
Thai economy. Industrial development, an outward looking strategy, and the 
world economic environment are behind the success. However, despite the 
high growth record, Thailand has failed to distribute the benefits of economic 
growth equitably. Income inequality has been worsening since 
industrialisation began, while poverty incidence has improved. There has 
been increasing concern with the problem of income distribution. In the 
seventh development plan (1992-1996), the Thai government has given 
priority to the problem, by focusing on the reduction of poverty and an 
increase in income of the targetted groups, particularly poor farmers and 
farm workers.
Beginning with a relatively small and basic industrial sector, Thailand 
initially opted for an import substitution regime, and then moved towards an
3export promotion regime. The advantages and disadvantages of the two 
regimes have been well discussed in the literature. In sum, import 
substitution is expected to supply domestic demand, especially for consumer 
goods, initially to foster industrialisation and improve the balance of 
payments. Provided that it is not over subsidized, export promotion has 
three main supports. First, the domestic resource cost of earning one unit of 
foreign currency by export promotion is said to be less than the domestic 
resource cost of saving one unit of foreign currency by import substitution. 
Second, the process of industrialisation through export promotion rests on 
exogenous world demand, and is not limited by a narrow domestic market, 
as is import substitution. Third, it is likely to have more linkages to 
agriculture and can upgrade the skill of labour. Because export industries are 
relatively labour intensive, it is also expected to utilize the country's labour 
surplus, increase employment, and improve the distribution of income.
Many empirical studies have attempted to establish a relationship 
between income distribution and a change in policy from an import 
substitution strategy to an export promotion strategy, especially through 
employment and the functional distribution of income. Narongchai (1975) 
asserts that import protection policies in Thailand induced capital intensive 
investment and have not created sufficient non-agricultural employment. 
Narongchai (1977) also supports the move towards export promotion 
strategy by showing that it would increase employment in every sector. Kim 
and Vorasopontaviporn (1989) show that, if national income increases 
exogenously, not only the export sector but also the non-traded sector in 
Thailand can create more employment than the import competing sector. 
However, Phomphen (1987) and Wattananukit and Bhongmakapat (1989 in 
Teerana, 1990), both based on a computable general equilibrium model, point 
to the unfavourable income distribution impact of export expansion. 
Phomphen points out that a (negative) shock of world demand for Thai 
export leads to a reduction in income of farmers and casual labourers. Thus, 
income inequality is worsened. Wattananukit and Bhongmakapat, in 
assessing the impact of export expansion on income distribution, found that 
export led growth did not encourage overall income equality, and increased
income inequality. They maintain that the expansion of agricultural exports 
has a favourable income distribution impact, since it has better forward 
linkages, requires less imported machinery and raw materials, and benefits 
the lower income classes, especially farmers. Whereas, manufacturing export 
only benefits non-agricultural households.
The relationship between industrial protection and income 
distribution has been of considerable interest to economists. Generally, the 
literature focuses on the functional distribution of income, i.e., returns to 
labour and capital. In the neoclassical world of two countries, two mobile 
factors, and two sectors, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that an 
increase in the relative price of a commodity will increase the return to factor 
used intensively in the production of that commodity in relation to both 
commodity prices and will reduce the return to the other factor. Thus, 
protection will benefit the factor used intensively in the protected sector. 
However, Magee (1978) shows that the theory is not supported by empirical 
evidence, since all factors of production in protected industries support 
protection. The so-called Ricardo-Viner-Jones specific factors model focuses 
on a short run impact, in which a factor is specific to sectors of production. 
The model states that the income distribution impact of protection depends 
on the consumption basket of consumers.
The implications of these two sector models are limited by the 
simplicity of their assumptions since the reality is more complicated. Other 
studies attempt a multi-sectoral model (e.g., Jones, 1975). But, most of them 
focus on partial equilibrium analyses, that fall short of capturing the 
behaviour of economic agents in the general equilibrium framework, and 
lack emphasis on the impact of protection on the size distribution of income. 
Empirical studies on the effect of trade liberalisation show that many 
developing countries experience average annual positive growth rates in the 
post-liberalisation era (Michaely et al., 1991). As also pointed out by the same 
study, there is no evidence that lower income groups benefit from 
liberalisation nor there is any confirmation that liberalisation leads to a 
deterioration of income distribution.
5In the case of Thailand, the impact of industrial protection on poverty 
incidence and income inequality has not been satisfactorily investigated. No 
previous studies have examined the impact of the system of protection on the 
size distribution of income, which is very important in policy decisions, both 
in terms of economic growth and welfare.
Available studies on industrial protection and income distribution in 
Thailand are limited and fall into two categories. Firstly, Corden (1967), 
Chalongphob, Pranee, and Tienchai (1988), and Overbosch et al. (1988) are 
studies in which the overall income distribution impact of protection is seen 
to be ambiguous. Corden points to the progressive effects of import duties, 
since imports are consumed mainly by the better-off sections of the 
community. He also points to the regressive effects of an export tax on rice, 
since it is a transfer of income from rice producers, especially poor rice 
growers in the Northeast, (possibly) traders, and millers to the government. 
Chalongphob, Pranee, and Tienchai, based on a CGE model, found that the 
impact of replacing import taxes with a proportional tax on household 
income, to generate exactly the same total tax revenue, was unclear. Their 
results depended on the closure of the model. With fixed investment, 
inequality of real household income worsens. With a fixed current account, 
inequality improves. Overbosch et al., based on THAM-2 CGE model, found 
that the income distribution impact of government intervention in 
agriculture is inconclusive. On the other hand, Fabers and Kennes (1982, 
quoted in O’mara and Le-si, 1985), based on a multi-sectoral macro-economic 
model, point to the resource allocation effect of a reduction in import tariffs, 
since the share of agriculture in GDP significantly increases. Therefore, their 
results indicate that the income distribution impact of a reduction in import 
tariffs is favourable.
The impact of industrialisation and trade policy in Thailand has not 
yet been fully investigated and clarified. In particular, the impact of 
industrial protection on poverty and income inequality has not been 
examined by any past studies.
61.2. General Equilibrium and Income Distribution
Because of the interrelationship of all sectors of the economy, especially 
between agriculture and manufacturing, the problem of industrial protection 
and income distribution requires a general equilibrium analysis. The 
theoretical structure of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is 
well known. Based on the traditional Walrasian equilibrium, a CGE model 
consists of a system of equations which explain the behaviour of various 
economic agents in the economy. General equilibrium is similar to partial 
equilibrium, in that it assumes all producers to be profit maximisers; 
consumers to be utility maximisers; and production factors paid according to 
their marginal revenue products. It differs from a partial equilibrium model 
in that, whereas in a partial equilibrium model all prices other than the price 
of a good under consideration are assumed to remain constant, in a general 
equilibrium model all prices are variables, and quantity adjusts accordingly. 
By making profit and utility maximisation feasible and consistent, the 
solution set provided by the CGE model clears all factor and goods markets 
simultaneously.
With the relatively large size and complicated nature of the CGE 
model, four different approaches have been developed in order to solve for 
the solution (Robinson, 1989). The approach used in this thesis, the linearized 
Johansen type CGE model, which was introduced by Johansen in 1960, 
involves the linearization of all equations in the model and then solving them 
by a matrix inversion. Although this approach has been used in many 
applications in many countries, its application to income distribution has not 
been fully explored.
Generally, income distribution in CGE is measured by the functional 
distribution of income - distributive shares among factors of production - and 
the socio-economic or class distribution of income. The functional 
distribution of income is partly explained by the distribution rigidity of 
production functions employed by the model. Typical is the well-known 
Cobb-Douglas production function, which implies constant factor shares in 
the total production cost, while the Leontief, the constant elasticity of
7transformation (CET), and the constant ratios of elasticities of transformation 
and homothetic (CRETH) production functions imply that factor shares are 
functions of the return to those factors. Based on the functional distribution 
and a factor ownership matrix, the class distribution can be determined. The 
factor ownership matrix explains how each class derives its income from 
various factors of production. The distribution of income within each class 
explains how equal income is distributed among members of the class.
All other elasticities also affect income distribution in the model, 
particularly various elasticities of consumer demand. Based on the 
disaggregation of consumers, the elasticities of demand allows consumers to 
have different responses to a policy shock through changes in income and 
prices. It can also illustrate how a policy shock affects the welfare of 
consumers differently. This thesis estimates these important parameters.
CGE modellers can measure the distribution impact of a policy shock 
in several ways. Generally, the focuses are on the functional distribution of 
income and economic welfare by means of the compensating variation and 
the equivalent variation. Some modellers use the changes in utility indices of 
consumer groups to show the distribution impact of policy being simulated 
(Sierra-Puche, 1984). Some modellers transform the class distribution of 
income into the size distribution of income by using a parametric probability 
density function such as lognormal and uniform distributions (Adelman and 
Robinson, 1978, de Melo and Robinson, 1980, and Narayana et al., 1987). 
Following the estimation of a parametric probability density function, the 
impact of policy shocks on poverty and inequality can be measured.
The use of a parametric density function has some theoretical 
weaknesses, especially the fitness of the function to data. Another alternative, 
a non-parametric density function, has many strengths which will be 
discussed in Chapter Six. Most importantly, it can be used in a general 
equilibrium model and, particularly in a linearised model. With an 
appropriate understanding of the measurement of poverty and income 
inequality, it can also be used to explore and detail the impact of shock on 
income distribution in a general equlibrium framework at disaggregated 
levels. This thesis is the first that attempts to do so.
81.3. Organisation of the Thesis
The thesis attempts to answer the question: What would be the income 
distribution impact of a move from the 1987 system of industrial protection 
towards free trade? The answer to this question will contribute to empirical 
knowledge in the area of protection and income distribution in Thailand.
The thesis is organized into four main parts - background (Chapters 
Two and Three), modelling and parameter estimation (Chapters Four, Five, 
and Six), simulation results (Chapter Seven), and main conclusion (Chapter 
Eight).
Chapter Two presents the historical background of industrialisation in 
Thailand, including economic growth and structural change, and industrial 
protection policies during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The chapter also 
reviews the literature on the estimates of nominal and effective rates of 
protection during the period. Based on the allocation of resources, changes in 
productivity, and industrial location, the chapter points to a relationship 
between protection, and the functional and regional distribution of income.
Chapter Three examines changes in poverty incidence and income 
inequality during the three decades. Although the chapter presents the long 
run trend of poverty incidence and income inequality, the main focus is the 
mechanism behind these changes.
To answer the central question of the thesis, Chapter Four constructs a 
general equilibrium model for the Thai economy within a consistent 
framework of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). The model, in the tradition 
of the linearized Johansen class of multi-sectoral models, is designed to 
reflect the main features of the Thai economy. The chapter constructs a 1988 
SAM, which provides some important information on the circular flow of the 
Thai economy, production technologies, and income distribution such as a 
factor ownership matrix. The chapter also discusses the rationale behind the 
parameterization of the CGE model.
Chapter Five deals with the theory and an estimation of consumer 
demand. Unlike estimates from past studies, these estimates do not presume
9that all households face the same price. In the model, the estimates explain 
how ten types of households adjust their demand for ten consumer goods, 
when prices and their total consumption expenditure are changed by a policy 
shock.
The methodological contribution of the thesis is in Chapter Six. The 
chapter offers methodologies to estimate the size distribution of income, and 
to incorporate income distribution into a general equilibrium framework. 
The methodologies enhance the analysis of poverty incidence and income 
inequality both at the national and disaggregated level. The chapter also 
estimates parameters used in the modelling of income distribution in the 
general equilibrium model.
Chapter Seven presents and analyses the impact of a move towards 
free trade. The move towards free trade leads to a government budget deficit. 
The analysis in the chapter is designed to capture the differences in the 
impact of the way the government chooses to finance the deficit. The impact 
on income distribution, the primary concern of this thesis, is examined at 
regional and community levels. The chapter also analyses the sensitivity of 
the results when the CGE model departs from some critical assumptions.
Chapter Eight summarizes the thesis. The chapter also presents the 
main findings, and makes suggestions for policy implementation and future 
research.
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- CHAPTER 2 -
INDUSTRIALISATION AND PROTECTION 
DURING THE 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
2.1. Introduction
Economic growth in Thailand has been marked by the growing dominance of 
the manufacturing sectors. Expansion of manufacturing in the 1960s was 
dominated by protected industries, which were geared toward the domestic 
markets for consumer goods. At the beginning of the 1970s, when domestic 
markets were saturated, the country moved toward an export oriented 
strategy. Manufactured exports have gradually taken the place of the export 
of primary products. The economic importance of agriculture has been 
declining, not only in GDP share, but also in its share of Thailand's 
international trade.
Industrial protection has played an important role in the performance 
of Thai manufacturing, raising the domestic price of manufactured products 
above world prices and attracting resources from agriculture and other 
sectors. Thus, the growth of agriculture, the biggest pool of employment, has 
been restrained. With accelerating and sustained economic growth, demand 
for food commodities shows a declining trend in relation to demand for non­
food commodities.
Estimates of the level of industrial protection during the past three 
decades are reported by many studies. These studies focus on the estimation 
of measures, such as the nominal rate of protection (NRP), and the effective
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rate of protection (ERP), by which the resource allocation impact of 
protection could be analysed. However, none of the studies discuss directly 
the impact of industrial protection on income distribution, which is very 
relevant in terms of policy decisions. Although it is well understood that the 
present situation of poverty incidence and income inequality cannot be solely 
explained by industrial protection policies, the pattern of industrial 
protection may have some dimensions which could shed some light on the 
impact of protection policies on income distribution in Thailand.
This chapter seeks to examine these dimensions. The first section 
provides a broad picture of the Thai economy. The second presents 
industrialisation and the systems of industrial protection during the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. The third section examines productivity differences, and 
the regional dimension of industrialisation and industrial protection, which 
might have some distributional impact. The final section summarizes the 
chapter.
2.2. Economic Growth and Structural Change
The Thai economy has grown rapidly during the past three decades. The 
annual average growth rate was approximately 8% in the 1960s, and declined 
to 7% in the 1970s. During the first half of the 1980s, the growth rate fell to 
5.7%, but rose dramatically to nearly 10% in the second half. With an annual 
population growth rate of about 2%, the growth of per capita GNP reached 
8% in that period.
During the past three decades of modern industrialisation, the 
manufacturing sector has increasingly become a dominating sector. The 
structure of the Thai economy has been changing from an agricultural to a 
manufacturing base. The growth rate of the manufacturing labour force was 
extremely high, although the absolute level was not enough to shift the 
structure of employment. The majority of labour was still in agriculture. The 
share in GDP of the agricultural sector sharply declined from nearly 40% in 
1960 to 16.7% in 1985, and 12.4% in 1990. The shares of two major crops, 
paddy and rubber, in GDP declined from 10.5% and 3.4% to 3.4% and 0.9%,
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much faster than other agricultural products. These reductions accompanied 
a more than 100% expansion of the manufacturing sector from 12.5% to 
26.1% of GDP. The share of other sectors gradually increased from about 48% 
to more than 60% in the same period.
TABLE 2.1: Structure of Gross Domestic Product and the Composition of
Manufacturing at Current Prices, by Industry: 1960-1990
Industry 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990
GDP (billion Baht) 54 147 659 1014 2051
Total Share (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Agriculture 39.8 25.9 23.2 16.7 12.4
Manufacture 12.5 15.9 21.3 22.1 26.1
Others 47.7 58.2 55.5 61.2 61.5
Manufacturing (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Food & beverages 42.8 31.9 20.1 24.8 18.7
Tobacco & snuff 14.5 7.4 5.3 5.1 3.0
Wearing apparel & leather 8.4 11.3 12.1 16.1 18.9
Textiles 4.7 7.5 12.2 9.9 10.5
Petroleum refining .04 5.7 8.2 6.8 4.5
Non-metallic minerals 4.0 4.3 3.7 4.7 4.6
Electrical machinery 0.6 1.9 2.4 2.6 3.4
Transport equipment 4.9 5.2 8.2 4.9 9.4
Others 20.1 24.8 27.8 25.1 27.0
Note: There are two series of the National Income of Thailand - old and new series.
Differences between the two series are definition, method of calculation, and the base years. 
Data at constant prices in the old series are based on 1962 prices while those in the new series 
are based on 1972 prices. In this table, 1960 data are from the old series. The ten year average 
annual growth rate in 1970 is also based on the old series. The remaings are based on the 
new series.
Source: National Income of Thailand (various issues), NESDB.
A shift away from simple processed agricultural based industries, 
which were discriminated against, to highly processed and protected 
industries, has also characterised the rapid expansion of the manufacturing 
sector. Typical is the total share of food, beverages, tobacco, and snuff in total
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manufacturing products, which decreased from more than 57% in 1960, to 
about 22% in 1990, while the total share of wearing apparel, leather, and 
textiles increased from 13% to 29%. The share of other protected industries, 
such as electrical machinery and transport equipment also increased.
TABLE 2.2: Import, by Economic Classification: 1960-90
Types 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990
Import value (billion Baht) 10 27 189 251 842
Average Growth (%) - 11.0 22.4 6.4 28.9
Total Share (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Consumer goods 35.0 19.4 10.2 9.5 9.0
Non-durable 26.6 12.9 6.5 5.1 3.8
Durable 8.4 6.5 3.7 4.4 5.2
Intermediate and raw materials 18.1 24.9 24.0 30.2 33.3
for Consumer goods 10.7 15.3 14.9 20.4 22.2
for Capital goods 7.4 9.6 9.1 9.8 11.1
Capital goods 24.6 34.7 24.4 30.0 38.8
Other imports 22.3 21.0 41.4 30.3 18.9
Note: 1990 data are predicted figures.
Source: Quarterly Bulletin (various issues), Bank of Thailand.
The high growth rates were dominated by world demand for Thai 
products, particularly manufacturing products (UNIDO, 1985). The 
importance of the primary sector in trade is gradually declining. Export of 
manufactured goods, machinery, and miscellaneous manufactured goods, 
which had very low share of about 1% of total exports in 1960, emerged as 
major exports with a total share of more than 60% by 1990. The total share of 
food and crude materials decreased from more than 95% in 1960 to only 
about 34% in 1990. The share of consumer goods in total imports sharply 
declined from nearly 35% in 1960, to 9% in 1990, while the share of 
intermediate products and raw materials for the production of consumer 
goods, and the share of capital goods, increased from 10.7% and 24.6% in 
1960 to 22.2% and 38.8% in 1990, respectively.
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TABLE 2.3: Export, by End Use: 1960-90
Types 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990
Export Value (billion Baht) 9 15 133 193 587
Average Growth (%) - 5.9 25.8 8.2 25.1
Total Share (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Food 45.4 47.1 44.6 44.8 28.2
Beverages and tobacco 0.3 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.4
Crude materials 50.0 28.9 14.3 10.1 5.5
Mineral fuel and Lubrication 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.3 0.8
Animal & vegetable oils & fat 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0
Chemicals 0.1 0.2 0.7 1.3 1.4
Manufactured goods 1.1 14.8 22.1 18.5 18.4
Machinery 0.0 0.1 5.7 8.8 22.3
Miscellaneous manufactured 0.2 0.4 6.4 12.4 21.5
Miscellaneous 0.7 3.2 2.8 0.7 1.2
Re-export 2.2 3.5 2.1 0.9 0.3
Note: 1990 data are predicted figures.
Source: Quarterly Bulletin (various issues), Bank of Thailand.
2.3. Industrialisation and Protection
The crucial role of Thailand's industrial protection policies in the expansion 
of manufacture has been accepted in the literature. Conventional explanation 
of the impact of protection is that protection raises domestic prices above 
world prices, bids up the return to mobile factors of production, and 
redirects resources from the unprotected sectors to the highly protected 
sector. Consequently, protected sectors, e.g., manufacturing or highly 
processed industries, expand at the expense of non-protected sectors, e.g., 
agriculture or simple processed industries. Other sectors, such as the non- 
traded sectors, are also affected but to a lesser degree.
During the past three decades of industrialisation, expansion of 
manufacturing has been characterised by the reallocation of resources in 
favour of manufacturing and at the expense of agriculture. Between 1970 and 
1989, capital stocks in the agricultural sectors expanded at decreasing rates,
15
while those of manufacturing and other sectors are quite steady (Table 2.4). 
Direk (1990), by showing that the lowest return to capital is in agriculture 
and the highest return to capital is in manufacturing, points to the same 
conclusion. The manufacturing labour force also expanded at a much faster 
rate than agricultural labour (Table 2.5). The average annual growth of the 
agricultural labour force, at around 2-3%, can be considered a result of 
natural growth rather than resource allocation. The average annual growth 
rate of the labour force in manufacturing and other sectors was more than 
double that of agricultural labour. However, the share of agricultural labour 
in the total labour force, which was about 82% in 1960, was still more than 
65% in 1990.
TABLE 2.4: Net Capital Stock at 1972 Prices, by Sector: 1970,1980,1985, and 
1989. (Million Baht)
Industry 1970 1980 1985 1989
Total 299854 696556 990197 1287499
(Share in %) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Agriculture 25694 47484 61698 68807
(8.57) (6.82) (6.23) (5.34)
Manufacturing 70674 189948 266189 356721
(23.57) (27.27) (26.88) (27.71)
Others 203486 459125 662310 861971
(67.86) (65.91) (66.89) (66.95)
Average Growth Rate (%) - 8.79 7.29 6.78
Agriculture - 6.33 5.38 2.76
Manufacturing - 10.39 6.98 7.59
Others 8.48 7.60 6.81
Source: Unpublished Data, National Economic and Social Development Board.
2.3.1. Development of Industrial Protection
Modern industrialisation in Thailand did not start until around the late 1950s 
and the beginning of the 1960s. Since 1958, the policy of the government has 
been to promote and guarantee private investment, and to provide
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infrastructure. In its first development plan (1961-66), the Thai government 
encouraged industrial expansion in the private sector, mainly by granting 
privilege and protection to import competing industries. After years of 
import substitution, Thailand moved to limit import substitution with a 
gradual change to export promotion. The aims of the second plan (1967-71), 
emphasized both agricultural and manufacturing export. The plan also 
focussed on the quality of export products. However, export was not actively 
promoted during this plan.
TABLE 2.5: Labour Force, by Industry: 1960,1970,1980, and 1990
Industry 1960 1970 1980 1990
Labour Force (Thousand) 13772.1 16652.3 23281.4 31724.3
(Share in %) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Agriculture 11334.4 13201.9 16820.6 20635.1
(82.30) (79.28) (72.25) (65.04)
Manufacturing 471.2 682.6 1308.5 2248.7
(3.42) (4.10) (5.62) (7.09)
Others 1966.5 2767.7 5152.4 8840.5
(14.28) (16.62) (22.13) (27.87)
Average Growth Rate (%) - 1.92 3.41 3.14
Agriculture - 1.54 2.45 2.06
Manufacturing - 3.78 6.72 5.56
Others ” 3.48 6.41 5.55
Note: In 1960, 1970, and 1980, labour force is defined as employed population aged 11
years and over. In 1990, it is defined as employed population aged 13 years and over, which 
is on average about 4-5% lower than the former definition.
Source: Report of the Population and Housing Census (various issues), National Statistical 
Office.
Since the third development plan (1972-1976), the government has 
attempted to promote export industries. The aims of the third plan were to 
promote the export of agricultural and manufacturing products, using locally 
available raw materials. The two following plans still focused on the export 
sector, but with more emphasis on marketing, industrial decentralization, 
and promoting heavy industry. Different rates of special privilege were
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granted to promoted firms located in provincial areas. The aim was to 
decentralize industrial location away from Bangkok and surrounding 
provinces. More export industries were added to the list of promoted 
industries. Protection for export industries increased. However, import 
competing industries were still heavily protected.
The motives behind industrial protection policies in Thailand are 
difficult to verify. Generally, there were four objectives for protection.
The initial objective was to raise revenue (Ingram, 1971). Trade tax is 
an important source of government revenue. Between 1972 and 1981, trade 
tax contributed about 25%-31% of government revenue. Of this, nearly 90% 
was revenue from import tax (Tables 3.7-3.8, Narongchai and Juanjai, 1986). 
In the 1980s, it was still an important source of government revenue.
Protection has been regarded as an appropriate means to stimulate 
industrialisation. The so-called infant industry argument asserts that 
temporary protection may be required for a young industry to be able to 
compete with foreign industry and to develop its latent strength. However, 
many industries that were receiving high protection in the 1960s and the 
1970s were still heavily protected in the 1980s. Nishimizu and Page, Jr. 
(1986), studied the comparative advantage of 22 industries, and concluded 
that infant industry arguments for protection in Thailand, based on 
improvement in total factor productivity and international competitiveness, 
are only supported empirically in a minority of protected industries.
The infant industry argument is often accompanied by the 
employment argument. In the case of Thailand, the relationship between 
labour intensity and the level of protection rejects this argument. Table 2.6 
presents OLS estimates of the relationship between the level of protection 
and labour intensity in the protected sectors. The level of protection is based 
on the 1987 system of protection estimated by Paitoon et al. (1989). Due to the 
availability of data, the sectoral labour intensity, the ratio between the wage 
bill (wL) and the total non-wage bill (rK), is based on the 1985 input-output 
table. Empirical evidence shows that there is a negative relationship between 
labour intensity and the level of protection (NRP or ERP). Although the 
regression coefficients are quite low, the result of NRP is significant while
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that of ERP is insignificant. Most importantly, they indicate that protection 
tends to be lower for labour intensive industries.
TABLE 2.6: Regression Analysis of a Relationship between the Level of
Protection and Labour Intensity: 1987.
Variables Coefficient t-statistics
Dependent Variable: ERP
Constant 0.3848 3.6790
wL/rK -0.0575 -1.6104
Dependent Variable: NRP
Constant 0.2163 7.6220
wL/rK -0.0255 -2.6303
Note: Based on models: ERP = constant+ß(wL/rK), and NRP = constant+ß(wL/rK).
Sources: 1) Input-output Table of Thailand 1985, NESDB.
2) Tables 3.13-3.14, Paitoon et al. (1989).
In an attempt to relieve difficulties of trade deficit, a high tariff was 
placed on consumer goods considered to be luxurious. Since foreign 
exchange savings, due to the substitution of imported goods by locally 
produced goods, was more than foreign exchange dissavings, induced by the 
import of raw materials and intermediates used in domestic production; 
Chaiyut (1978) points to the success of import substitution policies between 
1958 and 1971. Nevertheless, except in 1961, the import substitution regime 
in the 1960s was still characterised by a balance of trade deficit. The same 
pattern continued in the 1970s and 1980s. This can be explained by a study by 
Jansen (1990) who points out that that the majority of manufactured exports 
are the products of industries depending on imported inputs.
2.3.2. Protective Measures
The system of industrial protection in Thailand is attributed to many 
measures. These are tariffs, import and export licenses, business taxes, and 
excise taxes. Detailed documentation is well presented in the literature (e.g.,
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Narongchai, 1973 and Pairote, 1975). In brief, tariffs are the most extensively 
used measures.
Ingram (1971) points out that in 1926, when tariffs steadily increased, 
their protective effects began to be felt. However, most rates were modest. 
From the 1950s onward, protection for domestic industry became a more 
important objective of tariff policy.
Following the 1960 major revision of Customs Duty Acts and the 
Announcements of Revolutionary Parties, issued between 1935-1959, non­
durable consumer goods and transportation equipment were subjected to 
high rates, while duties on imports of intermediate products and durable 
consumer goods were generally lower. During the first half of the 1960s, 
except for metal scrap, raw silk, and silk yam, most exports were subjected to 
low rates of duty of around 10% or less.
Since the 1960s, there have been many important customs duty 
revisions which reflect changes in government policy. Customs duty 
revisions in the early 1970s supported domestic industry by controlling 
export of domestic inputs and providing cheaper imported inputs. The 1970 
revisions aimed at solving a severe current account deficit, by the means of 
limiting imports of consumer goods and supporting import competing 
industries. Export industries, especially those using agricultural raw 
materials, were also promoted through the exemption of import duties on 
raw materials. A 1982 revision was more export oriented, when import 
duties on a wide range of consumer goods were reduced substantially.
The protective effects of other measures are also notable. Import 
licensing is used as a measure to safeguard domestic industries producing 
consumer goods and intermediate products. Export licensing is used in 
compliance with international trade agreements on some products such as 
sugar, coffee, and textiles. The protective effects of business tax began in 
1973, when different rates of business tax were placed on imported and 
locally produced goods. On average, most imported goods are subjected to 
higher tax rates than those which are domestically produced. In 1986, 
business tax rates on locally produced food, or food products, and various 
inputs for agriculture were reduced in order to support agriculture and
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labour intensive industries. The municipal tax rate, 10% of business tax, 
enlarges the protective effect of the business tax. Some products are subjected 
to excise tax. The excise tax protects domestic producers of alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco since higher rates were placed on imported products. 
Cement, petroleum products, lighters, and matches were subjected to the tax 
only if they were domestically produced. However, the tax on cement 
exports was refundable.
2.3.3. Degree of Protection
Various measures can be used to measure the degree of protection during 
these periods. The two most often used measures are the nominal rate of 
protection (NRP) and the effective rate of protection (ERP). NRP measures 
the extent to which domestic prices have been raised above or pressed under 
world prices by tariffs and other trade restrictions. ERP takes into account the 
effect of input price distortions as well as output price distortions. It 
measures the effect of protection policies on value added in the industry of 
interest.
Many studies report the estimates of NRP and ERP in the past three 
decades. In most cases, the discussion has focused on aspects of the trade 
regime, and the resource allocational impact of protection. Despite 
differences in methodology and definition, these studies have similar 
findings.
The discussion in this chapter is based on the estimates of NRP and 
ERP reported by Pairote (1975) and Paitoon et al. (1989)1*. Pairote reports 
estimates of the degree of protection for 58 industries in 1964, and for 82 
industries in 1971 and 1974 (Tables 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9). Paitoon reports 
estimates of the degree of protection for 111 input-output traded sectors,
1) These differences are classifications of industries by trade 
orientation and aggregation methods. For their classifications, 
readers are referred to the original papers. For aggregation method, 
in Pairote's estimates, NRP of a group of industries is the average 
value of individual industries' NRP weighted by their domestic sales 
valued at world prices. In Paitoon et al.'s study, NRP of a group of 
industry is the average value of industries' NRP weighted by their 
export or import shares.
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agriculture and non-agriculture, in 1981, 1984, and 1987 (Tables 2.10, 2.11, 
and 2.12). Because of two fundamental differences between the past studies, 
this thesis does not attempt to compare their results across time.
TABLE 2.7: Realized Nominal Rate of Protection for Manufacturing
Industries: 1964,1971, and 1974.
Realized Nominal Rate of Protection (%)
liiuubiry
1964 1971 1974
A. Classified by trade orientation
Exports -21.3 -12.7 -31.5
Import Competing 33.1 27.2 13.0
Non-import Competing 64.0 12.1 -13.7
B. Classified by end uses
Processed Food 10.7 2.8 -33.1
Beverages & Tobacco 170.0 23.1 12.0
Construction Materials 0.0 0.0 -22.5
Intermediate Products I 4.3 8.1 4.4
Intermediate Products II 21.2 30.5 2.4
Consumer Nondurable 31.0 23.8 4.8
Consumer Durable 27.2a 23.2 25.6
Machinery 40.8a 10.2 2.5
Transport Equipment 41.9 58.8 62.9
Note: a. Simple average from Pairote's results.
Source: Tables 4.1-4.12, Pairote (1975).
Based on the two studies, protection structures in the past three 
decades are characterised by five common features.
First, in comparison with neighbouring ASEAN countries, Thailand's 
protection policy is more inward oriented (Tables 2.13 and 2.14). Protection 
for export industries has been relatively lower than for import competing 
industries. In the 1980s, Thailand took steps toward protectionism, while 
other ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia, tended to liberalize trade.
Second, protection structures, especially the 1980 structure, 
increasingly protected the manufacturing sector and discriminated against
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agriculture. For the manufacturing sector, ERPs were higher than NRPs and 
vice versa for the agricultural sector. Thus, both output and input price 
distortions contributed to the contraction of agriculture.
Third, although an export oriented strategy has been attempted since 
the beginning of the 1970s, based on the nominal and effective system of 
protection, this has been far from successful. Protection for import competing 
industries is still relatively higher than for export industries. During the past 
decade, protection for export industries increased slightly, while those for 
other industries nearly doubled. Export promotion was put on top of existing 
policies to protect import competing industries. The focus on heavy 
protection for import competing consumer goods led to a change in the 
structure of imports, which were predominantly consumer goods (in 1960), 
to intermediate products and raw materials for the production of consumer 
goods, and capital goods (in 1990).
TABLE 2.8: Effective Rate of Protection for Manufacturing Industries: 1964, 
1971, and 1974.
Industry
Effective Rate of Protection (%)
1964 1971 1974
A. Classified by Trade Orientation
Exports -41.90 -24.29 -72.46
Import Competing 39.42 39.68 5.06
Non-import Competing 25.81 15.68 -32.27
B. Classified by End Uses
Processed Food -23.32 -0.31 -71.92
Beverages & Tobacco 49.99 107.41 4.42
Construction Materials -5.66 -16.13 -41.11
Intermediate Products I 4.05 5.30 -0.86
Intermediate Products II 36.06 44.95 -12.76
Consumer Nondurable 16.31 20.53 -6.92
Consumer Durable 18.86a 17.19 28.12
Machinery 7.09a 7.58 -10.46
Transport Equipment 121.69 146.45 181.10
Note: a. Simple average from potential effective rates of protection.
Source: Tables 4.1-4.12, Pairote (1975).
TABLE 2.9: Realized Nominal Rate of Protection for Some Industries: 1964, 
1971, and 1974.
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Realized Nominal Rate of Protection (%)
1 1 LIS LI y
1964 1971 1974
Some Non-protected Industries
1.Sugar 26.3 0.0 -50.0
2.Rice Millings -32.4 -12.7 -32.8
3.Cement 0.0 0.0 -24.9
4.Lumber -10.0 -18.7 -18.7
5.Fruit Canning 188.5 -2.0 -2.0
6.Tapioca Flour -5.0 -2.0 -2.0
7.Vegetable Fibres -1.5 -2.0 -2.0
8.Frozen Seafoods -1.5 -2.0 -1.5
9.Gunny Bags 14.9 0.0 0.0
lO.Cigarettes 71.0 12.6 0.0
Some Highly Protected Industries
l.Car Assembly 55.0 91.2 102.5
2.Perfumery & Cosmetics 80.0 95.0a 95.0
3.Whisky 334.0 79.1 72.5
4.Beer 238.0 35.7 52.6
5.Pottery, China & Earthenware - 47.8 47.8
6.Glass Products 27.3 40.7a 45.4
7.Motor-vehicle Parts 30.3a 38.4 43.7
8.Truck Assembly 33.8 40.0 40.0
9.Motor-cycles and Parts 27.2 37.8 37.8
lO.Pigment, Paint & Varnishes 24.4 27.1 37.0
11.Wheat Flour 88.0 74.6 30.0
12.Radio, Television, and
Household Appliances 26.3a 41.7 27.1
13.Chemical Materials - 31.4 14.6
14.Electric Bulbs 48.5 0.0 14.3
15.Textile Fabrics 34.4 44.2 0.0
16.Rubber Tires & Tubes 24.7 26.9 0.0
17.Pharmaceutical Products 13.8 36.8 0.0
18.0ther Textile Articles 27.2 37.0 0.0
19.Vegetable Oils 28.5 0.0 0.0
20.Mashlight Batteries 50.2 73.2 0.0
21.Leather Goods 29.0 44.2 0.0
Note: a. Potential rate.
Source: Tables 4.1-4.12, Pairote (1975).
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TABLE 2.10: Nominal Rate of Protection: 1981,1984, and 1987.
Nominal Rate of Protection (%)a
Industry ------------------------------------------------
1981 1984 1987
Every Industry
Export (E) 6.6 7.0 8.4
Import Competing (IC) 14.2 16.1 19.5
Mixed E-IC 10.6 12.1 16.1
Manufacturing Sector
Export (E) 7.1 7.6 9.3
Import Competing (IC) 14.9 17.0 20.7
Mixed E-IC 12.2 13.7 17.7
Agricultural Sector
Export (E) 4.2 4.2 4.2
Import Competing (IC) 6.2 6.5 6.8
Mixed E-IC 2.7 4.3 7.9
Note: a. Simple average from individual industries.
Source: Table 3.13, Paitoon et al. (1989).
TABLE 2.11: Effective Rate of Protection: 1981,1984, and 1987.
Effective Rate of Protection (%)a
Industry ------------------------------------------------
1981 1984 1987
Every Industry
Export (E) 9.4 9.5 11.0
Import Competing (IC) 18.0 19.7 26.3
Mixed E-IC 18.3 32.5 36.2
Manufacturing Sector
Export (E) 10.6 10.7 12.8
Import Competing (IC) 19.1 20.9 28.2
Mixed E-IC 21.7 38.3 42.0
Agricultural Sector
Export (E) 3.7 3.8 2.9
Import Competing (IC) 6.0 6.5 5.6
Mixed E-IC 1.4 3.5 7.2
Note: a. Simple average from individual industries.
Source: Table 3.14, Paitoon et al. (1989).
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TABLE 2.12: Nominal Rate of Protection for Some Industries: 1981, 1984, 
and 1987.
Nominal Rate of Protection (%)
Industry
1981 1984 1987
Some Non-protected Industries
Rice Milling -8.9 -8.9 -6.4
Chemical Fertilizer Minerals -2.0 -2.0 -2.8
Some Highly Protected Industries
Motor Vehicles 16.4 27.7 69.7
Made-up Textile Goods 42.6 61.4 64.3
Cosmetics 43.2 62.1 59.6
Bakery Products 48.2 48.2 51.4
Structural Clay Products 44.4 44.4 49.3
Soap and Cleaning Preparations 36.9 31.1 41.1
Office and Household Machinery 25.4 31.6 37.7
Household Electrical Appliances 28.6 38.6 36.1
Electrical accumulator
and Batteries 32.9 26.0 35.3
Insulator Wire and Cable 29.0 29.0 33.6
Motor Cycles and Bicycles 25.6 26.2 33.5
Saw Mills 20.3 30.0 33.3
Other Chemical Products 24.2 33.1 32.3
Basic Industrial Chemicals 24.1 32.2 30.4
Paper Products 21.7 23.5 29.9
Monosodium Glutamate 38.4 38.4 29.8
Engines and Turbines 33.9 32.8 29.6
Drugs and Medicines 23.0 28.0 28.9
Breweries 0.9 0.6 10.4
Source: Table 3.13, Paitoon et al. (1989).
Despite being discriminated against, the industries with the highest 
growth potential were export oriented industries, and industries producing 
their intermediate inputs (Paitoon et al., 1989).
Fourth, in terms of protection policies, Thailand is a patchwork of 
conflicting regional interests. On one hand, industrial protection increases 
the market price of manufacturing products, produced mostly in the Central 
region and Bangkok, forcing buyers in other regions to pay higher prices for
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manufactures. On the other hand, discrimination or negative protection 
decreases the market price of agricultural goods and subsidizes non- 
agricultural consumers at the expense of farmers.
Fifth, the protection structure tends to be biased in favour of highly 
processed products. Also, protection for agricultural primary products was 
less than the protection for their processed products.
TABLE 2.13: International Comparison of Nominal Rate of Protection
Industry
Nominal Rate of Protection (%)
Total Export Import Others
Thailand
1964’) - -21.3 33.1 64.0
1971» - -12.7 27.2 12.1
1974» - -31.5 13.0 -13.7
1981» - 6.6 14.2 10.6
1984» - 7.0 16.1 12.1
1987» - 8.4 19.5 16.1
Malaysia3^
1973 28.2 9.1 4.3 35.4
1978 18.8 12.5 12.7 21.7
Singapore4!
1979 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.9
Indonesia5!
1975 70.0 56.0 74.0 20.0
1980 33.0 27.0 37.0 9.0
Note: Except for Thailand, export industries (import industries) were those that exported
or imported at least 20% of apparent consumption.
Sources: 1) Tables 4.1-4.12, Pairote (1975).
2) Table 3.13, Paitoon et al. (1989).
3) Table 4.3, Hock, L.K. (1985).
4) Table 5.6, Nga, T.B. (1985).
5) Table 1.7, Pangestu, A. and Boediono (1985).
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TABLE 2.14: International Comparison of Effective Rate of Protection
Industry
Effective Rate of Protection (%)
Total Export Import Others
Thailand
19641» - -21.3 39.4 25.8
19711» - -24.3 39.7 15.7
19741» - -72.5 5.1 -32.3
19812> - 9.4 18.0 18.3
19842> - 9.5 19.7 32.5
19872> - 11.0 26.3 36.2
Malaysia3^
1973 37.4 6.4 8.8 48.6
1978 34.2 -17.0 23.0 55.9
Singapore4)
1979 2.3 3.4 4.5 0.04
Indonesia5)
1975 67.0 61.0 80.0 17.0
1980 33.0 29.0 39.0 7.0
The Philippines6)
1974 36.0 4.0 37.0 148.0
Note: Except for Thailand, export industries (import industries) were those that exported
or imported at least 20% of apparent consumption. For Thailand, the rates are realized 
effective rates calculated by Corden's method.
Sources: 1) Tables 4.1-4.12, Pairote (1975).
2) Table 3.14, Paitoon et al. (1989).
3) Table 4.3, Hock, L.K. (1985).
4) Table 5.6, Nga, T.B. (1985).
5) Table 1.7, Pangestu, A. and Boediono (1985).
6) Table 2.4, Tan, N. A. (1985).
The regional bias of the protection for various manufacturing 
industries benefitted Bangkok and the Central region. Before 1972, the 
nominal and effective systems of protection discriminated against processed 
food and construction materials. In the 1980s, effective protection for 
industries using agricultural raw materials was mostly negative. Nominal 
and effective protection for food industries was relatively lower than
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protection for other manufacturing industries. In I960, more than 50% of the 
products of the processed food industry originated from outside Bangkok 
and the Central region. Conversely, except for rubber products, the highly 
protected industries - intermediate products, consumer goods, machinery, 
and transport equipment - were mostly located in Bangkok and the Central 
region. In the 1970s and the 1980s, these highly protected manufacturing 
industries still agglomerated in Bangkok and surrounding provinces.
2.4. Productivity and Regional Income
As mentioned in Chapter One, there have been a limited number of empirical 
studies on the income distribution impact of protection in Thailand. Some 
previous studies have discussed the distribution impact of industrialisation 
(Suganya and Somchai, 1988; Teerana, 1990; and Pranee, 1992). Basically, 
their explanation is based on the fact that the share of manufacture in Gross 
Domestic Product increased faster than the share of manufacturing labour in 
the total labour force. Consequently, output per worker increased more 
slowly in agriculture than in manufacture, and the agricultural labour force 
was left with lower incomes. At the same time, income distribution 
deteriorated.
This section further explores these explanations. The following 
discussion on the distribution impact of protection takes two dimensions. 
The first is differences in productivities across sectors. The second is 
widening regional income disparities.
2.4.1. Productivity Differences
Productivity indicates how efficiently inputs are used to produce outputs. It 
can be measured in terms of labour productivity, capital productivity, and 
total factor productivity. The level of productivity reflects the prosperity of 
owners of factors of production.
Empirical evidence indicates that there have been different changes in 
labour and capital productivities in agriculture and manufacture. The overall
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productivity of manufacturing labour significantly increased in relation to 
the productivity of labour employed by agriculture and other sectors (Table 
2.15). Direk (1990) also found that the annual return to agricultural capital 
decreased faster than those of other sectors, from 14% in 1972 to 4% in 1987, 
while those of manufacture and services decreased from 34% to 24%, and 
from 31% to 15%, respectively. The decline in agricultural terms of trade 
(Figure 2.1), of which industrial protection is a part, enlarged the adverse 
impact of changes in factor productivities on income distribution.
Theoretically, an increase in labour productivity can be the result of 
the installation of more physical capital, and an increase in human capital - 
more educated and skilled labour. Empirical evidence supports the theory. 
The previous section shows that capital increased in the manufacturing 
sector faster than in agriculture. It is also well-known that, during the past 
thirty years, the share of educated labour in the non-agricultural labour force 
increased, while those of the agricultural labour force remained almost 
unchanged. By the end of the 1980s, agriculture still absorbed more than 65% 
of the total labour force. This was unskilled labour those who did not finish 
lower secondary education. However, only about 12% of total value added 
(GDP) originated from agriculture.
The role of protection in these productivity changes is not clear. In 
terms of resource allocation, protection for manufacture attracts resources to 
manufacture. It also obstructs technological development and a move 
towards higher productivity in agriculture. In terms of efficiency, protected 
industries are not encouraged to be more efficient and, thus, remain 
inefficient.
Protection for manufacturing is equivalent to a tax on agriculture or 
negative protection, which constrains the increase in farmers' productivity 
and income. Martin and Warr (1990) show that, between 1960-85, technology 
contributed an estimated 49% of the reduction in agriculture's share in GDP. 
Bertrand (1969 quoted in Lam, 1977) states that rice premium is an 
obstruction to the modernisation of Thai agriculture, by chaining rice 
farming to low productivity technology. On the one hand, negative 
protection, e.g., rice premium, was an important means of raising
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government revenue, securing domestic consumption, and supporting 
industrialisation by suppressing food prices. On the other hand, it was a 
major obstacle to technological development in agriculture, and adversely 
affected farmers' productivity and income.
TABLE 2.15: Output-Labour Ratio, by Industry: 1960,1970,1980, and 1990
(Thousand Baht)
Industry 1960 1970 1980 1990
Per Capita Output3 4.0712 7.1974 - _
(Average Growth in %) (-) (5.86) (-)
Agriculture 1.8880 2.7409 - -
(-) (3.80) (-) (-)
Manufacturing 15.5346 29.4401 - -
- (6.60) (-) (-)
Others 13.9078 22.9687 - -
- (5.14) (-) (-)
Per Capita Output*5 - 9.3497 12.8631 19.9093
(Average Growth in %) (-) (-) (3.24) (4.47)
Agriculture - 3.1862 3.6723 4.3960
(-) (-) (1.43) (1.82)
Manufacturing - 36.4658 49.6645 69.3925
(-) (-) (3.14) (3.40)
Others - 32.0613 33.5218 43.5333
(-) (-) (0.45) (2.65)
Notes: a. Output at constant 1962 prices, based on old series, divided by sectoral employed 
population.
b. Output at constant 1972 prices, based on new series, divided by sectoral employed 
population.
Sources: 1) Report of the Population and Housing Census (various issues), NSO.
2) National Income of Thailand (various issues), NESDB.
Despite empirical evidence suggests that protection not only 
constrained technological development and an increase in productivity in 
un-protected agriculture, it also adversely affected the growth of factor 
productivity and long run factor income in the highly protected 
manufacturing sector. Nishimizu and Page, Jr. (1986) found that the increase
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in total factor productivity in highly protected import competing industries 
was less than in those of less protected import competing and export 
industries. Their results indicate that protection induces inefficient allocation 
of resources, and does not encourage a move towards more efficient 
production technology.
FIGURE 2.1: Agricultural Terms of Trade (Pa/Pna).
Source: National Income of Thailand, NESDB.
2.4.2. Regional Income Disparities
During the past three decades, regional income disparities have been 
widening. Table 2.16 shows that the change in the Gross Regional Products 
(GRP) of Bangkok and vicinities is sharply in contrast with those of other 
regions. In 1960, per capita gross regional product, at current prices, of the 
Central region (including Bangkok) was 3,358 Baht, about three times the 
1,164 Baht of the poorest Northeastern region. In 1973, the gap widened. The 
per capita GRP was 2,410 Baht for the Northeastern region, while it was 
10,217 Baht for the Central region. Nearly half of the gross regional product
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of the Central region went to Bangkok, for which the population share was 
only about 32%. In 1988, the per capita GRP of Bangkok (104,475 Baht) was 
much higher than the per capita GRP of other regions, such as the Central 
region (27,844 Baht), and the Northeastern region (9,493 Baht).
TABLE 2.16: Gross Regional Product at Current Prices, by Industry and 
Region: 1960,1973, and 1988. (Million Baht)
Year and Industry Total Central Bangkok Northeast
1960 55190 27873 10472
Agriculture 20652 6965 - 5506
Manufacturing 5883 3988 - 682
Others 28655 16920 - 4284
Per Capita GRP (B) 2090 3358 - 1164
1973 216453 67862 57135 33724
Agriculture 73233 26026 1134 17720
Manufacturing 35614 14926 14294 2391
Others 107606 26910 41707 13613
Per Capita GRP (B) 5455 8101 14813 2410
1988 1506977 254833 754652 179498
Agriculture 250384 57325 23600 57280
Manufacturing 373326 46490 291010 15931
Others 883267 151018 440042 106287
Per Capita GRP (B) 27632 27844 87032 9493
Note: In 1988, the gross regional product (GRP) of Samut Prakarn, Pathum Thani, Samut
Sakhon, Nonthaburi, and Nakhon Pathom are excluded from the Central region, and 
included in Bangkok. The per capita GRP of these provinces are 92,555; 60,931; 48,224; 22,533; 
and 21,091 Baht, respectively. The per capita GRP of Bangkok was 104,475 Baht. The total 
GRPs of Northern and Southern regions is the total GRP less the GRPs of Central region, 
Bangkok, and Northeastern region.
Source: National Income of Thailand: Gross Regional Products (various issues), NESDB.
The causes of regional income disparities are difficult to document. 
They can be attributed to many factors, i.e. spatial immobility of labour, 
transportation costs, the endowment of natural resources, and productivity 
differences. Because of the differences in industrial mix across regions, 
productivity differences can also be regarded as a determinant of regional
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income disparities. A region with a large proportion of high productivity 
sectors, e.g., manufacturing and highly processed industries, has high 
average productivity and income. Conversely, a region with a large 
proportion of low productivity sectors, e.g., agriculture and simple processed 
industries, has low income.
Productivity does not only differ between agriculture and 
manufacturing. It is well-known that manufacturing in Bangkok and 
surrounding provinces is more capital intensive than manufacturing in other 
parts of Thailand (Somsak, 1991). Thus, productivity and income of 
manufacturing labour in Bangkok and surrounding provinces is also higher. 
This fact, together with the conglomeration of manufacturing in Bangkok and 
surrounding provinces, points to regional income disparities.
The differences in industrial mix between Bangkok and surrounding 
provinces, and other regions, have been increasing. During the past three 
decades, the rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector, mostly allocated in 
Bangkok and the Central region, has characterised the high growth rates of 
the regions (Table 2.16). Between 1960 and 1973, the share for Bangkok and 
the Central region of total manufacturing products increased from 67.8% to 
81.5%. By 1988, the share of gross manufacturing product for Bangkok and 
vicinities2^ , and the Central region, accounted for more than 90% of the 
country's gross manufacturing products. Of the 90%, 78% was shared by 
Bangkok and vicinities3).
2.5. Conclusion
This chapter has examined protection policies in Thailand during the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. During these three decades, export industries were 
discouraged by the protection system, while import competing and non­
import competing industries were promoted. Thus, the policy led to rapid
2) The 1980 statistics provided by the national income account are 
for Bangkok and vicinities and are not for Bangkok.
3) Bangkok and vicinities include Bangkok and five surrounding 
provinces: Samut Prakarn, Pathum Thani, Samut Sakhon, Nonthaburi, 
and Nakhon Pathom.
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expansion of the highly protected industries. Some of these industries, which 
had latent comparative advantage, emerged as Thailand's principal exports 
in the later periods.
During the 1980s, there was protection for, instead of discrimination 
against, export industries. However, the degree of protection was relatively 
low, when compared with protection for mixed (export and import 
competing) and import competing industries. The structure of protection also 
supported industries using agricultural raw materials, but, discriminated 
against important agricultural sectors, such as paddy and upland crops.
The resource allocation impact of industrial protection is clear. 
Manufacturing and other sectors expand, while agriculture contracts. Since 
the manufacturing sector continues to conglomerate in Bangkok, and 
surrounding provinces in the Central region, protection structures have been 
in favour of well-off Bangkok and surrounding provinces.
So far, the levels of protection have been discussed in terms of NRP 
and ERP. The limitations of these measures are well known. They do not take 
into account the roles of other factors in the economy. A better alternative, a 
general equilibrium approach, will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
However, there is a tendency for industrial protection policies to be related to 
the widening regional income disparities through industrial location and 
productivity differences. The following chapter examines and details the 
change in income distribution during the past three decades of 
industrialisation.
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- CHAPTER 3 -
INCOME DISTRIBUTION DURING THE 
PAST THREE DECADES
3.1. Introduction
Chapter Two shows that industrial protection systems in Thailand have been 
biased, not only in favour of the manufacturing sector at the expense of 
agriculture, but also in favour of Bangkok and surrounding provinces at the 
expense of other regions. Productivity differences among sectors are affected 
by the protection systems. At the same time, sectoral factor income 
disparities, as well as regional income disparities, have deteriorated. The 
spatial imbalance in industrial development - between regions, urban and 
mal areas - has been seen as one of the major causes.
During the same period, there has been a dramatic change in 
functional distribution of income, as reflected by the distribution of national 
income. The distribution of national income was characterised by two main 
features (Table 3.1). First, a 50% increase in the share of wages and salaries, 
from 22.73% in 1970 to 33.49% in 1989, and this, in turn, was dominated by 
an increase in wages and salaries in the manufacturing sector. Second, a 
decrease from 65.03% to 47.23% in the share of income from farm and other 
unincorporated profit, which is mainly explained by the reduction in farm 
income. At the same time, the proportion of labour employed in the 
agricultural sector also decreased, to a lesser degree, from 74.3% in 1973 to 
58.4% in 1988.
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This chapter examines the size distribution of income in Thailand, 
which explains how equal income is divided among households or 
individuals. Based on a minimum level of income (poverty line), the size 
distribution of income can also explain the proportion of poor in the total 
population, and the extent of poverty in Thailand. The focus on income 
distribution arises from the increasing concern that rapid economic growth 
and structural change in the Thai economy did not sufficiently reduce 
poverty and income inequality. Large proportions of the Thai population 
were not benefiting from the growth.
TABLE 3.1: Percentage Distribution of National Income at Current Prices:
1970,1980, and 1989.
Distribution 1970 1980 1989
Compensation of Employees 24.32 30.73 35.16
Wage and Salaries 22.73 28.06 33.49
Others 1.59 2.67 1.67
Income from Farm and
Unincorporated Profit 65.04 59.47 47.23
Farm Income 23.46 17.81 -
Others 41.58 41.66 -
Property Income 8.13 8.68 10.66
Savings 2.57 1.54 6.56
Direct Taxes 0.82 1.75 2.92
General Government Income
from Property and Enterprise 0.86 0.78 1.52
Others -0.05 -2.95 -4.05
Source: National Income of Thailand (various issues), NESDB.
Following this introductory section, section 3.2 discusses poverty 
incidence during the past three decades, and the common features of these 
changes. The discussion is based on results from previous studies which
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allow comparability across time. Similarly, changes in income inequality are 
discussed in section 3.3. Section 3.4 summarizes this chapter.
3.2. Poverty Incidence
3.2.1. Changes in Poverty
This thesis focuses on the absolute concept of poverty lines, calculated from a 
nutritional approach1 >. The earliest two studies on poverty in Thailand, 
based on this concept, are Oey (1979) and Suphawadi (1980). In both studies, 
the Household Socio-economic (Expenditure) Surveys of the National 
Statistical Office were the source of data. Because of the way her poverty 
lines were constructed, and the additional number of years included in her 
study, Oey's results are highlighted in this section (Table 3.2). However, her 
results are supported by Suphawadi's results.
Two absolute poverty lines, urban and rural poverty lines, were used 
to calculate poverty incidence on an individual basis. Head count ratio, or 
HCR, was used as a measurement of poverty. The HCR shows the number of 
poor as a proportion of the total population. The poor are individuals whose 
income was below the poverty lines.
Oey found significant reductions in poverty in Thailand between 
1962/63 and 1975/76, and between 1968/69 and 1975/76. Between 1962/63 
and 1975/75, the reductions were at both national and regional levels. In 
1962/63, 57% of urban Thais were in poverty, while in 1975/76, the figure 
was only 33%. This was a reduction of approximately 42% in thirteen years. 
However, Oey adds that, although the number of poor over the total 
population decreased, the number of poor was almost the same when 
population growth was taken into account.
1) See Medhi, Pranee, and Suphat (1991) for new poverty lines.
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TABLE 3.2: Poverty Incidence, by Region and Community: 1962/63,1968/69, 
and 1975/76.
Region and Community 1962/63 1975/76 1968/69 1975/76
Whole Kingdom 57 33 39 31
Rural 61 37 43 35
Urban 38 22 16 14
Northeast 74 46 65 44
Rural 77 48 67 45
Urban 44 38 24 20
North 65 35 36 33
Rural 66 36 37 34
Urban 56 31 19 18
South 44 33 38 31
Rural 46 35 40 33
Urban 35 29 24 22
Central 40 16 16 14
Rural 40 15 16 15
Urban 40 20 14 12
Bangkok 28 12 11 12
Notes: a) In 1975/76, urban poverty line is 2,961 Baht/person/year and rural poverty line is 
1,981 Baht/person/year. Consumer price indices were used to adjust price differences 
between the periods concerned and the base year 1975/76.
b) Urban areas mean municipal areas and sanitary districts for the first two columns 
and municipal areas for the second two columns. Rural areas mean villages for the first two 
columns and sanitary districts and villages for the second two columns.
c) Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut Prakarn are in the central region, except in 
1975/76 in which they are included in Bangkok.
Source: Table 3.1, Oey (1980).
Two studies on poverty incidence in the late 1970s and 1980s are 
Suganya and Somchai (1988); and Medhi, Pranee, and Suphat (1991). Both 
employed Oey's poverty lines. The former calculated HCR in 1975/76, 
1980/81, and 1985/86, while the latter calculated HCR in 1988. Their results 
are summarized in Table 3.3.
TABLE 3.3: Poverty Incidence, by Region and Community: 1975/76,1980/81, 
1985/86, and 1988.
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Region and Community 1975/76» 1980/81» 1985/86» 1988»
Whole Kingdom 30.02 23.04 29.51 21.18
Villages 36.16 27.34 35.75 26.30
Sanitary districts 14.76 13.47 18.55 12.17
Municipal areas 12.53 7.51 5.90 6.11
Northeast 44.92 35.93 48.17 34.56
Village 48.54 37.92 50.49 36.77
Sanitary districts 24.66 20.81 33.25 18.60
Municipal areas 20.90 17.99 18.67 18.62
North 33.20 21.50 25.54 19.95
Village 36.37 23.32 27.74 21.61
Sanitary districts 19.23 16.16 20.19 15.14
Municipal areas 17.84 8.03 6.87 10.53
South 30.71 20.37 27.17 19.43
Village 33.84 22.16 31.17 21.72
Sanitary districts 18.14 6.75 8.07 10.20
Municipal areas 21.69 15.20 8.61 10.81
Central 12.99 13.55 15.63 12.91
Village 14.26 14.16 17.37 15.04
Sanitary districts 7.99 11.62 11.36 5.90
Municipal areas 11.45 11.74 8.87 7.73
Bangkok 7.75 3.89 3.54 3.48
Fringes 11.97 9.15 8.83 6.58
Suburbs 6.00 2.58 2.51 -
City core 6.90 3.70 3.11 2.66
Notes: Rural poverty lines are 1981, 3454, 3823, and 4076 Baht/person/year in 1975/76, 
1980/81, 1985/86, and 1988, respectively. Urban poverty lines of the years are 2961, 5151, 
5834, and 6203 Baht/person/year. Rural poverty lines are applied to sanitary districts. 
Source: 1). Table 2.15, Suganya and Somchai (1988).
2). Table 2.10, Medhi, Pranee, and Suphat (1991).
In 1980/81, poverty incidence in most parts of the country was less 
than in 1975/76, apart from the Central region where poverty incidence
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increased - especially in sanitary districts and municipal areas2). However, 
this improving trend was reversed. Poverty incidence increased in 1985/86 
in all villages and most sanitary districts, although there was less poverty in 
Bangkok and most municipal areas.
Suganya and Somchai asserted that poverty incidence in 1980/81 was 
better than in 1985/86, because of the effect of the extra high crop prices that 
year. This can be seen from the 4.6% decrease of the average income per 
capita of all agricultural workers between 1980/81 and 1985/86. This period 
of worsening poverty incidence was the first time since 1960 in which the 
average welfare of Thai people significantly deteriorated (Suganya and 
Somchai, 1988).
In 1988, Medhi, Pranee, and Suphat (1991) show that there was a lower 
percentage of rural Thais in poverty in almost every region. Except for 
Bangkok and the Central region, poverty incidence in municipal areas either 
increased or insignificantly decreased. They assert that this situation was 
similar to that in 1980/81. The major determinant of the reduction in 1988 
poverty was crop prices which were at a peak among adjacent years. Despite 
that fact, this change had very significant consequences on changes in 
inequality which will be discussed in section 3.3.
3.2.2. Features of Changes
Although, the changes in poverty incidence over the past three decades have 
been impressive, it is remarkable that, for almost three decades, Bangkok has 
been insulated from poverty deterioration, while the Northeast has been the 
poorest region in the country. These can be explained by some common 
features of poverty incidence as follows.
Poverty incidence is a rural phenomenon. Table 3.4 shows that the 
rank of HCR by region is exactly the same as the rank of the size of the rural 
sector in each region, and the Northeast has the biggest rural sector. 
Moreover, Bergemeier and Hoffman (1988) studied the striking characteristic
2) For Thailand, sanitary districts mean small towns and municipal 
areas mean cities. Villages can be referred to as rural areas.
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of poverty concentration in Thailand in 1981, pointing out that poverty 
incidence had a rural bias. Only 16.2% of urban residents were living in 
poverty, compared to 26.5% of rural residents. However, if Bangkok is 
excluded, the proportion of urban residents living in poverty rises to 25.7%, 
nearly the same as for rural areas. The wealth of Bangkok, and bordering 
subregions on the fertile central plains, is increasingly and sharply contrasted 
with average living standards, especially in the Northeastern and upper 
Northern regions.
TABLE 3.4: Rank of Poverty and Size of Rural Sector, by Region: 1988.
Area & Region Rank of Poverty11 % of Village Household21
Northeast 1 86.42
North 2 79.03
South 3 76.92
Central 4 73.10
Bangkok 5 10.92
Sources: 1) Rank from Table 3.3.
2) Household Socio-economic Survey 1988, National Statistical Office.
Changes in poverty incidence were closely related to the performance 
of agriculture, especially crops. In 1985/86, agriculture recorded a very poor 
performance of nearly zero growth (Table 3.5). This was mainly caused by 
the negative growth rates of most major crops. Moreover, in 1985/86, the 
agricultural terms of trade was the lowest in three decades (Figure 2.1). Thus, 
between 1980/81 and 1985/86, poverty increased in village areas in every 
region. Poverty also increased in sanitary districts in almost every region 
except the Central region.
The Northeast not only has the largest rural sector, but also the 
poorest land quality in the country. About 38% of agricultural land in this 
region is salty, and only 8.64% is irrigated (Narong, 1989). Ammar et al. 
(1989) point out that the poor quality of land adversely affects the
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productivity of the agricultural labour force in the Northeast. Table 3.6 shows 
that the Northeast has the lowest paddy yield per rai, about 40% lower than 
the average of other regions. This affects the income of at least 80% of 
farmers in this region. Narong (1989) also concludes that land quality is one 
of the causes of poverty in this region.
TABLE 3.5: Economic Growth, by Industry: 1962/63, 1968/69, 1972/73, 
1975/76,1980/81,1985/86, and 1988.
Area & Region 1962/63 1968/69 1972/73 1975/76
Economic Growth (%) 8.4 9.6 9.9 9.4
Agriculture 8.9 10.1 9.4 6.0
Crops 9.2 9.5 14.3 6.6
Manufacture 9.0 10.7 15.7 15.3
Other sectors 7.8 8.9 8.1 8.7
TABLE 3.5: Continued.
Area & Region 1980/81 1985/86 1988
Economic Growth (%) 6.3 4.9 13.2
Agriculture 5.4 0.3 10.2
Crops 5.8 -4.5 14.4
Manufacture 6.3 10.8 16.8
Other sectors 6.7 4.4 12.7
Source: National Income of Thailand (various issues), NESDB.
Poverty is a problem of human capital. Suganya and Somchai (1988) 
found that in almost all poor families the household head did not have more 
than an elementary education. Thus, high poverty is expected among un­
skilled labour. Medhi, Pranee, and Suphat (1991) also found a very high 
poverty incidence among households whose heads were agriculturalists, 
labourers, or economically inactive people.
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TABLE 3.6: Land Ownership, Percentage of Paddy Farmers, and Average 
Yield per Rai of Paddy, by Region.
Land Owned Paddy Land Paddy Land 
Region by Farmer1) per Farmer1) Yield2) Share2)
(%) (Rai) (Kgs./Rai) (%>
Northeast 95.62 18.08 235 37.63
North 85.33 13.93 402 30.18
Central 78.98 22.45 386 26.82
South 96.08 8.39 288 5.37
Notes: Major Bangkok is included in Central region. Paddy yields are average yields of 
major rice, 1986/87-1989/90. Land shares are regional share of paddy land.
Sources: 1) Report of the 1988 Intercensus Survey of Agriculture, National Statistical Office.
2) Agricultural Statistic of Thailand, Crop Year 1989/90, Office of Agricultural 
Economics.
3.3. Income Inequality
This section discusses income inequality in Thailand. Based on the 
Household Socio-economic Surveys of the National Statistical Offices, most 
previous studies used Gini index to measure income inequality in Thailand. 
Gini index provides a summary picture of the extent to which the actual 
distribution of income deviates from the perfectly equal distribution of 
income. The index ranges between zero (perfect equality) and one (perfect 
inequality).
3.3.1. Changes in Inequality
Medhi (1977) studied income inequality in three periods, 1963, 1969, and 
19723). He used both money income, and adjusted income, which already 
included income in kind and net corporate retained earnings. Based on 
household income, his finding was severe income inequality during all
3) These are equivalent to Household Socio-economic (Expenditure) 
Survey in 1962/63, 1968/69, and 1971/73.
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periods. One half of the households in Thailand shared less than 20% of the 
country's income. The income share of the bottom 20% of households was 
less than 3.5%, while the share of the top 20% of households was nearly two- 
thirds. Medhi concluded that income equality had clearly deteriorated 
during all periods. As shown in Table 3.7, the top 20% income class was the 
only one to gain a greater income share during the periods, and, of these, the 
top 1% benefited the most. Where poor households were larger than rich 
households, in terms of per capita basis, the worsening inequality was even 
more severe.
TABLE 3.7: Income Inequality: 1963,1969, and 1972.
Income Distribution 1963 1969 1972
Income share (%) of
20% First (lowest) 2.9 3.4 2.4
20% Second 6.2 6.1 5.1
20% Third 10.5 10.4 9.7
20% Fourth 20.9 19.2 18.4
20% Fifth (top) 59.5 60.9 64.4
1% Highest 9.6 10.5 15.0
Gini Indices^ .5627 .5550 .6051
Gini Indices^) .4559 .4822 .5348
Notes: 1) Based on money income.
2) Based on adjusted income. 
Source: Tables 9 and 10, Medhi (1977).
Suganya and Somchai (1988) studied income inequality in 1975/76, 
1980/81, and 1985/86. The difference between this and Medhi's study is that 
Suganya and Somchai used per capita basis rather than household basis. In 
terms of Gini indices, income inequality was 0.426 in 1975/76; 0.453 in 
1980/81; and 0.500 in 1985/86. The degree of worsening inequality was more 
severe between 1980/81 and 1985/86 than between 1975/76 and 1980/81. 
This could also be the effect of agricultural terms of trade and the 
performance of agriculture. As shown in Table 3.8, the income share of the
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top 20% of the population in 1975/76 was 49.26%. In 1980/81 and 1985/86, 
this share increased to 51.47% and 55.63%, respectively. On the opposite side, 
the share of the bottom 20%, which was already low, reduced from 6.05% to 
5.41% and then to 4.55%. Again, the top 20% income class was the only one 
that gained, and the top 10% class gained the most. One could ask whether 
all of the gain went to the top 1 % class.
Using the same methodology as that of Suganya and Somchai, 
Teerana (1990) calculated income inequality in 1988. He found that the share 
of the lowest quintile insignificantly decreased, while the share of the middle 
three classes increased at the expense of the share of the top income class. 
Moreover, the major loser was the top 10% income class. In terms of Gini 
index, inequality decreased from 0.500 in 1985/86 to 0.478 in 1988. His results 
are reported in Table 3.8.
TABLE 3.8: Income Inequality: 1975/76,1980/81,1985/86, and 1988.
Income Distribution 1975/76» 1980/81» 1985/86» 1988»
Income share (%) of
20% First (lowest) 6.05 5.41 4.55 4.52
20% Second 9.73 9.10 7.87 7.98
20% Third 14.00 13.38 12.09 12.20
20% Fourth 20.96 20.64 19.86 20.30
20% Fifth (top) 49.26 51.47 55.63 54.98
10% Highest 33.40 35.44 39.15 37.98
Gini Index 0.426 0.453 0.500 0.478
Sources: 1) Table 2.2, Suganya and Somchai (1988). 
2) Table 6, Teerana (1990).
It is notable that this is the first time in thirty years that Thailand 
recorded a decrease in inequality. This improvement in inequality coincided 
with the increase in poverty between 1985/86 and 1988, which was an urban 
phenomenon. In that period, municipal areas in almost every region 
experienced an increase in poverty, except for Bangkok and municipal areas 
of the Central region, which were insulated from these increases. Thus, this
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decrease in inequality was at the expense of the non-poor people in urban 
areas who became poor.
Inequality reduction was predicted by Chalongphob et al. (1988) who 
show that there is some relationship between the level of economic 
development and the level of income inequality in Thailand. This can be 
explained by many factors, one of which is GDP per capita and the large 
scale of labour in the agricultural sector. Their study also shows that 
Thailand was on the rising trend of the curve. The major key to reversing the 
trend of inequality is a rising real wage and a shift of labour from the 
traditional sector to the modern sector. Their conclusion confirms Kuznets' 
inverted U-curve.
3.3.2. Features of Changes
In comparison to poverty incidence, the change in income inequality is not 
impressive. Except in 1988, the distribution of income has become more 
unequal. Suganya and Somchai (1988) study the important features of the 
changes in equality. Their analysis can be summarized as follows.
Firstly, by using multiple regression, Suganya and Somchai conclude 
that employment related factors are the major cause of income inequality. 
Other important factors are locational (community and region), and personal 
(human capital) variables.
Secondly, based on their inequality disaggregation, the dynamism of 
these causes of inequality can be analysed. Basically, the overall (national) 
inequality can be separated into two parts, inequality within each subgroup 
and inequality among different subgroups. Subgroup can be defined as 
region, community, sector of production, or any socio-economic variable. 
Over time, changes in the contribution of the two types of inequality show 
their relative importance in explaining the overall inequality. The 
contribution also indicates how balanced development is across sub-groups.
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TABLE 3.9: Factor Disaggragation of Income Inequality: 1975/76, 1980/81, 
and 1985/86. (%)
Factor Disaggregation 1975/76 1980/81 1985/86
Inequality (Shorrocks index)
Region
Between group 
Within group
Location
Between group 
Within group
Community type
Between group 
Within group
Sex of head
Between group 
Within group
Age of head
Between group 
Within group
Education of head
Between group 
Within group
Socio-economic class 
Between group 
Within group
Occupation of head
Between group 
Within group
Sector of production 
Between group 
Within group
0.304 0.347 0.427
16.18 19.87 24.90
83.82 80.13 75.10
15.01 18.86 24.98
84.99 81.14 75.02
20.20 21.77 28.15
79.80 78.23 71.85
0.28 0.52 0.76
99.72 99.48 99.25
0.47 0.62 0.27
99.53 99.38 99.73
- 15.14 20.00
- 84.86 80.00
25.57 26.97 33.82
74.43 73.03 66.18
22.62 24.02 31.31
77.38 75.97 68.68
21.19 23.94 28.53
78.81 76.06 71.47
Source: Table 2.7, Suganya and Somchai (1988).
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Suganya and Somchai (1988) disaggregated inequality, as measured 
by the Shorrock index4 >, by various subgroups (Table 3.9). Their results 
show that development has been increasingly unbalanced. Inequality 
amongst people living in different locations, different communities, and 
different regions has been relatively increasing compared to inequality 
amongst people living in the same location, the same community, and the 
same region, respectively. Inequality amongst people in different socio­
economic classes, different occupations, different sectors of production, and 
with different education levels has also relatively increased.
The regional, community, and sectoral inequality disaggregations 
confirm the widening income disparities across region, urban and rural 
settings, and sectors of production, as already discussed in the previous 
chapter. As an example, in 1975/76, 83.82% of the national inequality was 
caused by inequality amongst people living in the same region, while the 
remaining 16.18% was caused by inequality amongst people living in 
different regions. In 1980/81 and 1985/86, the contribution of inequality 
amongst people living in the same region decreased to 80.13% and 75.10%, 
respectively. At the same time, inequality amongst people living in different 
regions increased to 19.87% and 24.90%.
3.4. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the changing pattern of income distribution in 
Thailand during the past three decades of industrialisation. The movement of 
poverty incidence and income inequality has been in opposite directions. 
Generally, poverty incidence improved along the trend of increasing national 
income, while income inequality deteriorated. However, in the late 1980s, 
there were both ambiguous changes in poverty and a turning trend in 
income inequality.
4) A major advantage of Shorrock index over Gini index is its 
aggregate decomposability which allows a decomposition of 
inequality.
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Major contributing factors of poverty have been in the agricultural 
sector and rural areas, quality of land, and the output and prices of crops. 
Employment related factors, locational factors, and human capital variables 
have been seen as major contributing factors of income inequality in 
Thailand. The disaggregation of inequality analysis points to the widening 
income gaps amongst various sub-groups, especially amongst regions, 
amongst communities, and amongst sectors of production. Therefore, it 
indicates that economic development has been unbalanced during the 
period.
Through these factors, especially relative prices, industrial protection 
could have some distribution impacts which are not clearly addressed in the 
literature. This study opts for a general equilibrium approach to clarify the 
relationship between industrial protection and income distribution in 
Thailand. The general equilibrium approach is needed because it allows the 
interrelationships amongst various economic agents. It is capable of 
identifying and tracing the effects of policy shocks, both within and amongst 
all the major sectors of the economy. The framework of the general 
equilibrium model and its benchmark database are discussed in subsequent 
chapters.
50
- CHAPTER 4 -
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
MODEL AND ITS PARAMETER SETTINGS
4.1. Introduction
Economic theory argues convincingly in support of free trade. However, 
Chapter Two has shown that the changes in the nominal and effective 
protection systems in Thailand were against the regime. The impact of these 
changes is important, both in terms of economic growth and welfare. An 
appropriate understanding of their impact is important for policy decisions. 
However, the issues are too complicated to be measured by any single 
measure such as NRP and ERP, since protection distorts not only the 
producing sectors, but also other parts of the economy.
The explanations of the impact of industrial protection policies on 
income distribution, briefly discussed in the Chapter Two, are limited. They 
cannot fully explain the impact of the protection policies on income 
distribution and the underlying mechanism behind the impact. As shown in 
Chapter One, some studies have attempted to explain, however, lack of 
emphasis on the impact of industrial protection on the problems of poverty 
incidence and income inequality in Thailand.
The aim of this chapter is to develop a model which can properly 
explain the income distribution impact of the change from the 1987 system of 
industrial protection towards free trade. The remainder of this chapter is 
organized as follows. Firstly, it describes the structure of a computable
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general equilibrium (CGE) model which is designed to analyse the effect of 
industrial protection policies on poverty incidence and income inequality in 
Thailand. This model is in the tradition of the Johansen-class of CGE models. 
Secondly, it describes the structure of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), 
which provides the economic environment of Thailand in the base year 1988. 
This SAM contains share parameters which are important for this class of 
CGE model. Thirdly, it reviews elasticity estimations from past studies and 
other relevant parameters. The rationale behind the choice of elasticities and 
other parameters is explained.
4.2. Computable General Equilibrium Model
This section describes the structure of a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model, which is in the tradition of the Johansen class of multi-sectoral 
models. The model is in the form of a system of linearized equations of 
percentage changes in variables. Basically, its structure is derived from the 
ORANI model of the Australian economy (Dixon et al., 1982).
This model is developed in order to investigate relationships between 
industrial protection policies and income distribution in Thailand. The Thai 
economy, represented in this model, is confined to product and factor 
markets in which perfect competition is assumed. There is no money market 
in the model. Production technology is constant return to scale. All economic 
agents are price takers and all markets are cleared. A relatively small, open 
economy is assumed, i.e. exogenous world prices prevail.
There are two mobile primary factors of production: skilled and 
unskilled labour. Education is arbitrarily used to divide labour into two 
types. Skilled labour are those who finished lower secondary education, and 
unskilled labour those who did not. Both types of labour are internationally 
immobile. Unskilled labour is perfectly mobile across industries, while 
skilled labour is perfectly mobile across non-agricultural industries, i.e. 
skilled labour is not a factor of production in agricultural industries. Skilled 
labour and un-skilled labour are assumed to be imperfect substitutes.
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It will be more reasonable to have two types of capital, fixed capital 
and variable capital. Because of time and resource constraints, this model 
assumes that there is only one type of capital which is specific to industry. 
Land is also an industry specific factor. Since Northeastern land is less fertile 
than land in other regions of the country, land is divided into two types: 
ESAN (Northeastern) land, and non-ESAN land. This issue was discussed in 
Chapter Three. In brief, the average paddy yield per unit area of ESAN land 
is about 40% lower than that in other regions. Yields of other crops do not 
significantly differ by region. It is also well-known that Northeastern rural 
Thais are amongst the poorest in the country. In order to highlight these 
facts, agriculture is divided into two industries, i.e. ESAN and non-ESAN 
agricultural industries. Thus, by definition, land is specific to each 
agricultural industry.
There are eight industries and ten producer goods. The first two 
industries, ESAN and non-ESAN, are multi-output agricultural industries 
producing four goods - paddy, MCS (maize, cassava, and sugar-cane), 
rubber, and other agricultural products. The remaining six industries are 
single-output industries namely agro-industry, other export oriented 
industries, petroleum industry, other import-competing industries, EWTC 
(electricity, water supply, transport, and communication), and services. The 
ten producer goods, which are locally produced, can also be supplied from 
overseas. There are ten consumer goods: rice and cereal, meat and fish, fruit 
and vegetables, other foods, non-alcoholic beverages, clothing and footwear, 
house and housing expenditure, transport and communication, medical 
expenses, education and entertainment, and other non-food expenditure. 
Each consumer good is produced from producer goods.
The aggregation of 180 input-output sectors into the ten producer 
goods is based on many criteria, such as their linkages to other sectors, shares 
in GDP, and labour employment. They are also classified by trade 
orientation. Sectors for which import-production and export-production 
ratios are both less than 2% are non-traded sectors. The remaining traded 
sectors are classified as export oriented sectors if exports are greater than 
twice that of imports, otherwise they are classified as import competing
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sectors. The classification of the ten producer goods is given in Appendix 4.1.
There are three types of institutions: households, government, and 
transfer pool. Households are divided into ten expenditure classes - five 
quintiles for urban households and five quintiles for rural households. The 
classification of households into these ten quintiles is detailed in Chapter 
Five. These households derive income from their ownership of primary 
factors. Assistance payment from other households and government transfer 
also form part of their income. The transfer pool is included as a medium of 
income transfer among households, and from government to households.
The detailed structure of the model consists of ten main parts: 
producer goods industries, margin sector, investment and savings, 
production of consumer goods, household behaviour, export demand, 
government behaviour, zero pure profit, market clearing conditions, and 
miscellaneous equations. In the following paragraphs, the levels of variables 
are written in upper case (e.g. X) while their percentage changes are written 
in lower case (e.g. x = lOOdX/X)1^ . Appendix 4.2 presents the overall system 
of linearized equations in this model. Appendices 4.3 and 4.4 define variables 
and parameters. Appendix 4.5 presents a typical list of exogenous variables. 
The diagrammatic explanation of the model is in Appendix 4.6.
4.2.1. Producer Goods Industries
Producers in the eight industries are profit maximisers. They choose a 
combination of inputs that minimizes their costs and a combination of 
output(s) that maximizes their revenues. Effective primary factor and 
effective intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions, i.e. Leontief 
technology, to produce a level of activity. Effective primary factor is the 
aggregate of effective labour, capital, and land which are imperfect 
substitutes. Effective labour is the aggregate of the two types of labour. 
Effective intermediate inputs are the aggregates of domestically produced
1) Suppose that initially X = K.Y, where K > 0. By writing x = y it 
implies k = 0. Thus, as an example, if X is demand and Y is supply 
then x = y simply means that the ratio between demand and supply is 
constant at K. Market could be cleared but is not necessary.
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and imported producer goods. Substitution between the two types of labour, 
amongst primary factors, and between producer goods from the two sources 
are imperfect, and are governed by the Armington elasticities of substitution.
There is no substitution amongst these effective inputs. A change in 
output price induces a change in output supply and, thus, changes in 
demands for effective inputs. A relative change in returns to unskilled and 
skilled labour induces substitution between the two types of labour (4.1). 
Similarly, a relative change in returns to primary factors induces substitution 
among primary factors (4.2), and a relative change in the prices of producer 
goods from different sources induces substitution between intermediate 
inputs from the sources (4.3).
(4.1) /|qj /lj ^lqj-[rlqj"^AOiqj.rjqj].
(4.2) /„j = Zj -O0nj'[''nr|A°nj rnj]'
(4.3) =
s
Where and are the percentage changes in demand for and the 
return to labour, type q. f n j and rnj are the percentage changes in demand for 
and the prices of primary factors employed by industry j (effective labour: n 
= 1, capital: n = 2, and land: n = 3). and p 1^  are the percentage changes 
in industry j's demand for, and the price of intermediate input i from source s 
(domestic, s = 1; and import, s = 2). Zj is the percentage change in activity 
level. a°nj, and a lij are the elasticities of substitution between two
types of labour, among primary factors, and between intermediate inputs 
from different sources. A°lcij, A°nj, and H^gj are the share of labour type q in 
total labour cost, the share of each primary factor in total cost of primary 
factors, and the share of intermediate input i from source s in the total cost of 
intermediate input i. For multi-output industries, A°nj in Equation 4.2 is 
replaced by the modified cost share (A*nj) which is defined as follows.
(4.4) A*nj = A°nj. a°nj/ZA°nj. a°nj for all j.
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Generally, is equal to defined by Equation 4.53. However, 
for export industries, i.e. j = 5 and 6, is defined by Equation 4.54.
For single-output industries, the supplies of producer goods are equal 
to industries' activity levels (4.5). For multi-output industries, the 
combination of goods produced is determined by their relative prices (4.6). 
The total supply of each producer good is equal to the weighted sum of 
industry supplies of that good (4.7).
(4.5) x°p =Zj.
(4.6) x°{^  = zj+T°iij-[p0irS H*iij-P0ii]-
(4.7) for all i.
Where x0^  is the CRETH elasticity of transformation, is the 
percentage change in the output i produced by industry j. and are 
the percentage changes in the output and the basic price of good i. D0^  is the 
share of producer good i produced by industry j in the total production of 
producer good i. If H0^  is the value share of producer good i in the total 
output value of industry j, the modified value shares, H^jj, is defined as 
follows.
(4.8) H*nj = H0ilj.x0ilj/XH0nj.x0.lj for all j.
If is equal to x°|j, i.e. constant elasticity of transformation (CET), 
then H*j|j is equal to H0^ .
4.2.2. Margin Sector
The role of the margin sector - transport, wholesale, and retail trade - is to 
facilitate the flow of producer goods from industries to users. This model 
assumes that margin is required in a constant proportion to facilitate the flow 
of a unit of output. Thus, the share of margin in each purchase price differs
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across users. The following Equations 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 relate 
demands for margin to intermediate demand and final demands. Equation 
4.14 implies that the total demand for margin is equal to the sum of various 
demand for margin. Equation 4.61 in Sub-section 4.2.9 will show that the 
total supply of margin is made available by outputs of industries 7 and 8.
(4.9) m'jsj * i^sj
(4.10) m2is = *2is
(4.11) m3isk «j
C<S~
HII
(4.12) m4ü = x4il
(4.13) m \ =
(4.14) m = J X p ^ is j .m 1^  + S S A 2is. 2.is
+ Z IZ A 3isk.m3isk+ZA4n .m4n +XXA5is.m5is.
i s k l i s
Where x1^ ,  x2is, x3isk, x4^, and x5is are changes in industry j demand 
for intermediate input i from source s, capital creation demand for input i 
from source s, consumer goods production's demand for input i from source 
s, export demand for producer good i, and government demand for producer 
good i from source s. mlisy m2is, m3isk, m4ilr and m5is, are changes in their 
demand for margin, respectively. A1^  A2is, A3isk, A4is, and A5is are their 
shares in total margin, respectively.
4.2.3. Investment and Savings
This thesis assumes that, in the short run, policy shocks have no impact on 
savings-investment decisions of economic agents, as expressed in real terms, 
deflated by capital price index (pik). All economic agents view these shocks 
as permanent phenomena. Thus, there is no real change in all components of 
national savings and the inflow of foreign direct investment. If household 
savings are set constant in real terms, the remaining changes in disposable 
income are converted to present consumption. Equation 4.28 in Sub-section 
4.2.5. expresses these relationships in nominal terms. There is also no real
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change in aggregate investment, through Equation 4.20. In a medium to long 
run model, the role of savings and investment can be incorporated. However, 
this is not in the scope of this thesis.
Equation 4.15 implies that total savings are equal to the sum of 
household savings (s \) , government savings (sS), industry savings (slj), and 
foreign direct investment (sw). Equations 4.16 and 4.17 define nominal and 
real savings. By setting uL and at zero, industry savings and the inflow of 
foreign direct investment are constant in real terms and are un-affected by 
policy shocks. By assuming that vw is zero, the nominal inflow of foreign 
direct investment is not zero, i.e. sw and net export is not zero and depends 
on changes in prices. However, to avoid this weakness by assuming that sw is 
zero, it follows that real investment is not constant and, therefore, the impact 
of policy shock on the future benefit of a change in real investment is a waste 
in this model. Between these two choices, this thesis elects to assume that uw 
is zero, i.e. no real change in the inflow of foreign direct investment.
(4.16) sJj = pjj+pik.
(4.17) sw = v™+pik.
Where H \,  H sg, Hsj, and Hsw are the base year shares of household 
savings, government savings, industry savings, and the inflow of foreign 
direct investment in total savings, respectively.
The 1985 input-output table does not disaggregate investment 
demand for producer goods used in the creation of specific capital by 
industry. Thus, the availability of data limits this thesis to consider the 
aggregated investment demand for each producer good. Effective units of 
producer goods are used in fixed proportions, i.e. Leontief technology, to 
produce a level of real investment. Effective units of each producer good are 
the aggregate of producer goods from the two sources which are imperfect 
substitutes (4.18). By assuming zero profit condition, the change in capital 
price index can be explained as the weighted sum of the cost of inputs used
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in capital creation (4.19). Equation 4.20 defines real aggregate investment in 
terms of nominal savings (nominal investment) and capital price index. 
Equations 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20 ensure that all savings are invested in the 
creation of capital.
(4.18) x2is = u+o2i.[p2is-IH 2is.p2is],
s
(4.19) pik = XIG2is.p2is.
i s
(4.20) s = v+pik.
Where v is the percentage change in total investment, o2A is the 
Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported 
producer goods, p2^  is the percentage change in the purchase price of 
producer good i from sources used in capital creation, and H2is is the cost 
share of producer good i from source s in the total cost of producer good i 
used in capital creation. G2is is the cost share of producer good i from source 
s in capital creation.
4.2.4. Production of Consumer Goods
The approach to household demand of this model is based on Coxhead and 
Warr (1991a). The ten producers of consumer goods are also profit 
maximisers. Inputs for producing consumer goods are the ten producer 
goods, both domestic and imported. There are no primary factor inputs, 
margin demand, and tax burden at this stage of production. They are 
implicitly included in the purchase prices of producer goods. Leontief 
production technology is assumed, i.e. fixed proportions of the effective units 
of producer goods are used in producing a unit of consumer goods. Each 
producer first chooses effective units of producer goods that are required for 
the production of a level of consumer goods. Demands for the effective units 
of producer goods depend on demand for consumer goods, and there is no 
substitution amongst different producer goods. Based on the effective units 
of producer goods, each producer chooses a combination of producer goods
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from the two sources that minimize cost (4.21). Subsitution between producer 
goods from the sources, caused by a change in their relative prices, is 
explained by Armington elasticity of substitution (g3^ ). Equation 4.22 sums 
up demand for each producer good used in producing all consumer goods.
Where x3isk is the percentage change in demand for producer good i 
from source s used in the production of consumer good k. x3is, and p3is is the 
percentage change in demand for and the price of producer good i from 
source s used in the production of consumer goods in general. c \  is the 
percentage change in total supply of consumer good k. H3isk is the cost share 
of producer good i from source s in the total cost of input i used in the 
production of consumer good k. G3^  is the share of producer good i from 
source s used in the production of consumer goods accounted for by the 
production of consumer good k.
4.2.5. Household Behaviour
Households derive most of their income from their ownership of factors of 
production. Assistance payment and transfers from government, through the 
transfer pool, are also sources of income. Equation 4.23 shows that household 
income is equal to income from their ownership of primary factors and the 
transfer pool. If u is zero, then there is no change in the transfer pool, i.e. no 
change in non-factor income.
Where y^ *s income of household h. and Huh are the shares of 
factor incomes and non-factor incomes in total households' income,
(4.21) *3isk ^k^^ik't/^is^H^isk'/^is-i*s
(4.22) *3js = 3isk.
(4.23) yh -  ZO^.t/Sjq+rjql.Hfh + X 0 2jlr[/S2j+r2)l-H fh
1^ 1
+ S 0 3jh.[/S3j+r3j].Hfh+w.Huh-
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respectively. O -^  is the share of return to labour type q in income of 
household h. 0 2jh and are similarly defined for household h' income 
from industry specific capital and land.
Household income is allocated to direct tax, assistance payments to 
other households, and disposable income (4.24). Percentage changes in direct 
tax payment and assistance payments can be exogenous. Equation 4.25 states 
that the percentage change in direct tax payment is equal to the percentage 
change in household income plus the percentage change in direct tax rate. In 
one simulation, the model assumes that households pay direct tax to 
government in fixed proportions, i.e. direct tax rates remain unchanged. This 
assumption is more reasonable for urban households than for rural 
households. However, the assumption is applied for both types of 
households.
(4.24) yh -  Hdh.ydh+Hgh.rfrh+Huh.wh.
(4.25) d \  = yh+/dh.
(4.26) uh = 0uh.yh.
Where yh, ydh, drh, and wh are the percentage changes in household h's 
income, disposable income, direct tax payment, and assistance payments to 
the transfer pool. t \  is the direct tax rate on household h. Hdh, HSh, and Huh 
are the shares of disposable income, direct tax payment, and assistance 
payments in the total income of household h. 0uh is the parameter 
explaining household assistance payments. In general, 0uh is set at zero, i.e. 
there is no change in household assistance payment.
There is household demand for the ten consumer goods and not for 
the producer goods. The estimations of expenditure, own prices, and cross 
prices elasticities of demand for consumer goods will be discussed in 
Chapter Five. In brief, household consumption behaviour follows the well- 
known linear expenditure system (LES). Each makes decisions in two steps. 
First, they allocate their disposable income to savings and consumption. 
Second, they allocate their consumption expenditure on the ten consumer 
goods. Equation 4.27 defines the real change in household savings. Equation
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4.28 States that household disposable income is divided between savings and 
consumption expenditure. By Equation 4.29, household h's demand for each 
consumer good is governed by the own price and cross price elasticities of 
demand Cnhkq), and the expenditure elasticity of demand (%]<.).
(4.27) s \  = v\+pik.
(4.28) ydh = BVshh+BVh-
(4.29) = ■^Tlhkq-PCq+TUik-t:tv
Where and s*Y are the percentage changes in household 
consumption expenditure and nominal savings of households; and BY and 
BY are their shares, respectively. is savings of household h in real terms. 
c \h  and pY (pcq) are the percentage changes in household h's demand for 
and the price of consumer good k.
The percentage changes in the transfer pool is equal to the weighted 
sum of the percentage changes in household assistance payments and 
government transfer payment (4.30).
(4.30) u = XGuh.uhh+Gug.wg.
Where u is the percentage change in the total transfer pool, and Wg 
are the percentage changes in household, and government contributions to 
the transfer pool, respectively. GY and Gug are the shares of household 
assistance payments and government transfers in the transfer pool, u^ and wg 
could be excluded from this model. However, for computational purpose, 
they are included and set at zero.
4.2.6. Export Demand
The following Equation 4.31 explains export demand. pwjl and are the 
percentage changes in f.o.b. price in US$ and the export of good i, 
respectively, y, is the reciprocal of elasticity of world demand for Thai export
62
of producer good i. j4^ is a shift parameter which represents an exogenous 
change in world demand.
Yi can be set flexibly. Under small country assumption, where Thai 
exports have no influence on world price, it is set at zero. However, as will be 
discussed in the subsequent section, Thai exports of rice and rubber have 
market power and can affect world price to some degree.
The role of (4.31) is very limited. In the case of export oriented 
producer goods, x4^  is endogenously determined by the model. In the cases 
of import competing and non-traded producer goods, x4il is exogenously 
determined and set at zero. In both case, pw^ is accordingly explained by
(4.31) .
(4.31) pwü = "Yr*4il+/4il/ f°r i*
4.2.7. Government Behaviour
Tariff revenue, indirect tax, direct tax, and property income are the four main 
sources of government revenue. Government property income is assumed to 
derive from ownership of non-agricultural specific capital. Equations 4.32- 
4.35 calculate changes in government revenue from trade taxes, indirect tax, 
direct tax, and properties, respectively. Equation 4.36 sums up the change in 
total government revenue.
(4.32) t w =  S G xi l .(p w i l +S4 i l + Jxi l + x 4 j l + ew )
+ S G m i2 .(pw i2 + fm i2 + ^ ° i2 + «W>-
(4.33) f1 =  E E G 'j^ p O js + f 'i s + x 0^ ) .
1 S
(4.34) fd =  S G d h .(y d h + fd h).
(4.35) t< =  ? ° 2 j g - ( r 2j+/2j)-
(4.36) = H^fw+HUi+Hd. fd+Hfi f.
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Where Gxü and Gmj2  are the shares of export tax revenue and import 
tax revenue in total tariff revenue. G^s is the share of indirect tax revenue 
from producer good j from source s in total indirect tax. Gdh is the share of 
household h's direct tax payment in total direct tax. Similar to C^jh in Sub­
section 4.2.5, C>2 jg refers to government income from industry specific capital. 
H w, H 1, Hd, and H* are the shares of revenues from trade taxes, indirect 
taxes, direct taxes, and property income.
Government expenditure on each producer good, from each source, is 
assum ed constant in real terms (4.37). Thus, Government dem and does not 
adjust according to the change in the relative prices of producer goods from  
different sources. Government also saves and transfers income to 
households, through the transfer pool. There is no theory to explain 
governm ent savings, which fluctuated greatly during the past tw o decades 
(sS). On one side, the government borrows to finance its budget deficit. On 
the other side, the government saves when the budget is in surplus. Equation 
4.38 defines governm ent savings in real terms (v8). Equation 4.39 sets the 
percentage change in government transfer (u&). If ri5g is set at one, 
governm ent transfer m oves in line with governm ent revenue. If r|5g is set at 
zero, which is the case in this m odel, governm ent transfer is fixed. Equation 
4.40 sum s up total government expenditure (eg). Equation 4.41 defines the 
windfall effect of policy shocks on government budget (dG). In this m odel, 
dG can be financed by borrowing from overseas (-dG), or by taxation. The 
last term in the Equation 4.41 assumes that, by controlling the exports of non­
export oriented goods, the government absorbs all consequences which is 
represented by a shift variable (g4^ .  The role of this variable w ill be 
explained in the following section.
(4.37) *5is = 0.
(4.38) sS = v8+pik.
(4.39) u& = r)5g.i/8.
(4.40) eg = IZ G 5is.[A:5is+p5is]+G5s.sg+G5u.wg.
i s
= Rg.yg-Eg.cg-ZE.S^i^^+^ji+x4^), i *  export oriented good.(4.41) lOOdG
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Where G5is is the share of government expenditure on good i from 
source s in total government expenditure. G5s and G5u are the shares of 
government savings and government transfers in total government 
expenditure. R8 and ES are total government revenue and expenditure in the 
base year.
Indirect and direct tax rates can be set flexibly by (4.42) and (4.43). If 
tidis, tbar's, and tbaris are set at zero, indirect tax rates are fixed. Similarly, 
direct tax rates can be fixed if td  ^ and tbard exogenously set at zero. The 
impact of trade liberalisation on the government budget deficit can be 
redistributed through endogenously determined indirect and direct tax rates 
subject to a government budget condition, e.g., dG = 0. A redistribution 
through a uniform change in direct tax rates (tbard) is implied by setting td 
tidfe tbar's, and tbar's at zero. Similarly, a redistribution through a uniform 
change in indirect tax rates on all producer goods is implied by setting all 
other indirect tax and direct tax variables exogenous at zero, while leaving 
tbaris endogenously determined, and so on.
(4.42) t \s = tidis+tbarls+tbarls.
(4.43) t \  = tdh+tbard.
4.2.8. Price Determination
The two types of labour are assumed perfectly mobile across industries. By 
Equation 4.44, the percentage change in return to labour type q employed by 
industry j ( r^ )  is equal to the percentage change in return to labour type q in 
general (rlq) plus a wage differential factor (dlqj). If rflqj is zero, which is the 
case in this thesis, Equation 4.44 does not imply that the returns to labour 
type q are equal across industries. It simply means that their percentage 
changes are equal. Any existing wage gaps between labour employed by 
different industries are not examined by this model. Where H1-^ is the share 
of labour type q in the total wage bill of industry j, Equation 4.45 explains the 
percentage change in the unit returns to effective labour in each industry.
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Equation 4.46 states that real wages are equal to nominal wages indexed by 
the consumer price index.
(4.44) rjqj = ^iq+^iqj-
(4.45) r^j — SH^iqj.r^qj.
(4.46) rwlq = rlq cpi.
In the case of multi-output industries, the percentage changes in 
returns to capital (r2j) and land (r3j), industry specific factors of production, 
are implicitly set by Equation 4.2. This is rewritten in the form of Equation 
4.47. If the elasticity of substitution, o°nj, is equal to 1, then capital and land 
are assumed to maintain constant shares in the total return to industry 
specific factors.
(4.47) / 2j -/3j -  -a°2j-(r2fr3j)-
There are three sets of product prices: basic prices, producer prices, 
and purchase prices. The basic prices are equal to the total cost used in 
producing one unit of output. The producer price of any producer good is 
the sum of its basic price and indirect tax including any trade tax in the case 
of imported goods. Due to the availability of data, indirect tax and margin 
costs are assumed uniform across sources of goods, i.e. domestic and 
imported. However, different users face different margin costs.
The basic price of each good is equal to the sum of its total cost, which 
consists of the cost of intermediate inputs, returns to the two types of labour, 
returns to capital, capital consumption allowance, and, in the case of 
agricultural industries, returns to land. Based on a zero profit condition, 
Equations 4.48 and 4.49 equate changes in the output and basic prices of the 
goods, produced by single output and multi-output industries, to changes in 
total cost of production. Equation 4.48 states that the total cost is equal to the 
total cost from all intermediate inputs and primary factors of production, less 
an import tax rebate from all imported inputs used in producing industry
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exports. Capital consumption allowance is part of the return to capital and 
assumed to be industry savings (sip. This was discussed in Sub-section 4.2.3.
(4.48) p°ji+Zj = 5XG0isj.(^1isj+p1isj)+G01j.(/1j+rij)+G02j.(/2j+r2j)+Gs2j.sjj
- fH * i2j. ( ^ i2+pwi2+,w +xl i2j+x4rZj)+/
(4.49) £B0iij.(*0iij+p°il) = S^G0isj.(x1isj+p1isj)+G01j.(/1j+r1j)+G02j.(/2j+r2j)
+Gs2j.sjj+G°3j.(/3j+r3j),
where ZXG0isj+£G°vj-XH*i2j+Gs2 j.sjj = 1, P°ii> G°isj, G0^, and Gs2j are
cost shares of intermediate inputs i from source s, primary factor v, and 
industry savings in total cost, net of import tax rebate (H*i2j)- Apart from 
agro-industry and other export oriented industries, the term H*i2j is zero, i.e. 
no import tax rebate. G°3 j.r3j is excluded from 4.48 because land is not a 
factor of production in the non-agricultural single-output industries, and 
B0^  is the price and the value share of each producer good i produced by the 
multi-output industry j.
In this thesis, tariffs, as represented by NRP, are assumed to be the 
only one protective measure. Other protective measures are implicitly 
included in the NRP. The domestic prices of exported and imported goods 
are related to world prices by an exchange rate and tariffs. Equations 4.50 
and 4.51 relate the percentage changes in producer good i's export price (p4^) 
and import price (p°i2) to the percentage changes in exchange rate (ew), their 
trade taxes (t x^  and tmi2), and the world prices of their counterparts (pw^
and pwi2).
The g4^ is a shift variable. In the case of export oriented producer 
goods, it is set at zero. Thus, domestic price is determined by the world 
market through (4.31). In the case of import competing and non-traded 
producer goods, of which exports are minor, when compared with total 
domestic outputs, their exports are exogenously set at zero, g4^ is allowed to 
adjust (through 4.50) and, consequently, is unaffected by domestic 
conditions (through 4.31). This arbitrary setting has no distorting effect on
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any economic variables in the model. Without g4^, pw^ would get an un­
realistic non-zero value which implies that the export of Thai's import- 
competing and non-traded producer goods have some power in the world 
markets.
(4.50) pwn+ew+g4ii = ßii-P4n +aii-(pwii+eW+S4i i+(Xii)'
(4.51) p°i2 = ßi2.(pwi2+ew)+ai2-(pwi2+ew+fmi2),
where and oq^  are the shares of export price and export tax in the 
world price of producer good i. ßi2 and oq2 are the shares of world price 
and import tax in the import price of producer good i. is generally 
negative for i = 5 and 6, since exports of agro-industry and other export 
industries are subsidised by tax rebates. Then, for the export oriented 
industries (j = 5 and 6),
(4.52) *xji+pwji+ew = ?Hmi2j.(jc1i2j+tmi2+pwi2+ew)-zj.
Equation 4.52 implicitly states that the total rebate for an export 
industry is equal to the sum of total import tax on its imported input, 
weighted by the ratio between total export and total output of the industry. 
H11^  is the value share of import tax paid by industry j accounted for by 
input i.
The percentage changes in purchase prices are explained by the 
changes in their basic prices, indirect tax, and the related cost of margin (4.53, 
4.55, and 4.56). Equation 4.54 defines the purchase prices net of import tax 
rebate from imported inputs used in producing for export. For domestic 
inputs (s = 1) or non-export oriented industries, i.e. j * 5 and 6, G*jj is one and 
K*ij is zero, i.e. no tax rebate. Equation 4.57 sets the prices of consumer goods. 
Tax and margin do not affect the percentage change in the price of consumer 
goods (pck). An assumption is that they are already included in the purchase 
prices of producer goods used in producing each consumer good.
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(4.53) p lisj -  H 01is-P0is+ H g l is-(P°is+ (1is)
+ H ^ l is j. ( G ^ 7 1 .p 0 7 1 + G m 8 1 .p 0 8 1 ) .
(4.54) p r ' isj = G*ij.p1isrK’ij-(pwi2+'mi2+«w+^4rzj).
(4.55) pnis = H°"is.p0is+HS"is.(pOis+tiis)
+Hmn.s.(Gm71.p071+Gm81.p081), n = 2 ,3 , and 5.
(4.56) p4n = H°4i l .p V H S 4 il .(pOil+fiil)
+Hm4 j j .(Gm7i .p°7 j +Gm8 j .p°8 j ).
(4.57) = I Z C 3isk.p3is. 
1 s
Where p hsj and pnis are the percentage changes in the purchase price 
of producer good i from source s for purpose n, n = 1, 2, 3, and 5. is the 
percentage change in the export price of good i. H°is/ Hgis, and Hmnis are the 
(value) shares of basic price, indirect tax, and margin cost in the purchase 
price of good i from source s for each purpose n. H°is+Hgis+Hmnis = 1 for all i 
and s. Gm71 and Gmgj are the value shares of the outputs from industries 7 
and 8 used in the services of margin. C3isk is the cost share of producer good 
i from source s in the unit cost of consumer good k and XXC3isk = 1.
4.2.9. Market Clearing Conditions
Equation 4.58 equates total supply of each type of labour to its total industry 
demand. By Equations 4.59 and 4.60, the industry specific factors (capital 
and land) are also fully employed.
(4-58) f i q = ? N lqj./lqj,
(4-59) = /2j,
(4.60) f 3j = /3j.
Where is the change in total supply of labour type q. N lqj and / lqj 
are the share of industry j's demand in total demand for labour type q and 
percentage change in industry j's demand for labour type q, respectively, /^j
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and /^ j are percentage changes in total supply of industry specific capital and 
land. /2j and /3j are percentage changes in industry j's demand for capital and 
land.
Equation 4.61 implies that the domestic production of each producer 
good is equal to the sum of its intermediate demand, capital creation 
demand, demand for the production of consumer goods, export demand, 
government demand, and demand for the supply of margin. By Equation 
4.62, the total supply of each imported producer good is equal to total 
demand, which consists of intermediate demand, capital creation demand, 
demand for the production of consumer goods, and government demand. 
Similarly, total supply of each consumer good is equal to total household 
demand for the consumer good (4.63).
(4.61) x0n = jB 1ilj.Ac1ilj+B2il.a:2il+^B3ilk.^3ilk
+B4il.x4il+B5il.x5il+Bmn.Hmilrn.
(4.62) X°i2 = ?-B1i2j,^ 1i2j+B2i2-^i2+^B3i2k* i^2k+B5i2*^ 5i2*
(4.63) c \  = ZG^h-C3!^.
where EBhij+B^i+EB^ik+B^+B^i+B111^  =
j ’ k i
? Bliij+B2n +XB3iik+B5ii = 1, and XG3kh = 1.
j 9 k h
x°is is the total supply of producer good i from source s. , x2^  x3isk,
x5is, c3^ ,  c3k, and m are as previously defined. Bhsj, B2is, B3isk, B4^ , B5is, and
G3kh are their demand shares, respectively. H111^  is the share of industry i in
the total supply of margin. Hmi:1 > 0 for i = 7 and 8, otherwise H11^  = 0 .
4.2.10. Miscellaneous Equations
The remaining equations explain the percentage changes in consumer price 
index (e3), poverty line (Q, import value (m), export value (e), and trade 
balance (dB). The concept behind the poverty line will be discussed again in
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Chapter Six. The trade balance, lOOdB, explains how policy shocks affect net 
exports of the Thai economy. Equation 4.69 defines the balance of payment 
(dBOP) which is equal to the sum of government borrowing (-lOOdG), the 
inflow of foreign direct investment (Fsw), and the net export (Ee-Mm). 
Because SAM is based on the accounting convention, the overall balance of 
payments is initially zero. The percentage change in GDP (y) is set by (4.70).
(4.64) e3
(4.65) C
(4.66) e
(4.67) m
(4.68) lOOdB
(4.69) 100dBOP
(4.70) y
£ GCk-PCk-
( l /S f^ H ^ .p ^ k  = 1, 5; i.e., food only.
I(x4n +pwil).Seil.
1
I(*°i2+pwi2).Smi2.
1
E.e-M.m.
-100dG+F.sw+E.e-M.m.
^ S°h-yh+S°g^f-
Where G ^  is the value share of consumer k in total household 
consumption. Sf is the share of food expenditure in the poverty line. is 
the cost share of consumer good k (k = 1,..,5) in the total poverty line. Se^ and 
Smi2 are the shares of producer good i's export in total exports and producer 
good i's import in total imports. E and M are export and import values at 
base year. S \  and S°g are the shares of household h's income and 
government property income in GDP.
4.3. Social Accounting Matrix
This section describes a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Thailand, which 
is the most important source of coefficients used in the CGE model. SAM 
provides a consistent framework for the construction of the CGE model, and 
ensures the consistence of macro-economic relationships in the base year of 
this study. In general, the base year should be the year that the Thai economy 
was stable and closest to equilibrium. However, 1988 is chosen as the base
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year because it is the most recent year for which data were available at the 
time of the field work done for this thesis.
The main sources of data for the construction of SAM are as follows.
1. The input-output table of Thailand, 1985.
2. National Income of Thailand, various issues.
3. Report of the 1988 Household Socio-economic Survey.
4. Report of the 1988 Labour Force Survey.
5. Report of the 1988 Intercensal Survey of Agriculture.
6. Report of the 1987 Industrial Survey.
7. Data from the Office of Agricultural Economics.
8. Publications from the Rubber Research Institute.
9. Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of Thailand, various issues.
10. Village Surveys, various issues.
11. Tax schedule from various studies and publications.
The structure of SAM can be described as follows. First, for every row 
(column) there is a corresponding column (row). Second, each element along 
a row is a receipt, and along a column an expenditure. Third, row-sum and 
corresponding column-sum are equal. There are ten main accounts in this 
1988 SAM, i.e. ten rows and ten columns. These accounts are 1) primary 
factors of production, 2) institutions, 3) producing sectors, 4) producers of 
consumer goods, 5) domestic producer goods, 6) imported producer goods, 
7) margin sector, 8) indirect tax, including tariff and subsidy, 9) capital 
account, and 10) the rest of the world.
This section will not detail how SAM was constructed. Concept and 
methodology are well discussed in the literature. Social Accounting Matrix 
Indonesia (1975) and King (1981) are particularly useful. In brief, three 
criteria are used in the construction of SAM - maintaining the production 
structure of the 1985 input-output matrix, adjusting many accounts according 
to the base year data, and focussing on various economic properties such as 
the adding-up and homogeneity properties of consumer demand. Where 
necessary, data from other sources were also incorporated into various 
accounts. Adjustment was based on discussion with experts. SAM was not 
initially in balance, i.e. row-sum is not equal to column-sum. Rather than
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using RAS technique, this thesis manually balances the receipts and 
expenditures of the accounts. Minimum departure from the initially un­
balanced SAM was always a precondition.
If this SAM is defined as a 10x10 matrix S then each element or sub­
matrix Sjj is the total receipt of an account i paid by an account j. Some of 
these sub-matrix are zero, i.e. zero flow between the accounts i and j. Each 
non-zero Sjj can be described as follows.
S-l 3  is the functional distribution of income which explains how value added 
in each producing sector is divided among primary factors of production. 
These factors are skilled labour, un-skilled labour, industry specific capital, 
Northeastern (ESAN) land, and non-ESAN land.
Si,io is income transfer from the rest of the world to primary factors of 
production. Generally, this is worker remittances from overseas. These 
remittances are assumed to be the return to skilled labour.
S^i is a factor ownership matrix, which explains how institutions derived 
their income from returns to primary factors. Institutions are divided into 3 
categories - households, transfer pool, and government. There are ten 
households, five quintiles for urban and rural settings. Since data do not 
allow the construction of a two-way matching between transferor and 
transferee, the transfer pool is included as a media of income transfer among 
households. Although household ownership of industry specific capital can 
be disaggregated into agriculture and non-agriculture, because data are not 
available, it cannot be disaggregated by industry. This thesis assumes that 
the distribution of industry specific capital among households is the same as 
the distribution of agricultural and non-agricultural capital in general.
S2 . 2  is income transfer between institutions. There are two main types of 
transfer: transfer among households (assistance payment through transfer 
pool) and transfer between government and households (government 
transfer, direct tax, and fine).
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$>2.8 is government revenue from indirect tax less subsidy. This includes 
trade tax (subsidy), which are mainly based on the 1987 nominal rates of 
protection.
S^io is an income transfer from the rest of the world to institutions. In this 
case, it only explains transfer from the rest of the world to government. 
Transfers from the rest of the world to households are explained by S j a n d  
transfer from primary factors to the rest of the world Sjq i-
S3 5 is the only non-zero sub-matrix along the third row. It is a diagonal 
matrix which simply transfers producer goods from producing sectors to its 
distributors, i.e. domestic goods.
S42 is also the only non-zero sub-matrix of its row. It explains the 
consumption expenditure of each household. The expenditure is classified by 
types of consumer goods.
S5 2 is Government consumption expenditure on domestic goods.
S5 3 is intermediate demand for domestic goods by the producing sectors 
(industry).
S5 4 is demand for domestic goods used in the production of consumer 
goods.
S5>7 is margin sector's demand for domestic goods. It explains how margin 
sector uses outputs from producing sectors to facilitate the flows of producer 
goods to intermediate and final users.
S5 9 is the investment demand for domestic goods. Due to the availability of 
data, it explains total investment demand but not investment demand by 
industry.
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S5/io is the rest of the world demand for domestic goods, i.e. export demand.
Similarly, S63, S63, S64 and S69 are demand for imported goods by 
Government, producing sectors, consumer goods, and investment. S6 7 and 
S6/io are zero, i.e. there is no demand for imported goods by margin sector, 
and there is no re-export.
S7>2 is demand for margin to deliver goods to government.
S73 is demand for margin to deliver intermediate inputs to the producing 
sectors.
S7 4 is demand for margin to deliver producer goods, used in the production 
of consumer goods.
57 9 is demand for margin to deliver goods to the creation of capital.
£>7.10 is demand for margin to deliver export to Thai ports.
58 5 and S8 6 are indirect tax less subsidy paid by the domestic and imported 
sectors, respectively. These indirect taxes consist of trade tax (subsidy) and 
other indirect taxes.
S92 is savings by institutions, i.e. household savings and government 
savings.
59 3 is capital consumption or depreciation in each producing sector. This can 
be viewed as industry savings which will be available for investment 
anywhere in the economy.
£>10.1 is the return to foreign owned primary factors of production. For 
Thailand, foreign investment is mostly concentrated in non-agricultural
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sectors. An assumption is that this transfer is derived from non-agricultural 
capital only.
£>10.6 is the c.i.f value of total import from the rest of the world.
Table 4.1 presents the general structure of this SAM. The numerical 
presentation of some sub-matrices such as Sj 3, S2 and S4 2 are presented at 
the appropiate points in the following chapters. The two multi-output 
industries, ESAN and non-ESAN, are assumed to have the same technology 
as described by the 1985 input-output table.
TABLE 4.1: General Structure of the 1988 Social Accounting Matrix.
(i/j) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0 0 * 0 0 0 0 0 0 *
2 * * 0 0 0 0 0 * 0 *
3 0 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 * * * 0 0 * 0 * *
6 0 * * * 0 0 0 0 * 0
7 0 * * * 0 0 0 0 * *
8 0 0 0 0 * * 0 0 0 0
9 0 * * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10. * 0 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 0
Notes: *  Non-zero submatrix,
1. primary factors of production,
2. institutions,
3. producing sectors,
4. producers of consumer goods,
5. domestic producer goods,
6. imported producer goods,
7. margin sector,
8. indirect tax, including tariff and subsidy,
9. capital account, and
10. the rest of the world.
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4.4. Other Parameter Settings in the Model
In addition to the share parameters from SAM, the model requires the 
specification of a number of elasticities and income distribution parameters. 
Elasticities of consumer demand were estimated and are discussed in 
Chapter Five. Income distribution related parameters are discussed in 
Chapter Six, which also presents the theory and measurement of income 
distribution in a general equilibrium framework.
This section provides the rationale behind the choice of the remaining 
elasticities and share parameters used in the model. Due to limited time and 
resources, most of the following elasticities are either quoted or imputed 
from past studies. Ideally, preferred choices would be studies of which 
estimates were based on Thai data. However, in many cases, such estimates 
are not available, and empirical estimates of other countries are the only 
possible alternatives. These elasticities and share parameters can be classified 
into six categories as follows.
4.4.1. Base Year Nominal Rates of Protection
As discussed in Chapter Two, this thesis relies on the estimates of the 1987 
nominal rates of protection by Paitoon et al. (1989). The nominal rate of 
protection (NRP) for each industry is equal to the sum of NRP for 
corresponding input-output sectors weighted by their export or import 
shares. However, the nominal rates of protection for export industries, 
especially other export industries, tend to be incredibly high (Table 4.2). By 
definition, the nominal rates of 10.21% for other export industries indicates 
that other export industries receive export subsidy, through tax rebate, 10.21 
Bahts for every 100 Bahts that the industries earned from exports. 
Considering the industries' cost of imported inputs (8.96%), the nominal rate 
of 10.21% implies that other export industries can rabate more than the total 
cost of imported inputs. This is not to say that the share of import taxes in the 
total cost of agro-industry and other export industries is much less than this.
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Table 4.2: Nominal Rate of Protection (NRP) and Cost Share of Imported 
Inputs, by Producer Good
Producer Good NRP (%)
Adjusted
NRP
(%)
Share of
Imported
Inputs
1. Paddy 0.00 - 5.29
2. Maize, Cassava, and Sugar-cane 0.19 - 4.97
3. Rubber 0.00 - 6.77
4. Other Agricultural Products 7.74 - 5.27
5. Agro-industry Products 0.04 0.13 0.48
6. Other Exportable Products 10.21 1.49 8.96
7. Petroleum Products 1.40 - 68.65
8. Other Import-competing Products 18.93 - 24.56
9. Electricity, Water Supply, 
Transport, and Communication 0.00 - 15.78
10. Services 0.22 - 4.05
Sources: 1) Weighted average from 1987 figures in Table 3.13, Paitoon et al. (1989).
2) The input-output table of Thailand, 1985, NESDB.
Table 4.3: Tax Drawbacks, Rebates, and Total Export: 1985-1989
(Million Baht)
Year Tax Drawback Tax Rebate Total Export
1985 2,992 1,754 245,251
1986 3,069 2,336 290,169
1987 3,916 3,417 375,596
1988 5,494 4,677 514,922
1989 6,230 4,250 650,030
Sources: 1. Table 2.6, Paitoon et al. (1989)
2. National Income of Thailand, NESDB.
78
There is an evidence that export subsidy, through tax drawbacks and 
rebates, are at very high rates. In 1987 and 1988, tax drawbacks and rebates 
accounted for about 1.7% and 2.0% of total exports of goods and services, 
respectively (Table 4.3). Paitoon et al. also state that, unless export firms are 
under the Customs Department Scheme, they are eligible for the full rebate 
rate. According to them, both the number of applicants for and the amount of 
tax exemption grew annually at the rate of around 25%; and most of these 
exporters produced textiles and textile products, garments, plastic products, 
ceramics, and electronic products. This thesis chooses to recalculate tax 
rebate of agro-industry and other export industries, based on the nominal 
rates of protection for all other industries and the cost structure from the 1985 
input-output table. Based on an assumption that exporters rebate 100% of 
their import tax payment, the adjusted nominal rates of protection for agro­
industry, and other export industries, are reported in the second column of 
Table 4.2.
4.4.2. Substitution Between Skilled and Unskilled Labour
There is no available empirical estimate of substitution parameter among 
classes of labour from Thai data. The preferred values used by this thesis 
follow Tinbergen (1975, quoted in Dixon et al., 1982), who concluded that the 
evidence is consistent with a unitary elasticity of substitution between 
different occupational groups of labour.
In this thesis, labour substitution parameters in non-agricultural 
industries are set at one. For the agricultural industries, in which only un­
skilled labour is employed, the parameter is set at 0.001. This is for 
computational purpose and does not harm the structure of the model.
This unitary elasticity of substitution implies that the changes in 
relative return to the two types of labour are counter balanced by opposite 
changes in relative demand for the two types of labour. The shares of skilled 
and un-skilled labour in each industry wage bill are kept constant. Thus, a 
change in the distribution of wage income is explained by the un-balanced
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growth between labour intensive industry and non-labour intensive 
industry.
4.4.3. Substitution Among Primary Factors
Much of the literature disagrees on the degree of substitution among primary 
factors of production. Arrow et al. (1961 quoted in Fuchs, 1963), by using 
cross section data, concluded that the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour in manufacturing may typically be less than unity. But 
Fuchs (1963) points out that Arrow et al.’s conclusion was induced by the use 
of heterogeneous countries. When this heterogeneity was corrected, Fuchs' 
results show that the elasticity of substitution clustered around one. Caddy 
(1976), after a detailed review of the literature, also adds that the long run 
estimates of the elasticities of substitution between primary factors of 
production do not show any significant deviation from unity, while the short 
run estimates are lower and fall between 0 and 1.
Past studies also support the use of different values of the elasticity of 
substitution across industries. The values used by Whalley (1985), and the 
values estimated by Rimmer (1990, quoted in SALTER, 1991) indicate that the 
highest elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is in the service 
industries, and the lowest is in agriculture. Their results show that, for 
services, the elasticities are around 1. For the manufacturing sector, Whalley's 
estimates are 0.6-0.9, while Rimmer's estimate is 0.5. Yotopoulos and Nugent 
(1976 quoted in SALTER, 1991) assert that many studies found larger 
opportunities for substitution in agriculture than in manufacturing, and 
claim that modem technology tends to decrease substitution opportunities. 
Thus, they point out that the elasticities of substitution in agriculture should 
be larger in less developed countries.
Only one study based on Thai data is available. Paitoon (1975), by 
using cross section data, estimated the elasticities of substitution between 
labour and capital in fifty manufacturing sectors. Most of his estimates are 
significant, and are in the range of 0.5 and 1.5. The majority of his long run
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estimates cluster around 1 and, therefore, confirms Fuchs' and Caddy's 
conclusions.
Table 4.4 summarises the guessed value of the elasticities of 
substitution.
Based on the estimates of, and suggestions by, the mentioned studies, 
guesses for the elasticities of substitution between (effective) labour and 
capital in this model are as follows. For the two multi-output agricultural 
industries, the elasticities of substitution between labour and capital are set at 
1. For the four single output manufacturing industries, the elasticities are set 
at 0.75. The value of 1 is also set for the two non-traded industries (EWTC 
and services).
TABLE 4.4: Elasticities of Substitution between Labour and Among 
Primary Factors.
Industry
Elasticities of Substitution
a b c
ESAN industry 0 1 1
Non-ESAN industry 0 1 1
Agro-industry 1 0.75 -
Other Export Industries 1 0.75 -
Petroleum Industry 1 0.75 -
Other Import-competing Industries 1 0.75 -
EWTC 1 1 -
Services 1 1 -
Notes: a Elasticity of substitution between skilled and un-skilled labour, 
b Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, 
c Elasticity of substitution between land and capital, and land and labour.
The multi-output industries also require elasticities of substitution 
between labour and land, and capital and land. Again, unitary elasticity of 
substitution is guessed for labour and land. The assumption that capital and
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land are specific factors in short run, imply that the return to mobile factor of 
production is determined by the market, while the total return to specific 
factors is determined by residual. This thesis has no theory to explain the 
distribution of the total return to industry specific factors. A plausible 
assumption is that the shares of capital and land in the total return to 
industry specific factors are constant, i.e. the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and land is 1.
4.4.4. Substitution Between Domestic and Imported Goods
This CGE model requires elasticities of substitution between domestic and 
imported producer goods. Dixson et al. (1982), in the ORANI model, assume 
that the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods is 
equal across end-uses. In defence of this assumption, they point out that most 
major Australian imports are mainly used for one end use. For Thailand, 
based on the 1985 input-output table, six out of seven Thai imports are 
predominantly for intermediate uses. Services, which has a very low import 
(export) output ratio, are mainly imported for government consumption. 
This fact also justifies the use of the same elasticity of substitution for all end- 
uses in this model.
Estimates of the elasticity of substitution by Alaouze et al. (1977), by 
using a rapid adjustment model and Australian data, are mostly between 0.5 
and 2.5. The highest estimates are 4.366 for motor vehicles, and 3.354 for 
men's and boys' trousers and shorts. ORANI's elasticities of substitution 
between domestic and imported products are between 1 and 2 (Table 29.2 in 
Dixon et al., 1982). Somsak (1985) reports estimates of elasticity of 
substitution in ten manufacturing products. His estimates, based on Thai 
data, are mostly higher than 1.5. Reinert (1992) estimates the Armington 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods for the 
United States. The majority of his estimates are between 0 and 1. The highest 
significant estimate is 3.49 for wine and brandy. The lowest significant 
estimate is 0.06 for mill-work, wood kitchens, and cabinets.
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TABLE 4.5: Armington Elasticity of Substitution and Reciprocal of Price 
Elasticity of World Demand for Thai Export.
Producer Goods
Elasticities
Armington World demand3
Paddy 0.001 0 .
MCS 0.001 0 .
Rubber 0.001 0 .
Other Agricultural Products 1.0 0 .
Agro-industry Products 1.0 0.5
Other Export Oriented Products 1.0 0.0001
Petroleum Products 1.0 0 .
Other Import Competing Products 1.0 0 .
EWTC 0.001 0 .
Services 0.001 0 .
Note: a Reciprocal of price elasticity of world demand.
Mansur and Whalley (1984) show that, under certain assumptions, the 
own price elasticity of import demand is determined primarily by the 
elasticity of substitution. One of the pre-assumptions is that the elasticity of 
substitution is not too far from unity. This practice is also applicable for 
Thailand. The estimates of short run own price elasticities of import demand 
in Thailand fall into two categories. The first category found that the 
elasticities are close to one. Typical are estimates by Kriengsak (1972, quoted 
in Suwat, 1986), and Olarn et al. (1979, quoted in Suwat, 1986). Kriengsak's 
estimates are 1.131 for consumer goods, 1.124 for capital goods, 1.243 for 
petroleum. Olarn's estimates are 0.9934 for raw materials and petroleum 
products, 1.1903 for capital goods, 0.8609 for consumer goods, and 1.0958 for 
services. The second category found that the elasticity ranges from 0.5 to 1. 
Typical are Gosah's estimates (1976, quoted in Suwat, 1986) and Somsak's 
estimates (1985, quoted in Suwat, 1986).
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Based on the above studies, the guessed values for the elasticities of 
substitution for the ten producer goods in this model are as follows. For 
paddy, MCS, rubber, EWTC, and services, the elasticity is set at 0.001, to say 
that they are non-traded goods, and a change in relative price of domestic 
and imported goods will not dramatically change their domestic demand in 
relation to their import demand. The value of 1.0 is set for all tradable 
products - exportable agro-industry products, other exportable products, 
other agricultural products, petroleum products, and other import competing 
products. Table 4.5 summarizes these guessed values. However, when 
different values were also set for exportable products and import competing 
products, differences in simulation results were negligible.
4.4.5. Price Elasticity of World Demand for Thai Export
CGE modellers heavily relied on Stern et al. (1976) for their choices of values 
of the price elasticity of world demand for export. Stern et al., after reviewing 
econometric evidence in many developed countries, suggest that the price 
elasticity of export demand varies between 0.5 and 2.0. They also suggest 
that, in order to capture inter-country and inter-commodity variations, it 
would be preferable to use a more detailed estimate that is available.
There are a limited number of available studies on the own price 
elasticities of world demand for Thai exports. This thesis has relied on the 
estimates of Kruaphant (1974), Rungsan (1983), and Direk and Vilai (1991).
An alternative for this thesis is to assume that Thailand is a small 
country in all world markets. Under small country assumption, the price 
elasticity of world demand for Thai export would be infinite, and its 
reciprocal would be zero. However, a common agreement among Thai 
economists is that for some products, especially rice, Thailand can exercise 
market power. The ground for this is Thailand's substantial share in the 
world rice market. However, the estimates of the own price elasticity of 
world demand for Thai rice exports vary significantly. Direk and Vilai 
estimated the price elasticity of rice export demand and supply. They found 
that the elasticity of demand for rice export is between 1.2 and 1.7. Their
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results are supported by a number of past studies (Kerdphibul, 1970; 
Chunanunthathum, 1977; and Tsujii, 1973, quoted in Direk and Vilai, 1991). 
However, they point out that, based on the majority of the literature, the 
elasticity is more than 2. Rubber is another product that Thailand has a 
substantial share in the world market. An estimate by Rungsan shows that 
the own price elasticity of demand for Thai rubber exports is as low as 0.072. 
These estimates for rice and rubber can be used to guess a value for the price 
elasticity of world demand for Thai exports of agro-industry products.
Manufacturing exports are expected to be price takers, because of their 
small shares in the world market. Kruaphant studies manufacturing export 
supply response of fifteen aggregated products by using time series data. She 
found that, except for paper products (0.2), all other manufacturing products 
have very high own price elasticities of export demand (3 to 33). Thus, her 
results indicate that demand for Thai manufacturing exports is perfectly 
elastic.
The guessed values in this thesis (Table 4.5) are based on the above 
studies. For non-traded goods, such as paddy, MCS, rubber, EWTC, and 
services, the reciprocal of the elasticity is set at zero. For agro-industry 
exports, which consist of rice and simple processed rubber, maize, and 
cassava, the value is set at 0.5. The reciprocal of elasticity is set at .0001 for 
other exportable products, while it is set at zero for petroleum products and 
other import competing products.
4.4.6. Elasticities of Transformation in Agriculture
The assumption that agricultural industries are multi-output industries 
requires the system estimation of supply response, which can be used to 
compute the product transformation parameters. But studies on supply 
response in Thai agricultural sectors are mostly single equation estimations, 
which ignore the ability of farmers to transform their output mixes in 
response to changes in the relative prices of outputs.
Only one available study (Phibul, 1988) uses the system estimation, 
however, paddy is not included in the study. Phibul's estimates are for seven
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major upland crops, and provide detailed analysis by agro-economic zone. 
According to his estimates, the own price elasticities of supply of many 
upland crops are very low. The elasticity is 0.247 for cassava. The elasticity 
ranges from 0.233 to 0.624 for maize while those of other upland crops are 
between 0.233 to 1.651.
TABLE 4.6: Own Price Elasticities of Supply of Major Crops.
1) 2) 3) 4)
Agriculture 0.90 - - -
Paddy
Irrigated _ 0.65 _
Non-irrigated - - 0.50 -
Maize - - 0.20 0.42
Cassava - - 0.22 0.25
Sugar-cane - - 0.27 -
Rubber - 0.22 - -
Other Crops - - - 0.28
Sources: 1) Table 31, Kumphol and Panayotou (1985).
2) Table 5.2, Rungsan (1983).
3) Table 48, Kumphol and Panayotou (1985).
4) Simple average from Tables 6, 8, and 10; Phibul (1988).
Two other studies for which analytical frameworks come close to the 
system estimation are Adulavidhaya et al. (1979 quoted in Kumphol and 
Panayotou, 1985) and Kumphol and Panayotou (1985). Adulyavidhya et al. 
estimate the supply response of agriculture in general. Their results show 
that agricultural output is highly sensitive to price change (the own price 
elasticity of supply is 0.898). Kumphol and Panayotou's (1985) estimates, 
hereafter KPTP, are based on survey data in 1979-80. There are four crops: 
paddy (irrigated and non-irrigated), maize, cassava, and sugar-cane; three 
variables inputs - seed, fertilizer, and labour; and two fixed inputs - land and 
farm assets. The focuses of KPTP are on the input demand, and the own price
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effect of each crop, while cross price effect is ignored. Although KPTP's 
estimates, based on cross section data, are long run estimates, which should 
be greater than short run estimates from time series data, their results show 
that the own price elasticities of all crops are low. The own price elasticities 
of paddy supply in both areas are higher than those of the three upland 
crops. The own price elasticity of paddy supply in irrigated areas (0.6496) is 
higher than that in non-irrigated areas (0.5008). The own price elasticities of 
maize, cassava, and sugar-cane are 0.2030, 0.2201, and 0.2693, respectively.
For other crops, these estimates are lower than estimates of some 
studies based on single estimation. For paddy, these estimates do not 
significantly differ from estimates by other studies. Tumnong (1972) shows 
that the short run own price elasticity of maize is around 0.6. Sakchai (1982) 
reports estimates of the own price elasticity of paddy planted area by region. 
Based on 1967-1980 data, his short run estimates are 0.29 and 0.13, while his 
long-run estimates are 0.89 and 0.98 for the Northeast and the whole 
kingdom, respectively. Apichart's (1983) results are around 1 for maize, 
between 1-2 for cassava, between 0.5-1 for sugar-cane, and around 1 for 
kenaf. However, his estimates for the short run own price elasticities of 
paddy are between 0.4-0.5 which are very close to KPTP's estimates.
Apart from similar framework, more up to date data is another reason 
that this thesis chooses the lower estimates of KPTP and Phibul. For paddy, 
since more than 90% of ES AN (Northeast) land is non-irrigated, the own 
price elasticities of paddy supply in non-irrigated areas is used as a proxy for 
that of ESAN agricultural industry, while that of irrigated paddy is used for 
the non-ESAN agricultural industry. For other crops, except rubber, the 
elasticities are assumed to be the same across agricultural industries.
There is only one available study on rubber. Rungsan Hataiseree 
(1983) found that the own price supply response of rubber is low (0.219). He 
also found that paddy is a substitute product for rubber. The paddy price 
elasticity of rubber supply response is 0.108.
The estimates of the above mentioned studies are summarized in 
Table 4.6. A strong assumption adapted here is that the estimates from the 
above studies can represent the own price elasticities of output supplies from
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the system estimation. With these own price elasticities of supply and their 
1988 shares in the total agricultural products by region, the values of product 
transformation parameters are imputed2^ . These parameters, as summarized 
in Table 4.7, show that, on average, farmers in the Northeast are less 
responsive to change in output price than farmers in other regions. An 
exception is other agricultural products, for which the supply response is 
much higher in the Northeast than in other regions.
TABLE 4.7: Own Price Elasticity of Supply, Share of Agricultural Product, 
and Imputed Transformation Parameter.
Producer Goods Elasticity Share ■^ iij
ESAN Agriculture
Paddy 0.50 0.5176 0.97
MCS 0.23 0.3846 0.60
Rubber 0.22 0.0 -
Others 0.30 0.0978 3.07
Non-ESAN Agriculture
Paddy 0.65 0.2197 2.96
MCS 0.23 0.1114 2.06
Rubber 0.22 0.0833 2.64
Others 0.30 0.5856 0.51
Note: is the CRETH transformation parameter.
4.4.7. Other Relevant Parameters
Other set of parameters to be estimated are related to the production 
structure of each multi-output industry. The share of each multi-output 
industry in the total supply of each agricultural producer good is calculated 
from NESDB's 1988 gross regional product. As shown in Table 4.8, the share 
of the Northeast (ESAN) in total production of rubber is negligible. However, 
it is kept in the model because of its future potential to grow at a very
2) see Kohli (1978) for the relationship between the own price 
elasticity of supply and Allen-Uzawa elasticity of transformation.
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substantial rate. The total returns to primary factors of the two multi-output 
industries are calculated by assuming that each output of the multi-output 
industries has the same cost share as shown in Table 4.9. This assumption is 
based on the ground that the cost share of each crop does not significantly 
differ across regions.
TABLE 4.8: Gross Regional Agricultural Product at 1972 Prices: 1988.
(Million Bahts)
Producer Goods
Region
Total Northeast Other Regions
Total Agriculture 73581 18968 54613
Paddy 17221 5223 11998
(100) (30.3) (69.7)
MCS 9965 3880 6085
(100) (38.9) (61.1)
Rubber 4547 - 4547
(100) (0.0) (100.0)
Others 41848 9865 31983
(100) (23.6) (76.4)
Note: Figures in parenthesis are in percent. Agricultural services and simple agricultural
processed are not included.
TABLE 4.9: Cost Structure of Major Crops: 1988. (%)
Producer Goods Labour Capital Land
Paddy 58.87 17.03 24.10
MCS 66.43 11.19 22.38
Rubber 66.83 9.49 23.68
Others 63.00 15.80 21.20
Sources: 1. Office of Agricultural Statistics.
2. Rubber Research Institute.
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Another set of share parameters is the share of each industry in the 
total employment of each type of labour. The shares of agricultural, 
manufacturing, EWTC, and services labour in the total labour force are the 
average of data from the Report of the 1988 Labour Force Survey, rounds 1 
and 3. Based on the Report of the 1987 Industrial Survey, the share of the 
manufacturing labour force is disaggregated into four manufacturing 
industries (Table 4.10).
TABLE 4.10: Labour Share, by Industry: 1988. (%)
Industry Unskilled Labour Skilled labour
1. ES AN 40.1007 -
2. Non-ESAN 30.0137 -
3. Agro-industry 0.7119 0.9997
4. Other Export Industries 2.4376 3.4232
5. Petroleum Industry 0.0059 0.0083
6. Other Import-competing Industries 6.0915 8.5544
7. EWTC 2.4396 5.9715
8. Services 18.1931 81.0429
Sources: 1. Report of the 1988 Labour Force Survey, Rounds 1 and 3.
2. Report of the 1987 Industrial Survey.
90
Appendix 4.1: Producer Goods, Classified by Trade Orientation
Producer Goods Trade Orientation
1. Paddy Non-traded
2. Maize, Cassava, and Sugar-cane, (MCS) Non-traded
3. Rubber Non-traded
4. Other Agricultural Products Import competing (IC)
5. Agro-industry Products Export oriented (EO)
6. Other Exportable Products Export oriented (EO)
7. Petroleum Industry Import competing (IC)
8. Other Import-competing Products Import competing (IC)
9. Electricity, Water Supply, Transport, 
and Communication, (EWTC) Non-traded
10. Services Non-traded
Note: Traded goods are those for which export-production or import- 
production ratio are at least 2%. Export oriented goods are those for which 
the total export is greater than twice of the total import, otherwise they are 
classified as import competing goods.
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Appendix 4.2: Equations in the Model
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A p p e n d ix  4.2: (continued)
Equation N um ber
(4.23) yh -  £O lqh-[/5lq+rlq]*Hfh 
+?°2jh-t/52j+r2j^H fh 
+S°3jh- [f*3)+r3)] -Hfh+W H uh. H
(4.24) yh = H dh.ydh+Hgh.drh+H uh.wh. H
(4.25) d \ =  yh+tdw H
(4.26) wh = e uh-yh- H
(4.27) = v \ + p i k . H
(4.28) ydh = BSh-shh+BCh-ch* H
(4.29) C3kh = ^ h k q ^ q ^ h k ^ h * HK
(4.30) u = XGuj .^w^+GUg.wS. 1
(4.31) pwn = “/Yr*4il+ /4il* I
(4.32) = IG x n .(pWu+g4u + (Xil+Z4n+ew) 
1
+ I G mi2.(pwi2+ lmi2+*0i2+«W)-i
1
(4.33) t ' = I 2 ,G lisXp°is+ t \ s+xVis). 
1 s
1
(4.34) fd = £ G dh.(ydh+fdh). 
h
1
(4.35) (f = 5 0 2 jg.(r2 j+/2j). 1
(4.36) y g = Hw.fw+H'.f’+Hd.td+Hf.ff. 1
(4.37) ^5is = 0. IS
(4.38) sg = vS+ pik. 1
(4.39) u S =  n 5 g -ys. 1
(4.40) cS = XSG^jg. [^ is+/^is^ +G5s.sg+G5u.wg. 
i s
1
(4.41) lOOdG = RS.yS-ES.cS~XB*^j|(^w+ ^ j|+x^ j|). 1
(4.42) t'js = tid is+ tbar[s+tbaris. IS
(4.43) fdh = td^+ tbard . H
Appendix 4.2: (continued)
Equation Number
(4.44) rlqj QJ
(4.45) rjj = ^H liqj-riqr J
(4.46) r w lq = rlq-cP‘- Q
(4.48) p°ji+Zj = ?S G 0isj.(^1isj+p1isj)+G01j.(/1j+r1j)+G02 j.(/2 j+r2j)+Gs2 j.sjj
-SH*i2j.((wi2+pwi2+ew+X1i2j+^4j-2j). Js
(4.49) ?B0ilj.(x0ilj+p°il) = J I G ° isj.(x1isj+p1isj)+G°1j.(/1j+r1j)
+G02j.(/2j+r2j)+Gs2j.sjj+G03j.(/3j+r3j). Jm
(4.50) pwil+ew+g4j1 = ß i i / i i+ a il .(pwn +«wV il+ ( x,l) I
(4.51) p0i2 = ßi2-(pwi2+eW)+^ 2 -^ wi2+^w+*mi2) I
(4.52) fxji+pwji+ew = I.H mi2j(*1i2j+imi2+pwi2+e'v)-2j, j = 5 and 6 2
(4.53) p lisj = H01is.p°is+Hglis.(pOis+Pis)
+Hrnlisj.(Grn7i.p07j+Gm81.p°gj). ISJ
(4.54) pr1 isj = G*ij.p1isj-K*ij.(pwi2+fmi2+^w+^4j-Zj) ISJ
(4.55) pnis = H0nis.p0js+Hgnis.(p°is+Pis)
+H™ is.(GnVi.p07i+Gm81.P°8l). 3IS
for n = 2, 3, and 5.
(4.56) p4n = H°4il.pOil+Hg4il.(pOil+«iil)
+Hm4ij.(Gm7j.p07j+Gm8j .p°8 j ). I
(4.57) pck = SZC3isk.p3is.
1 s
K
(4-58) f lq Q
(4.59) f 2j = /2j- J
(4.60) f 3j = /3j- Jm
(4.61) x°n = ? ^ i l j .^ i l j+B2ii.^2ii+SB3iijc.x3iijc
+B4il.x4i1+B5i1.x5ii+Bmil.Hmiim. I
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Appendix 4.2: (continued)
Equation N um ber
(4.62) x°i2 -  ?B1i2j.X1i2j+B2i2.X2i2
+f B 3i2ic.x3i2k+B5i2.x5i2.
k
I
(4.63) c3k = ^ G3kh-c3kh* h
K
(4.64) e3 = XGck.pck.
k
1
(4.65) C = ( l / S f) .2 H fk.pck, for k = 1,..., 5. 
k
1
(4.66) e = ?(^ii+Pwil)-Seii. 1
(4.67) m = p ° i2 + P Wi2)-S,V 1
(4.68) lOOdB = E.e-M .m . 1
(4.69) lOOdBOP = -100dG+F.sw+E.e-M.m. 1
(4.70) y = 2S °h.yh+S°gdf.
Total num ber of equations is
1
2QJ+NJ+4ISJ+(I-Js)Jm +8I+9IS+2ISK+4J+Jm+7H+2K+HK+2Q+24, w here 
H  = 1 0 ,1 = 10, J = 8, Js = 6, Jm  = 2, K = 10, N = 3, Q  = 2, an d  S = 2.
The total num ber of equations is 1616.
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Appendix 4.3: List of Variables
(Variables are in percentage change)
Variables and Definitions Number
f l q Total supply of labour type q Q
Total supply of industry j's specific capital J
Total supply of industry j's specific land Jm
/ lq j Industry j's demand for labour type q QJ
k Industry j's demand for factor n N J
r lq j The unit return to labour type q in industry j QJ
rflq j Wage differential between the unit return to 
labour type q in industry j and the unit return
to labour type q in general QJ
r lq
Unit return to labour type q in general Q
™ l q Real unit return to labour type q in general Q
r ij
Unit return to industry j's effective labour J
r2j Unit return to industry j's specific capital J
r3) Unit return to land in multi-output industry Jm
**isj Industry j's intermediate demand for the
good i from source s ISJ
2i Industry j's activity level J
A i Total domestic output of good i I
Ai Total import of good i I
^ °iij Good i produced by multi-output industry j (nyjm
p ° ii Basic price of domestic producer good i i
P°i2 Basic price of imported producer good i i
As Capital creation demand for good i from source s IS
*^isk Demand for good i from source s used in the
production of consumer good k IS K
* 3is Total demand for good i from source s used in the
production of all consumer goods IS
^ i l Export demand for domestic good i I
A is Government demand for good i from source s IS
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Appendix 4.3: (continued)
(Variables are in percentage change)
Variables and Definition Number
m*isj Margin used to facilitate the flow of ISJ
rrj2.
m  IS Margin used to facilitate the flow of x2is IS
^^isk Margin used to facilitate the flow of ISK
m 4 u Margin used to facilitate the flow of I
™5 is Margin used to facilitate the flow of x5is IS
m Total demand for margin 1
P’isj Purchase price of x1 jsj ISJ
pr’isj Purchase price of x1 jsj ISJ
P2 is Purchase price of x2is IS
F ^is Purchase price of x3isk IS
A \ Purchase price of x4 i | I
P5 is Purchase price of x5is IS
s Total savings 1
pik Capital price index 1
shh Savings of household h H
s i i
Savings of industry j j
sS Savings of government 1
sw Inflow of foreign direct investment in nominal terms 1
A Real savings of household h H
dj Real savings of industry j j
Real savings of government 1
v w Inflow of foreign direct investment in real terms 1
V Total real investment 1
Purchase price of consumer good k K
e3 Consumer price index 1
Total supply of consumer good k K
c \ h Household h's demand for consumer good k HK
yh Total income of household h H
y dh Disposable income of household h H
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Appendix 4.3: (continued)
(Variables are in percentage change)
Variables and Definition Number
Ch Consumption expenditure of household h H
d \  Direct tax burden on household h H
Direct tax rate on household h H
wh Household h's assistance payment to transfer pool H
wS Government's transfer payment to transfer pool 1
u Total payment to transfer pool 1
ew Exchange rate in Baht per US$ 1
pwn f.o.b. price of export of good i in US$ I
pwi2 c.i.f. price of import of good i in US$ I
j Exogenous change in world demand for
export i I
Shift variable on export i I
fw Government revenue from trade taxes 1
f1 Government revenue from indirect taxes 1
Government revenue from direct taxes 1
tf Government revenue from property 1
i/g Total government revenue 1
Cg Total government expenditure 1
dG Windfall effect of policy shocks on government
budget deficit 1
Export tax rate on the export of good i I
fmi2 Import tax rate on the import of good i I
t\ s Indirect tax rate on good i from source s IS
tidfe Exogenously determined indirect tax rate on good
i from source s IS
tdfr Exogenously determined direct tax rate on household h H
tbaris Average indirect tax rate on all producer goods 1
tbar's Average indirect tax rate on producer goods from source s S 
tbard Average direct tax rate 1
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Appendix 4.3: (continued)
(Variables are in percentage change)
Variables and Definitions Number
e Total export revenue 1
m Total import bill 1
£ Poverty line 1
dB Trade balance 1
dBOP Balance of payment 1
y GDP 1
Total number of variables is
3QJ+NJ+4ISJ+(I-Js)Jm +13I+10IS+2ISK+6J+2Jm +9H+2K+HK+3Q+S+27 
= 1747.
By Walras Law, one equation can be excluded from the model. 
Number of exogenous variables = 131+1 = 132.
99
Appendix 4.4: List of Parameters
Parameters and Definitions
Elasticity of substitution between two types of labour employed by 
industry j
A°!qj Share of labour type q in the total wage bill of industry j 
o°nj Elasticity of substitution between primary factors of production 
employed by industry j
A°nj Share of primary factor n in industry j's total cost of primary factors 
ohj Elasticity of substitution between industry j's intermediate input i 
from different sources
Hhgj Share of intermediate input i from s in the total cost of intermediate 
input i in industry j
t0^  Elasticity of transformation in the multi-output industry j 
H*jij Modified revenue share of good i produced by multi-output industry j 
H0^  Revenue share of good i produced by multi-output industry j 
D^-jj Output share of good i produced by industry j in total output i 
Ahgj Share of margin that facilitates the flow of good i from source s to 
industry j in total margin
A2is Share of margin that facilitates the flow of good i from source s for the 
creation of capital in total margin
A3isk Share of margin that facilitates the flow of good i from source s to 
the producer of consumer good k in total margin 
A4^  Share of margin that facilitates the flow of export i in total margin 
A5is Share of margin that facilitates the flow of good i from s for 
government consumption in total margin 
H sh Share of household h's savings in total savings 
Hsg Share of government savings in total savings 
H sj Share of industry j's savings in total savings 
H sw Share of the inflow of foreign direct investment in total savings 
a2j Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported 
producer goods in the creation of capital 
G2iS Cost share of producer good i from source s in capital creation
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Appendix 4.4: (continued)
Parameters and Definitions
H2is Cost share of producer good i from source s in the total cost of 
producer good i used in capital creation 
o3^  Elasticity of substitution between input i from different source used in 
producing consumer good k
H3isk Share of the total cost of input i used in the production of consumer 
good k accounted for by input i from sorce s 
G3isk Share of total input i from source s accounted for by the production of 
consumer good k
Hfh Share of factor income in total income of household h 
0*iqh Share of total income from labour type q accounted for by 
household h
Oiqh Share of total household h's income accounted for by the income from 
labour type q
0*2jh Share of total income from industry j specific capital accounted for by 
household h
0 2jh Share of total household h's income accounted for by the income from 
industry j's specific capital
0*3jh Share of total income from industry j's specific land accounted for by 
household h
0 3jh Share of total household h's income accounted for by the income from 
industry j's specific land
Huh Share of non-factor income in the total income of household h 
Hdh Share of disposable income in total income of household h 
HSh Share of direct tax payment in total income of household h 
Huh Share of assistance payment in total income of household h 
0^ Income elasticity of household h's expenditure
Bch Share of consumption expenditure in household h's disposable income 
Bsh Share of savings in total household h's disposable income
Appendix 4.4: (continued)
Parameters and Definitions
Tlhkq Household h's own price and cross price elasticities of demand for 
consumer good k
Hhk Household h's expenditure elasticity of demand for consumer good k 
Guh Share of household h's assistance payment in total transfer pool 
Gug Share of government transfer in total transfer pool 
Yj Reciprocal of elasticity of world demand for Thai export of good i 
Gxi:l Share of revenue from the export tax of good i in total tariff revenue 
Gmi2 Share of revenue from the import tax of good i in total tariff revenue 
G \s Share of total indirect tax account for by producer good i from source s 
Gdh Share of total direct tax accounted for by household h 
O 2jg Share of government in total return to industry j's specific capital 
0 2jg Share of revenue from industry j's specific capital in total government 
revenue from property
Hw Share of tariff revenue in total government revenue 
H* Share of indirect tax revenue in total government revenue 
Hd Share of direct tax revenue in total government revenue 
Hf Share of property income in total government revenue 
Rg Government revenue at the base year 
rj5g Income elasticity of government transfer
G5is Share of total government expenditure accounted for by expenditure 
on good i from source s
G5s Share of government savings in total government expenditure 
G5u Share of total government expenditure accounted for by government 
transfer
Cg Government expenditure at the base year
G°isj Cost share of intermediate input i from source s in the total revenue 
of industry j
G°ij Share of labour cost in the total cost of industry j 
G°2j Share of capital rent in the total cost of industry j
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Appendix 4.4: (continued)
Parameters and Definitions
Gs2 j Share of industry savings in the total cost of industry j 
G°3j Share of land rent in the total cost of industry j 
H*i2 j Share of import tax on intermediate input i in the total cost 
of industry j
Share of total revenue of multi-output industry j accounted for by 
good i
ßil Share of domestic export price in the world price of export i 
a A1 Share of export tax in the world price of export i 
ßi2 Share of world price in the import price of producer good i 
a i2 Share of import tax in the import price of producer good i 
HH^j Share of import tax on input i in the total tax on imported inputs paid 
by industry j
H0nis Share of basic price in the purchase price of good i from source s for 
purpose n
Hg j^g Share of indirect tax in the purchase price of good i from source s for 
purpose n
Hmnig Share of margin in the purchase price of good i from source s for 
purpose n
Gm71 Value share of good 7 in the cost of supplying one unit of margin 
Gmsi Value share of good 8 in the cost of supplying one unit of margin 
C3isk Cost share of good i from source s in the total cost of producing one 
unit of consumer good k
ßh|j Share of industry j's intermediate demand in the total demand for 
domestic good i
B2^  Share of capital creation demand in the total demand for 
domestic good i
B3nk Share of consumer goods k demand for domestic good i in the total 
demand for domestic good i
B4^  Share of export demand in the total demand for domestic good i
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A ppendix 4.4: (continued)
Parameters and Definitions
B5i:l Share of government demand in the total demand for domestic good i 
Nlqj Share of industry j's demand in total demand for labour type q 
B111^  Share of domestic goods i used as margin in the total demand for 
domestic good i
Hmil Share of domestic good i used as margin in the total demand for 
domestic goods used as margin
B*i2j Share of industry j's intermediate demand in the total demand for 
imported good i
B2i2 Share of capital creation demand in the total demand for imported 
good i
B3^  Share of consumer goods k demand for imported good i in the total 
demand for imported good i
B5i2 Share of government demand in the total demand for imported good i 
G \h  Share of total household demand for consumer good k accounted for 
by household h's demand
Gck Share of consumer good k in household consumption expenditure 
G^j Value share of the general purchase price of imported intermediate 
input i to industry j in the purchase price of input i net of tax rebate 
K*ij Value share of tax rebate in the purchase price of imported 
intermediate input i for industry j net of tax rebate 
Sf Share of food expenditure in poverty line 
Hfk Share of food consumer good k in total poverty line 
Sei:l Share of producer good i's export in total export revenue 
Smi2 Share of producer good i's import in total import bill 
F Inflow of foreign direct investment at the base year 
E Export value at the base year 
M Import value at the base year 
S \  Share of household h's income in GDP 
S°g Share of government property income in GDP
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Appendix 4.5: Typical List of Exogenous Variables
(Variables are in percentage change)
Variables and Definitions Number
/®lq Total supply of labour type q, q = 1 1
/s2j Total supply of industry j’s specific capital J
f 53j Total supply of industry j's specific land Jm
l^qj Wage differential between the unit return to 
labour type q in industry j and the unit return 
to labour type q in general QJ
rw^q Real unit return to labour type q in general, q * 1 Q-l
x4^ Export demand for domestic good i 1-2
z ; \  Real savings of household h H
vij Real savings of industry j J
v8  Real savings of government 1
v w  Inflow of foreign direct investment in real terms 1
ew Exchange rate in Baht per US$ 1
pwi2 c.i.f. price of import of good i in US$ I
Exogenous change in world demand for 
export i I
Shift variable on export i 2
dG Windfall effect of policy shocks on government
budget deficit 1
I Export tax rate on the export of good i 1-2
fmi2 Import tax rate on the import of good i I
tidfe Exogenously determined indirect tax rate on good
i from source s IS
tdfr Exogenously determined direct tax rate on household h H
tbaris Average indirect tax rate on all producer goods 1
tbarls Average indirect tax rate on producer goods from source s S
dBOP Balance of payment 1
Total number of exogenous variables is QJ+2J+Jm+IS+5I+2H+Q+S+4 = 132.
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Appendix 4.6: Diagrammatic Explanation of the Model
1. Primary Factor
2. Industry Intermediate Input Demand
3. Capital Creation Demand
Effective Labour
Skilled Labour
Effective Input i
Imported Input iDomestic Input i
Effective Input i
Effective Input I
Domestic Input i Imported Input i
Unskilled Labour
Industry Output j
Agricultural Land
Effective Primary Factor
Effective Primary Factor
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4. Intermediate Input Demand of Producer of Consumer Good
6. Domestic Output Demand
Export Demand
Imported Input iDomestic Input i
Effective Input i Effective Input I
Imported Input iDomestic Input i
Industry Demand
Consumer Good k
Government Demand
Capital Creation Demand
Total Output of Each Producer Good
Effective Demand for Producer Good i
7. Savings and Investment
Foreign SavingsNational Savings
Industry SavingsHousehold Savings Government Savings
Fund for Capital Creation
1 0 7
8. Household
Households
SavingsDirect Tax Consumption
Primary Factor Income Transfer from other Households
Transfer to
other Households
9. Government
SavingsSpending
Trade TaxDirect Tax Indirect Tax
Government
Primary Factor Income
Transfer to Households
10. Balance of Payments
Import Bill
Export Revenue Foreign Savings
Balance of Payments
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- CHAPTER 5 -
AN ESTIMATION OF CONSUMER DEMAND
5.1. Introduction
This thesis aims to use a general equilibrium framework to investigate the 
income distribution impact of industrial protection in Thailand. The general 
equilibrium model and the measurement of income distribution in general 
equilibrium, are developed in Chapters Four and Six. The methodology 
requires various parameters which explain the behaviour of economic agents, 
e.g. shares and elasticities. The important parameters are also discussed in 
these two chapters. The discussion includes the Social Accounting Matrix 
and various elasticities - except for elasticity of consumer demand. In this 
chapter, private or household consumption expenditure, which is an 
important part of national income, will be examined. This is essential for 
policy analysis. It provides information not only for the allocation of 
resources, but also for welfare improvement.
The need for study on private consumption behaviour in Thailand 
can be seen from the share of the consumption, which is about 80% of total 
consumption expenditure, and more than 60% of Gross Domestic Product. 
Past studies have been carried out both at macro- and at micro-level. Macro­
level analyses, based on time series data from the national income of 
Thailand, provide short run estimates. The micro-level analyses, based on 
cross-section data, provide long run estimates. However, a micro-level
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analyses is more relevant for this study since it allows more disaggregation 
of households.
This chapter focuses on the analysis of consumption behaviour by 
using cross-section data. Following this introductory section, the chapter is 
organised into three parts: a data discussion; the theory and estimation of 
consumer demand; and a conclusion. The major objective is to estimate 
households' consumer demand, by using household expenditure data from 
the 1988 Household Socio-economic Survey (SES), and the 1988 regional 
price data from the Department of Business Economics. Households will be 
disaggregated by urban and rural settings, each with five expenditure 
classes, as classified by per capita household expenditure. The resulting 
dataset will be analysed by the well-known Linear Expenditure System 
(LES), developed by Stone (1954). The model produces estimates that satisfy 
two important economic properties, adding up and homogeneity, which is 
suitable for the analysis of household behaviour in the general equilibrium 
framework. The adding up property requires the share-weighted sum of 
expenditure elasticities equal to unity. The homogeneity property means 
homogeneity of degree zero in price and expenditure, i.e. there is no change 
in demand if all prices and consumption expenditure change by the same 
proportion.
5.2. Datasets
The 1988 Household Socio-economic Survey (SES) of the National Statistical 
Office, and the 1988 consumer price data of the Department of Business 
Economics are the two main sources of data used in this study. Detailed 
discussion of the two sources of data are as follows.
5.2.1. Household Expenditure
The SES provides detailed information of households' income, expenditure, 
savings, various demographic variables, and weight attached to each 
observation. It contains 11,045 observations from a stratified two-stage
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sampling1 1. The nature of this dataset is that observations represent stratum 
of unequal size and, thus, cannot be treated as random samples of equal 
probability. Past studies on consumption behaviour do not utilise weight 
information attached to each observation. Thus, the well-known 
heteroscedasticity problem in cross section data is more severe. Results can 
be inefficient estimators. The proof of a similar case (the case of grouped data 
in ordinary least square or OLS) is well-explained in Kmenta (1971), and 
Stewart and Wallis (1981). In this study, each observation is weighted by the 
weight information.
Household is defined as a person or group of persons who, together, 
make provision for food and other essentials of living. They are divided into 
ten classes, by per capita expenditure and urban/rural settings. Urban 
households mean households situated in municipal areas and sanitary 
districts. The remaining households are rural households. The characteristics, 
and the upper and lower limits of per capita expenditure of each quintile are 
presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Uk and Rk mean urban and rural households 
in the kth quintile. U1 is the poorest urban quintile, U5 is the richest urban 
quintile, and so on.
Household expenditure, as reported in the 1988 SES, is divided into 
ten commodities - five food commodities and five non-food commodities. For 
convenience, the term - commodity - is used, interchangeable with consumer 
good in other chapters. The ten commodities are 1) rice and cereals; 2) meat 
and fish; 3) fruit and vegetables; 4) other foods including meal eaten away 
from home; 5) non-alcoholic beverages; 6) clothing and footwear; 7) house 
and housing expenditure; 8) transport and communication; 9) medical 
expenses, education and entertainment; and 10) other non-foods including 
tobacco and alcoholic beverages. These household expenditures are reported
1) As explained in the report of the 1988 household socio-economic
survey, group of provinces in each region, and the greater Bangkok 
area, constitute strata. Each strata was divided into three parts, 
according to municipal areas, sanitary districts and villages. The 
sample selection of blocks and villages were performed separately 
and independently in each part by using, probability proportional to 
the total number of households.
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without any information about prices. Thus, price information from the 
Department of Business Economics will be augmented to the SES dataset.
TABLE 5.1: Urban and Rural Household Characteristics: 1988.
Urban Quintile
Characteristics ------------------------------------------------
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
Income 2750 4459 5969 7387 12141
Expenditure 2405 3797 5109 6369 11886
Per capita Expenditure 
Minimum 189 709 1101 1546 2371
Maximum 708 1100 1545 2370 42380
Number of 
Observations 1256 1259 1252 1254 1255
Weight
Mean 570.04 622.81 681.74 736.41 774.52
S.D. 149.85 201.84 240.63 240.15 233.95
TABLE 5.1: (Continued).
Chracteristics
Rural Quintile
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Income 1732 2313 2735 3688 5557
Expenditure 1545 2123 2616 3308 6313
Per Capita Expenditure 
Minimum 97 385 533 728 1058
Maximum 384 532 727 1057 52218
Number of 
Observations 954 955 960 947 953
Weight
Mean 2151.8 2039.3 1944.5 1882.8 1842.7
S.D. 311.59 320.98 311.06 281.40 258.17
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
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TABLE 5.2: Weighted Average of Some Factors, by Household: 1988.
Household A.P.C. Size Adult Children
Urban 1 0.8745 4.6 3.4 1.2
Urban 2 0.8515 4.1 3.2 0.9
Urban 3 0.8559 3.8 3.1 0.7
Urban 4 0.8622 3.3 2.8 0.5
Urban 5 0.9790 2.7 2.5 0.2
Rural 1 0.8920 5.2 3.6 1.6
Rural 2 0.9179 4.6 3.5 1.1
Rural 3 0.9565 4.1 3.2 0.9
Rural 4 0.8970 3.7 3.0 0.7
Rural 5 1.1360 3.3 2.7 0.6
Note: A.P.C. Average propensity to consume. 
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
5.2.2. Regional Price Indices
The price data consists of nine datasets, one for the major Bangkok area; four 
for urban areas in central, northern, northeastern and southern regions; and 
the other four for rural areas in each of the four regions. Thus, there are nine 
prices for each commodity. The resulting dataset allows different consumer 
prices across regions and communities (urban and rural). However, it still 
assumes a single commodity price in each regional urban or rural area. In 
absolute terms, these price datasets may not be the actual prices faced by the 
sampling households. In relative terms, they are expected to reflect the 
regional price differences which are, at least, preferable to assuming a single 
price faced by the households.
There are two studies on regional price differences (Oey, 1976 and 
Duangkamon, 1989), which attempt to investigate the significance of regional 
price differences in Thailand. But the level of commodity aggregation, year, 
and the focus of the studies are not compatible with this study. Here, a
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process is adapted, which is similar to the one used by the Department of 
Business Economics, and Oey (1976). The regional price dataset is 
constructed in four steps. First, Bangkok prices are chosen as base prices for 
all commodities. This is equivalent to choosing the unit of every commodity 
such that its Bangkok price is one2). Second, prices of other regions are then 
normalised by Bangkok prices. Third, commodity relative prices are 
aggregated by weights provided by the Department of Business Economics, 
so that the grouped relative prices are comparable with the SES commodity 
classification. Fourth, the expenditure share weighted sum of the grouped 
relative prices give the relative prices of the ten commodities as previously 
classified. The general formula is presented by Equation 5.1. The aggregated 
regional relative prices are reported in Table 5.3.
(5.1) PRr = E(Pir/P io)Sir,
i
TABLE 5.3: Regional Consumer Price Index: 1970 and 1988.
Region
Community ------------------------------------------
South North
-east
North Central 
& East
Bangkok
Area
1970
Urban 110 107 101 96 100
Rural 116 104 101 99 -
1988 94.13 93.72 94.90 93.53 100
Sources: 1) 1970 indices from Table 2, Oey (1976). 
2) 1988 indices calculated by this thesis.
2) In a seminar on an early draft of this chapter, participants 
raised a question as to whether the choice of using Bangkok prices 
as base prices for all commodities will affect the estimates. A 
sensitivity analysis was done by, first, excluding Bangkok from the 
estimation of consumer demand, and second, by estimating consumer 
demand for Bangkok separately. Comparing the estimates in both cases 
with the estimates reported in this chapter, differences in the 
estimates are insignificant.
114
when PRr = the relative price of region r,
Pir = the price of commodity i in region r,
Pio = the price of commodity i in Bangkok, and
Sir = the weight given by the Department of Business Economics or a 
household's budget share of commodity i.
5.3. Theory and Estimation
There are at least four pertinent studies on consumption behaviour. The first 
two studies are Direk and Amnat (1988), and Suchart (1989). They have three 
features in common. They employ either the Linear Expenditure System 
(LES) or the Extended Linear Expenditure System (ELES), which are based 
on utility maximizing behaviour of consumers subjected to budget 
constraints. They also use data from the household socio-economic survey 
(SES) of the National Statistical Office, which contain no price information. 
Therefore, each commodity is assumed to have the same price across regions. 
Food is aggregated into only one commodity. There are also some differences 
between the two studies. Direk and Amnat analyse demand for twelve 
commodities (of which only one is food) by three households (municipal, 
sanitary district and rural). By using single equation estimation, they face an 
over-identification problem. A need to satisfy budget constraints is not 
considered, and the additivity and homogeneity properties of LES are not 
guaranteed. Consequently, various elasticities of demand cannot be drawn 
from the model. Suchart provides more detailed analysis of consumers by the 
disaggregation of households into eight classes, four classes for both urban 
and rural households. Household demand for food and seven non-food 
commodities is analysed. The savings decision is endogenised by the model 
(ELES). His result is weakened by the lack of price information. Suchart 
argues that his single price assumption is supported by Oey (1976), who 
states that regional price differences in Thailand are minor when compared 
with the experience of other developing countries (P. 48, Suchart, 1989). 
However, Oey also concludes that these price differences are significant 
(Table 5.3). Thus, the role of price information cannot be overlooked.
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The other two studies are by Prasarn (1983) and Mason et al. (1987 
quoted in Direk, 1989), who use a linear and /o r log-linear model, both of 
which do not satisfy various economic properties. The attractiveness of these 
studies is their inclusion of demographic variables such as sex and age 
group, and, in the case of Prasarn, price information and quality. Prasarn's 
results have considerably lower explanatory power and, therefore, are 
questionable. Moreover, he only analyses demand for food commodities and 
ignores the cross price effect of non-food commodities. The results of these 
studies are presented in Table 5.4.
TABLE 5.4: Selected Elasticities from Other Studies.
Elasticity Income Own Price
1) Prasarn’s estimates for low income group: 1975/76
Rice 0.401 -0.736
Meat
Beef 0.422 -7.181
Chicken 0.295 0.252
Pork 0.704 -2.215
2) Suchart's estimates for food and non-alcoholic beverages: 1981
Urban 0.149 -0.079
Rural 0.313 -0.157
3) Mason's estimates: 1981
Food 0.722 -
Beverages and Tobacco 0.979 -
Clothes 1.290 -
House 1.085 -
Health 1.299 -
Personal 0.884 -
Transport 1.708 -
Entertainment 1.655 -
Education 1.242 -
Others 1.762 _
Sources: 1) Table 14, Prasarn (1983).
2) Tables 4.10 and 4.11, Suchart (1989).
3) Mason et al. (1987, quoted in Table 7, Direk, 1989)
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Given the objectives of this thesis, four important factors should be 
included in the estimation of consumer demand: 1) the disaggregation of 
household by income/expenditure class, and urban and rural setting, 2) price 
information, 3) higher degree of commodity disaggregation, especially food, 
and 4) demographic variables such as household size and composition. The 
implementation of the results from previous empirical studies is limited by 
the fact that none of them contain all four features. Thus, there is a need for 
an estimation of consumer demand that contains all these features.
5.3.1. Consumer Demand System
The model for the estimation of consumer demand can be divided into two 
broad categories, dual models and primal models. The most widely used 
model in the first category is the AIDS (Almost Ideal Demand System) 
developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). This model is said to contain 
many desirable properties which are well discussed by its pioneers. The 
major conclusion is that this model has many properties which are not 
possessed simultaneously by any of its competitors, such as the Rotterdam 
and Translog models. It is also said to be un-restricted to any form of utility 
function, but to be restricted to the Piglog cost function. Moreover, 
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions can be rejected (Blanciforti and 
Green, 1983).
The well-known primal models are Stone's LES and Lluch's ELES, of 
which the quadratic expenditure system or QES developed by Howe, Poliak 
and Wales (1979) is a general form. The weakness of the QES is its high 
degree of non-linearity, which causes estimation difficulties and is time 
consuming. LES and ELES are more flexible, because of the lower degree of 
non-linearity. With single equation estimation, they can be linearly estimated 
by OLS.
The critique of LES is based on its restriction on Linear Geary-Stone 
utility function. It follows that the model assumes a linear Engel function and 
rules out inferior goods. Its strength lies in the utility maximizing behaviour 
of the consumer in the model. Thus, its estimates have the two desired
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properties of consumer demand, additivity and homogeneity, which is the 
major aim of this chapter. In order to satisfy the symmetry and semi­
definiteness of substitution matrix, inferiority and complementarity are ruled 
out (Stone, 1954).
Savings is treated differently between LES and ELES. It is exogenously 
determined in LES, while it is endogenised in ELES. Thus, LES provides 
information on the expenditure elasticity of demand and ELES the income 
elasticity of demand. The choice of consumption/savings function is more 
flexible in LES than in ELES. Any functional form can be applied, provided 
that it is best fitted with data. The saving function in ELES is not supported 
by any consumption/savings theory in macro-economic theory. Though the 
Keynesian function comes close, ELES tends to produce a biased and 
inconsistent estimator of Keynesian marginal propensity to consume (MPC). 
The proof of a similar case (the case of nominal variables) is in Wallis (1979, 
p. 3).
As a guide-line, a pre-analysis of the Thai dataset was carried out by 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS). It shows that consumer demand is better 
explained by LES than ELES. As shown in Table 5.5, the number of 
significant t-statistic of household expenditure (LES) in the demand equation 
of each of the ten commodities is more than those of household income 
(ELES).
LES assumes that the consumer has utility maximizing behaviour and 
total expenditure is exogenously determined. The total expenditure is 
allocated in two steps, as described by LES. First, at a given set of prices, the 
consumer consumes each commodity to a level called committed level. 
Second, the consumer distributes the remaining expenditure in such a way 
that utility will be maximized. Thus, the consumer's behaviour can be 
explained by Equation 5.2. First order conditions lead to Equation 5.3 which 
is suitable for the estimation of consumer demand behaviour.
(5.2) Maximize U = Eßiln(Qr yi),
i
subject to E = ?PiQi,
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(5.3) Ei = PtfffßiCE-HPffiJ+Ui,
i
when E = consumer's total expenditure,
Ej = consumer's expenditure on commodity i,
Pi = the price of commodity i,
Yi = the consumer's committed consumption level of commodity i,
Yi-0,
Qi = total consumption level on commodity i, Qi>Yi,
ßi = the marginal expenditure of commodity i out of total expenditure,
ßi>0 and Eßi = 1, and 
i
Ui = the disturbance term, and Sui = 0.
TABLE 5.5: Comparison between LES and ELES by Single Equation 
Estimation.
Household
jf
Number of Significant t-statistic
LES (Expenditure) ELES (Income)
Urban 1 10 6
Urban 2 8 6
Urban 3 9 1
Urban 4 9 4
Urban 5 9 8
Rural 1 10 6
Rural 2 9 1
Rural 3 10 3
Rural 4 8 4
Rural 5 5 8
Note:* Number of equations, out of ten equations, of which t-statistic of household
expenditure (LES) or household income (ELES) are more than 2. The models are
LES Ej = Piyi+ßi(E- EPjY^+Uj.
i
Ei = piYi+ßi(Y-  2PiYi)+Ui, andELES
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In the case of n commodities, the system consists of n-1 non-linear 
equations. There are 2n-l parameters to be estimated, n committed levels (yj) 
and n-1 marginal budget shares (ßj). The total committed expenditure (ZP^ yß
should not be misinterpreted as a basic need or a poverty line. Since, by 
definition, yj is less than Qj and, therefore, the use of the total committed 
expenditure will under-estimate poverty incidence.
The estimation of various elasticities depend on ßj and yp A 
supernumerary ratio is defined as -<£> which is equal to l-(l/E).IPjyp
If Wj = Ej/E, the expenditure (q),Marshallian price (ejj), and Hicksian price 
(rjjj) elasticities of demand can be calculated from the following equations.
(5.4) 6; = ßi/W j.
(5.5) Eji — £j[0-Wj(l-r-0.£j)]
(5.6) =  - q . W j d + O . e j ) ] .
(5.7) T|jj = E id -W ß ch .
(5.S) T]jj = -Ej.Wj.O.
Good 2
Good 1
Figure 5.1: Linear Expenditure System (LES)
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TABLE 5.6: Average M onthly Per Capita Expenditure (PjQj or Ej), by 
Commodity and Household. (Baht)
Commodity
Urban Quintile
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
TOTAL 2405.06 3797.39 5108.52 6369.20 11885.65
1. 368.83 340.66 291.06 254.73 208.47
2. 293.93 362.30 413.38 415.60 435.92
3. 156.12 200.30 261.19 294.42 353.26
4. 392.82 774.15 1172.70 1421.80 1930.10
5. 13.21 32.76 69.06 77.59 95.83
6. 99.77 173.87 249.31 355.31 789.32
7. 600.68 967.46 1278.80 1704.90 3547.00
8. 96.23 227.99 393.46 636.72 2401.10
9. 258.63 477.30 656.28 805.15 1473.90
10. 124.84 240.60 323.28 402.98 650.75
TABLE 5.6: (Continued)
Commodity
Rural Quintile
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
TOTAL 1545.29 2123.20 2616.41 3307.50 6312.75
1 . 405.73 439.40 433.82 401.13 377.32
2. 223.89 315.63 355.04 397.41 457.84
3. 115.38 153.80 180.84 199.73 248.33
4. 153.52 223.12 308.62 437.90 695.06
5. 1.99 5.31 10.55 20.14 39.95
6. 77.91 147.97 200.50 279.89 425.60
7. 326.87 450.40 565.54 729.57 1946.70
8. 41.06 82.88 132.04 266.84 957.99
9. 132.59 196.65 267.64 345.01 675.70
10. 66.35 108.04 161.82 229.88 488.26
Notes: 1. Rice and cereals. 2. Meat and fish.
3. Fruit and vegetables. 4. Other foods.
5. Non-alcoholic beverages. 6. Clothing and footwear.
7. House and housing expenditure. 8. Transport and communication.
9. Medical expenses, education, and entertainment. 10. Other non-foods.
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
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In this thesis, a demand system will be estimated from Equation 5.3 by 
using a household as a unit of consumer. Although the choice of unit is still 
debatable, whether on a household or a per capita basis, the use of a 
household has many advantages over the per capita approach. It implicitly 
allows economies of scale. Decision making is always done at household 
level. However, it can be criticized on the ground that each household has a 
different composition and size. In particular, the size of rural and/or poor 
households, which are larger than those of urban and/or rich households. 
The inclusion of household composition and size will be proposed in 
Appendix 5.1. Despite higher degree of non-linearity than Equation 5.3, the 
model could be estimated if time is not a constraint.
5.3.2. Discussion of the Results
An estimation of a system of nine non-linear demand equations was 
performed separately for each of the ten households. The technique is a 
maximum likelihood nonlinear estimation. Each observation is weighted by 
the weight information from SES. There are three important sets of 
parameters for the estimation of various elasticities as shown by Equations 
5.4-5.8. These are average commodity expenditure, commodity committed 
consumption levels, and marginal budget shares of which estimates are 
reported in Tables 5.6,5.7, and 5.8.
By commodity, a zero committed expenditure for a commodity 
indicates that there is welfare gain from every baht spent on that particular 
commodity. A non zero committed expenditure indicates that, unless 
expenditure on the commodity exceeds committed level, there is no welfare 
gain from purchasing the commodity. Table 5.7 shows that committed 
expenditure for the first four commodities, i.e., foods, is significantly higher 
than zero in every quintile. This reflects the fact that foods are basic needs for 
every household. Committed expenditure for non-alcoholic beverages, and 
clothing and footwear is very low for urban households, and it is zero for 
poor urban households. Except for the top rural households, it is also zero for 
rural households. Except for the top rural households, committed
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expenditure for house and housing expenditure significantly differs from 
zero. Committed expenditure for transport and communication is zero for 
every quintile, including urban households for which transport and 
communication occupies much of their daily life. Total committed per capita 
expenditure (TCE) for households in every quintile in urban areas are higher 
than equivalent quintiles in rural areas, e.g. TCE of the lowest quintile in 
urban and rural areas is 664.17 Bahts and 553.06 Bahts, respectively.
TABLE 5.7: Monthly Committed Per Capita Expenditure (P^), by 
Commodity and Household. (Baht)
Urban Quintile
Commodity -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
TOTAL
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
664.17
165.01
(27.60)
109.22
(18.80)
60.99
(19.59)
63.64
(7.32)
0 .
( 0.00) 
0.
( 0.00)
260.90
(27.32)
0 .
( 0.00)
0.
( 0.00)
4.41 
( 0.88)
1154.97
168.90
(24.56)
119.10
(14.55)
88.25
(20.73)
201.96
(11.45)
4.94
(3.17)
26.02 
(3.50)
456.43
(27.07)
0.
( 0.00) 
0.
( 0.00)
89.37
( 10.02)
1370.44
123.71
(21.69)
108.86
(10.94)
97.27
(17.89)
400.29
(18.08)
0.
( 0.00)
22.55 
(2.41)
490.89
(21.58)
0.
( 0.00) 
0.
( 0.00)
126.87
(11.31)
1724.64
106.92
(20.14)
63.34 
(6.48)
90.34 
(15.49)
651.69
(28.54)
29.45
( 10.68)
67.04 
(5.92)
590.35
(19.80)
0.
( 0.00) 
0.
( 0.00)
125.51
(9.12)
5105.39
167.98
(39.31)
275.02
(24.03)
254.73
(35.83)
1658.04
(66.53)
77.45
(30.60)
437.82
(19.01)
990.62 
(7.06)
0 .
( 0.00)
752.71
(17.94)
491.01
(24.68)
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TABLE 5.7: (Continued)
Commodity
Rural Quintile
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
TOTAL 553.06 613.37 596.65 761.68 2477.71
1. 176.19 153.26 98.11 124.97 341.59
(19.48) (17.13) (8.22) (16.16) (65.41)
2. 83.54 93.99 116.99 126.78 395.17
(14.94) (11.52) (13.41) (13.89) (54.89)
3. 52.55 79.58 81.06 94.84 214.13
(17.05) (19.81) (18.05) (21.76) (59.77)
4. 55.26 76.45 69.25 99.46 551.25
(14.31) (12.08) (8.55) (8.47) (47.56)
5. 0. 0. 0. 0. 31.45
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (19.74)
6. 0. 0. 0. 0. 299.15
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (26.18)
7. 173.77 210.09 231.24 315.63 0.
(25.97) (20.96) (15.43) (18.17) (0.00)
8. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
9. 11.75 0. 0. 0. 299.75
(3.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (11.71)
10. 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 . 345.22
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (16.26)
Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistic. These high t-statistics are results of the large
number of observations used in the estimation.
The expenditure elasticity of demand (q) can be used to determine 
whether the commodity is a necessity or a luxury good (Tables 5.10-5.19). In 
general, the results show that the first three food commodities are necessities 
(q<l). The fourth food commodity, other foods, is a luxury for households in 
the two lowest urban quintiles, and a necessity for households in every rural 
quintile and the other three urban quintiles. An explanation is that, as income 
increases, low income urban residents tend to spend more on food eaten
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away from home (other foods). Clothing and footwear; transport and 
communication; and medical expenses, entertainment and education are also 
luxuries. The exception is households in the richest quintile in both areas, 
where clothing and footwear; and medical expenses, entertainment and 
education are necessities. More results are in Tables 5.10-5.19. On average, 
the estimates are close to those reported by Mason et al. (1987, quoted in 
Direk, 1989) (Table 5.4). For examples, Mason et al.'s q  are 0.722 for food, 
and 1.290 for clothes, while the simple average q  from this thesis are 0.7051 
for rice and cereals, and 1.1185 for clothing and footwear.
TABLE 5.8: Marginal Budget Share (ßj), by Commodity and Household.
Urban Quintile
Commodity
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
1 . 0.1118 0.0587 0.0415 0.0301 0.0053
(23.33) (16.29) (18.86) (18.60) (9.13)
2. 0.1005 0.0854 0.0778 0.0742 0.0226
(21.97) (21.30) (22.24) (28.52) (16.32)
3. 0.0526 0.0403 0.0429 0.0437 0.0140
(20.07) (19.08) (21.27) (25.58) (15.14)
4. 0.1967 0.2334 0.2217 0.1757 0.0490
(28.25) (29.35) (30.50) (26.79) (15.22)
5. 0.0078 0.0104 0.0187 0.0106 0.0025
(14.16) (11.84) (20.32) (11.44) (6.72)
6. 0.0534 0.0462 0.0536 0.0567 0.0500
(21.46) (10.84) (14.00) (15.40) (16.74)
7. 0.2013 0.1984 0.2165 0.2462 0.3665
(29.60) (27.01) (31.83) (35.41) (31.86)
8. 0.0603 0.0831 0.0990 0.1345 0.3707
(23.83) (28.63) (30.93) (33.94) (32.27)
9. 0.1490 0.1891 0.1778 0.1724 0.0977
(38.74) (32.80) (40.25) (41.15) (19.89)
10. 0.0666 0.0550 0.0505 0.0559 0.0217
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TABLE 5.8: (Continued).
Commodity
Rural Quintile
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
1 . 0.2341 0.1935 0.1698 0.1099 0.0076
(27.02) (25.74) (22.29) (25.49) (5.91)
2. 0.1395 0.1457 0.1164 0.1032 0.0098
(22.25) (19.59) (19.49) (20.37) (5.70)
3. 0.0611 0.0474 0.0472 0.0390 0.0049
(15.35) (11.54) (14.27) (15.29) (5.54)
4. 0.0955 0.0933 0.1133 0.1265 0.0191
(17.79) (13.61) (18.09) (18.72) (6.94)
5. 0.0018 0.0034 0.0049 0.0077 0.0009
(6.71) (8.04) (11.16) (12.45) (2.32)
6. 0.0801 0.1010 0.1017 0.1125 0.0220
(18.88) (23.18) (22.68) (25.47) (8.34)
7. 0.1551 0.1595 0.1679 0.1636 0.6572
(19.09) (16.84) (16.74) (17.73) (49.74)
8. 0.0441 0.0561 0.0660 0.1135 0.1903
(16.48) (21.26) (20.27) (22.15) (18.66)
9. 0.1180 0.1269 0.1326 0.1371 0.0613
(27.99) (28.77) (28.00) (31.60) (10.14)
10. 0.0707 0.0732 0.0802 0.0870 0.0269
Notes: a) Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
b) Marginal budget share of other non-foods is calculated from the identity, Zßj = 1.
i
Its t-statistic can be derived from those of the nine commodities.
A comparison shows that there is a contrast between the richest 
quintile in urban and rural areas, and the remaining poorer households. 
Except for the richest quintile in urban and rural areas, expenditure 
elasticities of every commodity are quite uniform across households. In the 
case of the first six commodities (rice and cereals, meat and fish, fruit and 
vegetables, other foods, non-alcoholic beverages, clothing and footwear), and 
the last two non-foods, the expenditure elasticities of the two richest quintiles
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are much lower than those of other quintiles. While in the case of house and 
housing expenditure, and transport and communication, their expenditure 
elasticities are generally higher. Thus, demand for these eight commodities 
will increase more if there is a 1% increase in income of households in the 
eight lower quintiles in urban and rural areas, rather than households in the 
two top quintiles. Vice versa, increases in demand for house and housing 
expenditure, and transport and communication is less if there is a 1% 
increase in income of households in the eight lower quintiles, rather than 
households in the two top quintiles.
The own price elasticities (qp displays some differences between food 
and non-food commodities, and between households in the top quintile and 
households in other quintiles (Tables 5.10-5.19). Generally, demand for non­
food commodities is more sensitive to change in prices than demand for food 
commodities. Households in the top quintile of urban and rural areas behave 
differently from other households. Except for house and housing 
expenditure, their own price responsiveness is generally lower than those of 
the other quintiles. The main reason is that households in the two top 
quintiles can afford to buy, whatever the change in price. An example is the 
own price elasticity of demand for rice, which is between 0.5 and 0.8, while 
those of the top quintile in urban and rural areas are as low as 0.1775 and 
0.0841, respectively.
A comparison between the results from this thesis with those from 
past studies shows some differences. As already mentioned, Suchart's (1989) 
estimates are restricted by the assumption of one price, and are considerably 
lower than the estimates of this thesis. Prasarn's (1983) own price elasticity3! 
of rice and meat is -0.636 and -4.698, while this thesis's elasticities4! are -0.616 
and -0.613, respectively. Prasarn analyses beef, pork and chicken separately, 
while this thesis aggregates all types of meat, including fish and seafood. 
Therefore, the lower result for meat could be caused by the level of 
aggregation and substitution among different types of meat.
3) A simple average of Prasarn (1983)'s most significant results.
4) A simple average of the ten households.
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In terms of cross price effects (e^), almost every pair of commodities 
have complementarities (Tables 5.10-5.19). Since, these commodities, 
especially foods, are important in terms of consumption, a rise in price will 
reduce real income and, thus, reduce demand for other commodities. There 
are some exceptions, e.g. the effects of the cost of transport and 
communication; medical expenses, entertainment, and education; and other 
non-foods on the demand for other commodities, which are substitutes for 
many households. However, the degree of substitution is very low and 
should not be considered seriously in any interpretation.
The above estimation from Equation 5.3 assumes that committed 
expenditures of households in the same quintile are equal. But household 
size varies widely within each quintile, e.g. from 1 to 10 within the fourth 
urban quintile, and from 1 to 15 within the lowest rural quintile. The 
inclusion of household size and composition in the demand system would 
better clarify the household demand. A proposed model that incorporate 
household size and composition will be discussed in the following Appendix 
5.1.
5.4. Conclusion
This chapter focuses on the estimation of a consumer demand system for 
policy simulations in a general equilibrium framework by using cross section 
data. The model applied in this thesis, Linear Expenditure System, is used to 
estimate various elasticities that satisfy desirable economic properties, such 
as homogeneity and additivity, and are therefore suitable for a general 
equilibrium analysis.
Three points make this estimation different from those of previous 
studies. First, the disaggregation of households into ten expenditure classes 
is caused by the need to investigate the income distribution impact of 
industrial protection. Second, price information is incorporated into the SES 
dataset. Third, food commodities are analysed in a less aggregated level and, 
thus, enhance the analysis of the impact of industrial protection on poverty 
incidence. Although household size and composition are not introduced into
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the model, a proposed model with size and composition is presented in the 
following appendix.
The estimates from the LES shows significant differences among 
households. There are four major conclusions. First, food commodities and 
housing expenditure are shown to be necessities, while non-alcoholic 
beverages and other non-foods are shown to be luxuries. Second, the own 
price effect of food is weaker than those of non-alcoholic beverages and non­
foods. Third, the behaviour of the richest quintiles in urban and rural areas is 
different from the rest of the country. Fourth, the cross price effect illustrates 
weak complementarities between most pairs of commodities, especially 
foods.
129
Appendix 5.1: Demographic Variables in Consumer Demand
The role of demographic variables, especially household size and 
composition, in consumption behaviour is well-known. In addition to 
income, the economic welfare of households also depends on their size and 
composition. Many approaches have been used to incorporate these 
variables. The choice between the household and per capita approaches are 
two extreme cases. Poliak and Wales (1978) offer alternative techniques for 
incorporating demographic variables into the demand system. But Barnes 
and Gillingham (1984) prove that, in general, these techniques do not have 
greater explanatory power than a simple un-pooling estimation. There are 
many approaches based on economic theory, e.g. Prais and Houthakker 
(1955), and Muellbauer (1975). These approaches estimate a scale which is 
known as a consumer unit scale or an equivalent scale. This equivalent scale 
is useful not only for the analysis of consumer demand but also for the 
analysis of income distribution.
These scales are used widely and can be theoretically explained. They 
measure either the first adult or a standard household as one unit consumer. 
The additional household member can then be measured differently, e.g. 
male, female, adolescent, and baby. Many approaches have been used to 
estimate these scales. The well-known approach developed by Prais and 
Houthakker (1955) is based on an Engel curve. The approach by Barten (1974, 
quoted in Kakwani, 1977) is based on basic consumption theory. Both are 
widely used in the literature. Examples of these scales for Australia, Great 
Britain, and Thailand are shown in Table 5.9.
There are at least three estimations of such scales for Thailand. The 
first, as reported in the Journal of the Ministry of Agriculture and Co­
operatives, is based only on food expenditure. The second, by Praphon 
(1988), is also based on food expenditure. Duangkamon (1989) produces a 
detailed analysis of the scales, by region, commodity, and expenditure class. 
But her results show inconsistency over time. Rule of thumb is also used, e.g., 
Atkinson (1989) values the first person in each family 1, +0.5 for all 
subsequent persons, and the maximum of 6 for any family of more than 10
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persons; and Kakwani (1986 in Agrawal, 1987) values the first adult 1, the 
second adult 0.7, and each child 0.4. The reliability of results from such an 
arbitrary method must be questioned.
TABLE 5.9: International Comparison of Equivalent Scale.
Equivalent Scale
v ^ U L i i i i i y
Male Female Adolescent Child
Australia1^ 1.0000 0.9048 - 0.3762*
Great Britain2) 1.0000 0.8600 0.7350 0.5175
Thailand3) 1.0000 0.8900 0.8700 0.3767
Thailand4) 1.0000 0.9284 0.6866 0.3752
* Calculated from the first child.
Sources: 1) Simple average from Binh and Whiteford (1990).
2) Simple average from Table 30 of Prais and Houthakker (1955).
3) Simple averages from Table 7 in Prasam (1983).
4) Simple averages from Duangkamol (1989).
The two main approaches are claimed to suffer from an identification 
problem (Singh and Nagar, 1973; Muellbauer, 1975; and Kakwani, 1977). 
However, Muellbauer (1975) points out that - 'there is another way in which 
an identification of equivalent scales can be achieved. This is by using 
information from price variation. But to do this one must know how prices 
enter into demand relationships which include household composition 
effects. The only models available that predict how prices enter are those 
based on utility functions...'. By applying Barten's approach in ELES, 
Kakwani (1977) shows that these scales can be estimated without an 
identification problem. Furthermore, van der Gaag and Smolensky (1982) 
show that Kakwani's approach is also applicable in the absence of price 
information.
It is well known that most of these scales are estimated by assuming 
one price and ignoring price variations. This thesis proposes to incorporate 
price, expenditure, and the equivalent scales in the LES. Following Prais and
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Houthakker’s approach, an Engel curve of a unit consumer can be written in 
the form of Equation 5.9. In the framework of LES, this Engel function is 
linear.
(5.9) Qj/ (SajA+SkiK) = f(E;prices),
where A = the number of adults in a household,
K = the number of children in a household,
Saj = commodity i specific scale of each adult, generally Saj = 1, for 
all i, and
Skj = commodity i specific scale of each child.
If we assume: 1) that the utility maximizing consumer in Equation 5.2 
is an adult equivalent unit and 2) that each adult equivalent unit in the 
household maximizes utility subject to household budget constraint; then 
Equation 5.2 can be transformed into the following Equation 5.10. One may 
argue that some members of the household, such as a baby, cannot be 
assumed as utility maximizers. But, one may also argue that other members 
will make decisions in a way that the baby's utility is also maximized.
(5.10) Maximize U = ZßilnlQi/fA+SkK)-^].
i
subjects to IPiQi = E. 
i
Where ^  = the committed consumption level of commodity i for
one adult equivalent unit.
Equation 5.11, which is equivalent to Equation 5.10, implies that the 
household is a utility maximizing consumer, and its commodity committed 
levels of consumption depend on size and composition. First order 
conditions of Equations 5.10 and 5.11 lead to Equation 5.12. In order to 
reduce collinearity between total expenditure and size of household (more 
specifically, the number of adults), Equation 5.12 is rewritten in share form 
(5.13).
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(5.11) Maximize U = Xßiln[Qr -yi(A+SkiK)]/
i
subjects to EPiQi = E. 
i
(5.12) Ej = PlYl(A+Sk,K)+ß1[E-IP|yj(A+SkjK)].
(5.13) Sj= Ej/E = [PiYj(A+SkjK)/E]+ßi[l-LPjYj(A+SkjK)/E].
The specification in Equation 5.13 is still weak in a marginal case.
However, there are several ways in which the model can be improved. Given
the definition of ßp a household without a child will also buy a toy if the
marginal budget share of the toy is greater than 0. A modification of ßj to
ß:(A +ZW;K) can capture this case without violating the general properties
j
of LES. When Wj is a weight given to each child.
The model does not explicitly offer an equivalent scale. However, the 
scale can be calculated from commodity specific scales (Skj). By definition, the 
total committed level of expenditure for an adult is EPpj
while the total committed expenditure for each child is ZPfyjSK.j j j j
Therefore, the expenditure (income) scale, at a given set of prices, 
for each child is (ZPjYjSkj)/(IPjYj).
k
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TABLE 5.10: Expenditure (e-^, Own Price (£^1), and Cross Price (e-! j) 
Elasticities of Rice and Cereals, by Household.
Elasticity
Urban Quintile
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
e l 0.7290 0.6546 0.7289 0.7531 0.3034
e U -0.5805 -0.4875 -0.5527 -0.5628 -0.1775
e l,2 -0.0360 -0.0236 -0.0175 -0.0084 -0.0072
e 13 -0.0196 -0.0162 -0.0144 -0.0108 -0.0066
e l,4 -0.0153 -0.0271 -0.0491 -0.0716 -0.0408
e l,5 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0034 -0.0020
e l,6 -0.0021 -0.0089 -0.0070 -0.0109 -0.0115
e l,7 -0.0758 -0.0764 -0.0670 -0.0664 -0.0271
e l,8 -0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0034 -0.0014 0.0029
e l,9 -0.0002 0.0039 0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0207
e l,10 -0.0027 -0.0165 -0.0192 -0.0169 -0.0129
TABLE 5.10: (Continued).
Elasticity
Rural Quintile
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
0.8916 0.9349 1.0238 0.9062 0.1269
el,l -0.6726 -0.7297 -0.8259 -0.7307 -0.0841
e l,2 -0.0493 -0.0421 -0.0469 -0.0369 -0.0084
e13 -0.0316 -0.0362 -0.0335 -0.0275 -0.0046
e l,4 -0.0339 -0.0362 -0.0312 -0.0317 -0.0125
el,5 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0007
e l,6 0.0009 0.0020 0.0020 0.0018 -0.0069
e l,7 -0.0998 -0.0923 -0.0886 -0.0858 0.0115
el,8 0.0015 0.0008 0.0005 0.0061 -0.0046
e l,9 -0.0090 -0.0022 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0089
el,10 0.0023 0.0012 0.0001 -0.0023 -0.0078
Note: The above figures are calculated from Equations 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. Their standard errors 
are based on those of the committed levels of consumption and marginal budget shares in 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8.
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TABLE 5.11: Expenditure (e2), Own Price (e22), and Cross Price (e2 j) 
Elasticities of Meat and Fish, by Household.
Elasticity
Urban Quintile
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
e2 0.8227 0.8950 0.9616 1.1365 0.6152
e2,l -0.0596 -0.0437 -0.0256 -0.0205 -0.0089
e2,2 -0.6361 -0.6550 -0.7267 -0.8415 -0.3656
e2,3 -0.0221 -0.0221 -0.0190 -0.0164 -0.0134
e2,4 -0.0173 -0.0371 -0.0648 -0.1081 -0.0827
e2,5 0.0001 -0.0012 0.0002 -0.0051 -0.0041
e2,6 -0.0023 -0.0122 -0.0092 -0.0164 -0.0233
e2,7 -0.0856 -0.1045 -0.0884 -0.1002 -0.0550
e2,8 -0.0030 -0.0020 -0.0044 -0.0022 0.0058
e2,9 0.0002 0.0053 0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0420
e2,10 -0.0030 -0.0225 -0.0253 -0.0254 -0.0261
TABLE 5.11: (Continued).
Rural Quintile
Elasticity -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
£2 0.9629
e2,l -0.1081
e2,2 -0.6715
e2,3 -0.0341
e2,4 -0.0366
e2,5 -0.0001
e2,6 0.0010
e2,7 -0.1078
e2,8 0.0017
e2,9 -0.0097
e2,10 0.0024
0.9802 0.8579
-0.0680 -0.0298
-0.7412 -0.7016
-0.0380 -0.0281
-0.0380 -0.0261
-0.0001 -0.0002
0.0021 0.0016
-0.0968 -0.0743
0.0008 0.0004
-0.0023 0.0001
0.0012 0.0001
0.8590 0.1357
-0.0315 -0.0075
-0.6961 -0.0914
-0.0261 -0.0049
-0.0301 -0.0134
-0.0002 -0.0008
0.0017 -0.0073
-0.0813 0.0123
0.0057 -0.0049
0.0010 -0.0095
-0.0021 -0.0083
Note: The same as Table 5.10.
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TABLE 5.12: Expenditure (e3), Own Price (e3/3), and Cross Price (e3 j) 
Elasticities of Fruit and Vegetables, by Household.
Elasticity
Urban Quintile
U l U2 U3 U4 U5
e3 0.8100 0.7641 0.8394 0.9443 0.4726
e3,l -0.0587 -0.0373 -0.0223 -0.0170 -0.0069
e3,2 -0.0400 -0.0275 -0.0201 -0.0106 -0.0112
e33 -0.6080 -0.5505 -0.6307 -0.7022 -0.2798
e3,4 -0.0170 -0.0317 -0.0565 -0.0898 -0.0635
e3,5 0.0001 -0.0010 0.0002 -0.0042 -0.0031
e3,6 -0.0023 -0.0104 -0.0080 -0.0137 -0.0179
e3,7 -0.0843 -0.0892 -0.0771 -0.0833 -0.0422
e3 0.0030 -0.0017 -0.0039 -0.0018 0.0045
e3,9 0.0002 0.0045 0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0323
e3,10 -0.0030 -0.0192 -0.0221 -0.0211 -0.0200
TABLE 5.12: (Continued).
Rural Quintile
Elasticity -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
e3 0.8183
e3,l -0.0919
e3,2 -0.0453
e3 3 -0.5544
e3,4 -0.0311
e3,5 -0.0001
e3,6 0.0008
e3,7 -0.0916
e3,8 0.0014
e3,9 -0.0082
e3,10 0.0021
0.6544 0.6826
-0.0454 -0.0237
-0.0295 -0.0313
-0.4907 -0.5493
-0.0254 -0.0208
-0.0001 -0.0002
0.0014 0.0013
-0.0646 -0.0591
0.0006 0.0003
-0.0015 0.0001
0.0008 0.0001
0.6456 0.1245
-0.0237 -0.0069
-0.0263 -0.0083
-0.5166 -0.0802
-0.0226 -0.0123
-0.0001 -0.0007
0.0013 -0.0067
-0.0611 0.0113
0.0043 -0.0045
0.0008 -0.0087
-0.0016 -0.0076
Note: The same as Table 5.10.
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TABLE 5.13: Expenditure (e4), Own Price (£4 4 ), and Cross Price (e4  j) 
Elasticities of Other Foods, by Household.
Elasticity
U rban Q uintile
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
e4 1.2041 1.1449 0.9656 0.7873 0.3020
e4,l -0.0872 -0.0559 -0.0257 -0.0142 -0.0438
e4,2 -0.0595 -0.0412 -0.0232 -0.0088 -0.0072
e4,3 -0.0323 -0.0283 -0.0190 -0.0113 -0.0066
e4,4 -0.8968 -0.8442 -0.7716 -0.6489 -0.2129
e4,5 0.0002 -0.0016 0.0002 -0.0035 -0.0020
e4,6 -0.0034 -0.0156 -0.0092 -0.0114 -0.0114
e4,7 -0.1253 -0.1336 -0.0888 -0.0694 -0.0270
e4,8 0.0044 -0.0025 -0.0045 -0.0015 0.0029
e4,9 0.0004 0.0068 0.0016 -0.0005 -0.0206
e4,10 -0.0044 -0.0288 -0.0255 -0.0176 -0.0128
TABLE 5.13: (Continued).
Elasticity
R ural Q uintile
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
e4 0.9615 0.8874 0.9608 0.9558 0.1738
e4,l -0.1079 -0.0616 -0.0334 -0.0351 -0.0096
e4,2 -0.0532 -0.0400 -0.0440 -0.0389 -0.0116
e4,3 -0.0341 -0.0344 -0.0314 -0.0290 -0.0063
e4,4 -0.6539 -0.6655 -0.7710 -0.7691 -0.1227
e4,5 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0010
e4,6 0.0010 0.0019 0.0018 0.0019 -0.0094
e4,7 -0.1076 -0.0876 -0.0832 -0.0905 0.0158
e4,8 0.0017 0.0008 0.0004 0.0064 -0.0063
e4,9 -0.0097 -0.0021 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0121
e4,10 0.0024 0.0011 0.0001 -0.0024 -0.0106
Note: The same as Table 5.10.
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TABLE 5.14: Expenditure (£5), Own Price (£55), and Cross Price (e5 j) 
Elasticities of Non-alcoholic Beverages, by Household.
Elasticity
Urban Quintile
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
e5 1.4178 1.2103 1.3867 0.8679 0.3074
e5,l -0.1027 -0.0591 -0.0369 -0.0156 -0.0045
e5,2 -0.0701 -0.0436 -0.0333 -0.0097 -0.0073
e53 -0.0381 -0.0299 -0.0274 -0.0125 -0.0067
e5,4 -0.0297 -0.0502 -0.0934 -0.0825 -0.0413
e5,5 -1.0261 -0.8439 -1.0144 -0.6368 -0.1774
e5,6 -0.0040 -0.0165 -0.0133 -0.0126 -0.0116
e5,7 -0.1475 -0.1413 -0.1275 -0.0765 -0.0275
e5,8 0.0052 -0.0027 -0.0064 -0.0017 0.0029
e5,9 0.0004 0.0071 0.0023 -0.0006 -0.0210
e5,10 -0.0052 -0.0305 -0.0365 -0.0194 -0.0130
TABLE 5.14: (Continued).
Elasticity
Rural Quintile
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
e5 1.3838 1.3514 1.2086 1.2594 0.1471
e5,l -0.1553 -0.0937 -0.0420 -0.0462 -0.0081
e5,2 -0.0765 -0.0609 -0.0554 -0.0513 -0.0098
e5,3 -0.0490 -0.0523 -0.0395 -0.0383 -0.0053
e5,4 -0.0526 -0.0524 -0.0368 -0.0441 -0.0145
e5,5 -0.8888 -0.9611 -0.9333 -0.9696 -0.0902
e5,6 0.0014 0.0028 0.0023 0.0025 -0.0079
e5,7 -0.1549 -0.1334 -0.1046 -0.1193 0.0134
e5,8 0.0024 0.0012 0.0006 0.0084 -0.0053
e5,9 -0.0139 -0.0032 0.0001 0.0015 -0.0103
e5,10 0.0035 0.0017 0.0001 -0.0031 -0.0090
Note: The same as Table 5.10.
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TABLE 5.15: Expenditure (e6), Own Price (e66), and Cross Price (e6 j) 
Elasticities of Clothing and Footwear, by Household.
Elasticity
Urban Quintile
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
e6 1.2865 1.0094 1.0985 1.0156 0.7536
e6,l -0.0932 -0.0493 -0.0292 -0.0183 -0.0109
e6,2 -0.0636 -0.0363 -0.0263 -0.0113 -0.0179
e63 -0.0345 -0.0249 -0.0217 -0.0146 -0.0164
e6,4 -0.0270 -0.0418 -0.0740 -0.0966 -0.1013
e6 ,5 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0045 -0.0050
e6,6 -0.9349 -0.7161 -0.8144 -0.7553 -0.4585
e6,7 -0.1338 -0.1178 -0.1010 -0.0895 -0.0674
e6,8 0.0047 -0.0022 -0.0051 -0.0019 0.0071
e6,9 0.0004 0.0060 0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0515
e6,10 -0.0047 -0.0254 -0.0290 -0.0227 -0.0319
TABLE 5.15: (Continued).
Rural Quintile
Elasticity -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
e6 1.5883
e6,l -0.1783
e6,2 -0.0878
e63 -0.0563
e6,4 -0.0604
e6 J5 -0.0002
e6,6 -1.0183
e6,7 -0.1778
e6,8 0.0028
e6,9 -0.0160
e6,10 0.0040
1.4487 1.3276
-0.1005 -0.0462
-0.0652 -0.0608
-0.0561 -0.0434
-0.0562 -0.0405
-0.0001 -0.0004
-1.0271 -1.0224
-0.1430 -0.1149
0.0012 0.0006
-0.0034 0.0001
0.0018 0.0001
1.3297 0.3266
-0.0488 -0.0180
-0.0541 -0.0217
-0.0404 -0.0119
-0.0465 -0.0322
-0.0002 -0.0019
-1.0208 -0.2161
-0.1259 0.0297
0.0089 -0.0118
0.0016 -0.0228
-0.0033 -0.0199
Note: The same as Table 5.10.
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TABLE 5.16: Expenditure (e7), Own Price (e77), and Cross Price (e7 j) 
Elasticities of House and Housing Expenditure, by Household.
Elasticity
Urban Quintile
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
e7 0.8061 0.7788 0.8648 0.9196 1.2279
e7,1 -0.0584 -0.0380 -0.0230 -0.0166 -0.0178
e7,2 -0.0399 -0.0280 -0.0207 -0.0103 -0.0292
e7,3 -0.0216 -0.0192 -0.0171 -0.0132 -0.0267
e7,4 -0.0169 -0.0323 -0.0583 -0.0874 -0.1651
e7,5 0.0001 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0041 -0.0082
£7,6 -0.0023 -0.0106 -0.0083 -0.0133 -0.0465
e7,7 -0.6673 -0.6328 -0.7123 -0.7517 -0.8102
e7,8 0.0030 -0.0017 -0.0040 -0.0018 0.0116
e7,9 0.0002 0.0046 0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0839
e7,10 -0.0030 -0.0196 -0.0228 -0.0206 -0.0520
TABLE 5.16: (Continued).
Rural Quintile
Elasticity -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
e7 0.7331
e7,1 -0.0823
e7,2 -0.0405
e73 -0.0260
e7,4 -0.0279
e7,5 -0.0001
e7,6 -0.0007
e7,7 -0.5528
e7,8 0.0013
e7,9 -0.0074
e7,10 0.0019
0.7518 0.7766
-0.0521 -0.0270
-0.0339 -0.0356
-0.0291 -0.0254
-0.0291 -0.0237
-0.0001 -0.0002
0.0016 0.0015
-0.6088 -0.6668
0.0006 0.0004
-0.0018 0.0001
0.0009 0.0001
0.7415 2.1312
-0.0272 -0.1176
-0.0302 -0.1418
-0.0225 -0.0775
-0.0259 -0.2099
-0.0001 -0.0123
-0.0015 -0.1152
-0.6409 -1.1010
0.0050 -0.0770
0.0009 -0.1488
-0.0019 -0.1301
Note: The same as Table 5.10.
140
TABLE 5.17: Expenditure (e8), Own Price (e8/8), and Cross Price (e8 j) 
Elasticities of Transport and Communication, by Household.
Elasticity
U rban Q uintile
U l U2 U3 U4 U5
e8 1.5082 1.3842 1.2848 1.3450 1.8349
e8,l -0.1092 -0.0676 -0.0342 -0.0242 -0.0266
e8,2 -0.0746 -0.0498 -0.0308 -0.0150 -0.0437
e8 3 -0.0405 -0.0342 -0.0253 -0.0194 -0.0398
CO
0
0
4
^ -0.0316 -0.0574 -0.0865 -0.1279 -0.2466
e8,5 0.0002 -0.0019 0.0003 -0.0060 -0.0122
e8,6 -0.0043 -0.0189 -0.0123 -0.0195 -0.0695
e8,7 -0.1569 -0.1615 -0.1181 -0.1186 -0.1640
e8,8 -1.0862 -0.9624 -0.9460 -0.9834 -1.0294
e8,9 0.0005 0.0082 0.0021 -0.0009 -0.1253
e8,10 -0.0056 -0.0348 -0.0339 -0.0301 -0.0778
T A B L E  5.17: (C o n t in u e d ) .
Elasticity
Rural Q uintile
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
e8 1.6591 1.4370 1.3074 1.4068 1.2543
e8,l -0.1863 -0.0997 -0.0455 -0.0516 -0.0692
e8,2 -0.0918 -0.0647 -0.0599 -0.0573 -0.0835
e8,3 -0.0588 -0.0557 -0.0427 -0.0427 -0.0456
e8,4 -0.0631 -0.0557 -0.0398 -0.0492 -0.1235
e8,5 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0072
e8,6 0.0017 0.0030 0.0025 0.0028 -0.0678
00'
OJ -0.1857 -0.1419 -0.1132 -0.1332 0.1140
e8,8 -1.0624 -1.0206 -1.0086 -1.0735 -0.8073
e8,9 -0.0167 -0.0034 0.0001 0.0017 -0.0876
e8,10 0.0042 0.0018 0.0001 -0.0035 -0.0766
Note: The same as Table 5.10.
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TABLE 5.18: Expenditure (e9), Own Price (£9 ,9 ), and Cross Price (e9  j) 
Elasticities of Medical Expenses, Education and Entertainment, by 
Household.
Elasticity
Urban Quintile
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
£9 1.3854 1.5046 1.3841 1.3639 0.7876
*9,1 -0.1003 -0.0735 -0.0368 -0.0246 -0.0114
£9,2 -0.0685 -0.0541 -0.0332 -0.0152 -0.0187
-0.0372 -0.0372 -0.0273 -0.0196 -0.0171
£9,4 -0.0291 -0.0624 -0.0932 -0.1297 -0.1059
£93 0.0002 -0.0020 0.0003 -0.0061 -0.0052
£9,6 -0.0040 -0.0205 -0.0133 -0.0197 -0.0298
£9,7 -0.1441 -0.1756 -0.1272 -0.1202 -0.0704
£9,8 0.0051 -0.0033 -0.0064 -0.0026 0.0074
£9,9 -1.0024 -1.0381 -1.0105 -0.9955 -0.5031
£9,10 -0.0051 -0.0379 -0.0365 -0.0305 -0.0334
TABLE 5.18: (Continued).
Rural Quintile
Elasticity -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
£9 1.3747
e9,l -0.1543
£9,2 -0.0760
£93 -0.0487
e9,4 -0.0523
£93 -0.0002
£9,6 0.0014
£9,7 -0.1539
£93 0.0024
£9,9 -0.8965
£9,10 0.0035
1.3706 1.2966
-0.0951 -0.0451
-0.0617 -0.0594
-0.0531 -0.0424
-0.0531 -0.0395
-0.0001 -0.0004
0.0029 0.0025
-0.1353 -0.1122
0.0012 0.0006
-0.9778 -1.0008
0.0017 0.0001
1.3140 0.5723
-0.0482 -0.0316
-0.0535 -0.0381
-0.0399 -0.0208
-0.0460 -0.0564
-0.0002 -0.0033
0.0026 -0.0309
-0.1244 0.0520
0.0088 -0.0207
-1.0099 -0.3876
-0.0033 -0.0349
Note: The same as Table 5.10.
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TABLE 5.19: Expenditure (e10), Own Price (e10/io)/ and Cross Price (e10 j) 
Elasticities of Other Non-foods, by Household.
Elasticity
Urban Quintile
U1 U2 U3 U4 U5
e10 1.2833 0.8663 0.7974 0.8860 0.3962
e10,l -0.0929 -0.0423 -0.0212 -0.0160 -0.0057
e10,2 -0.0634 -0.0312 -0.0191 -0.0099 -0.0094
e 103 -0.0345 -0.0214 -0.0157 -0.0128 -0.0086
e10,4 -0.0269 -0.0359 -0.0537 -0.0842 -0.0533
e10,5 0.0002 -0.0012 0.0002 -0.0040 -0.0026
e10,6 -0.0037 -0.0012 -0.0076 -0.0128 -0.0150
e10,7 -0.1335 -0.1011 -0.0733 -0.0781 -0.0354
e10,8 0.0047 -0.0019 -0.0037 -0.0017 0.0037
e10,9 0.0004 0.0051 0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0271
e10,10 -0.9336 -0.6246 -0.6045 -0.6660 -0.2428
TABLE 5.19: (Continued).
Elasticity
Rural Quintile
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
e10 1.6492 1.4405 1.2972 1.2525 0.3464
e10,l -0.1841 -0.0999 -0.0451 -0.0460 -0.0191
e10,2 -0.0912 -0.0649 -0.0594 -0.0510 -0.0231
e 103 -0.0584 -0.0558 -0.0424 -0.0380 -0.0126
e10,4 -0.0627 -0.0558 -0.0395 -0.0438 -0.0341
e10,5 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0020
e10,6 0.0016 0.0030 0.0025 0.0025 -0.0187
e10,7 -0.1846 -0.1422 -0.1123 -0.1186 0.0315
e10,8 0.0029 0.0012 0.0006 0.0084 -0.0125
e10/9 -0.0166 -0.0034 0.0001 0.0015 -0.0242
e10,10 -1.0548 -1.0226 -1.0012 -0.9672 -0.2316
Note: The same as Table 5.10.
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- CHAPTER 6 -
POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN 
THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
6.1. Introduction
In Chapter Two, industrial protection policies in Thailand during the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s were reviewed. The theoretical impact of these policies on 
the functional distribution of income was also discussed. However, their 
implementation is limited by the rigidity of frameworks employed by those 
theories. Thus, they cannot fully explain the impact of the policies on poverty 
incidence and income inequality in Thailand during the periods.
As is well-known, the degree of impact is influenced by many parts of 
the economy, such as household ownership of factors of production, 
producer demand for those factors, intermediate input demand, regional 
allocation of sectors of production, and household demand for consumer 
goods. Given the roles of and the linkages amongst these parts, a general 
equilibrium analysis is selected. As discussed in Chapter Four, the structure 
of the model is designed to capture two main features, which are central to 
this thesis - industrial protection policies and income distribution in 
Thailand.
Three types of income distribution are important in terms of 
investigating the income distribution impact of policy in a general 
equilibrium framework, i.e. the functional distribution, the socio-economic 
distribution, and the size distribution of income. As is well-known, most
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economic theories only explain the impact of a policy on the functional 
distribution of income, which explains how total factor income is divided 
among factors of production such as labour, capital, and land. Chapter Four 
describes how the socio-economic distribution can be derived from a factor 
ownership matrix. Information from the Social Accounting Matrix can be 
used to construct this matrix. Each element in a particular column of the 
matrix explains the proportion of each factor owned by a particular socio­
economic class. As an owner of factors, each socio-economic class derives 
income from the returns to factors of production. Although, as pointed out 
by de Melo and Robinson (1980), this socio-economic distribution can reflect 
social and political division, which are relevant for policy analysis; it does 
not place enough emphasis on the size distribution of income, which explains 
the unequal distribution of income amongst members of each class.
This chapter deals with the size distribution of income. It explains the 
methodology used to transform policy impacts on the functional distribution 
and the socio-economic distribution into policy impacts on the size 
distribution of income and, therefore, on poverty incidence and income 
inequality. The focus is on the problem of income distribution in Thailand 
during 1988, the base year of this thesis. The methodology consists of three 
steps. First, the size distribution of income among members of each socio­
economic class is estimated by using information from the 1988 Household 
Socio-economic Survey. As in Chapters Four and Five, households are 
divided into ten classes, based on their per capita expenditure and 
urban/rural settings. Second, the distribution among members of each class 
can be used to measure poverty incidence and income inequality in that 
class. These two steps can be done with any desirable number of classes and 
a particular poverty line faced by each member of that class. However, the 
present resources and time constraints limit the number of classes to ten (five 
urban quintiles and five rural quintiles), and an average national poverty line 
is used. Third, based on the population and expenditure shares of these 
classes in each region and community, the additive decomposable property 
of various poverty and inequality measures can be used to investigate the 
national and regional distribution impact of changes in protection policies.
145
The remainder of this chapter is organised into five sections. The first 
provides various issues in income distribution and data discussion. The 
second focuses on the estimation of a density function, or a size distribution 
of income within each expenditure class. The third section discusses the 
concept of a poverty line and the standard properties of measurement of 
poverty incidence. This is important for the uses of the measurements 
themselves, and for the interpretation of results from the model. The 
decomposition property of these measures enhances the analysis of the 
model in many dimensions, i.e. community and region. Since the 
methodology used in this thesis is the Johansen type CGE model, these 
measures are also derived in percentage change forms. The number of poor 
and the intensity of poverty in Thailand in 1988 are also presented. The 
fourth section discusses income inequality measures, their properties, and 
income inequality in Thailand. The final section summarizes the framework.
6.2. Source of Data and Choice of Unit
The 1988 Household Socio-economic Survey (SES) of the National Statistical 
Office is the data source. The detail of this data source are discussed in the 
previous chapter.
Tables 6.1-6.2 summarise basic household statistics from this survey. 
About 72% of the Thai population live in rural areas, while the remaining 
28% live in urban areas, i.e. municipal areas and sanitary districts. More than 
half of this 28% live in Bangkok. However, the income and expenditure share 
of rural areas does not match their population share. Only about half of total 
income and expenditure are shared by rural Thais. This unequal distribution 
of income and expenditure is mainly dominated by the Northeast and 
Bangkok. The population, income, and expenditure share of the Northeast is 
34.27%, 20.95%, and 21.89%, respectively. While the share of Bangkok is 
14.50%, 31.91%, and 30.83%. Bangkok's per capita income and expenditure is 
more than twice the national figures, while the Northeast's figures are 
slightly over 60% of the national figures.
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The classification of households into ten classes, five urban quintiles 
and five rural quintiles, is based on per capita household expenditure and 
urban/rural settings. This is described in Chapters Four and Five. The 
analysis of income distribution in this thesis is also based on per capita 
household expenditure. The record of income data is naturally more accurate 
than that of expenditure data, but expenditure is sometimes preferred to 
income because of its better explanation of economic welfare, coverage, and 
reliability. However, high levels of expenditure could also be the result of 
income transfer or consumption from past savings. As a result, poverty 
incidence and inequality, based on per capita household expenditure, could 
be lower than those based on per capita household income.
TABLE 6.1: Household Characteristics, by Community and Region: 1988.
Community
and
Region
Number of
Population
(thousand)
Per Capita Monthly Household
Income (Baht) Expenditure (Baht)
WHOLE KINGDOM 55153 1064.00 999.81
Urban 15457 1888.00 1680.80
Rural 39696 743.11 734.67
North 10878 929.95 852.10
Northeast 18899 650.41 638.54
Central 10210 1061.70 981.75
South 7169 935.72 945.05
Bangkok 7997 2083.30 2172.60
Note: Bangkok includes Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut Prakam.
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
The use of 'household' expenditure implicitly includes the role of the 
household in decision making. Although the 'per capita' cannot capture the 
role of household composition, it captures the role of household size. It also 
assumes constant return to scale, or the homogeneity hypothesis, i.e. 
household consumption is homogeneous of degree one in household size.
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The use of a better choice, a consumer unit scale which is discussed in 
Chapter Five, is limited by the well-known identification problem; and non­
uniformity across region, community, and income position.
6.3. Income Distribution: a Nonparametric Estimation
Two approaches have been used to explain the within class distribution of 
income. The first approach assumes a parametric form of probability density 
function (Robinson and Derwis, 1977; Adelman and Robinson, 1978; de Melo 
and Robinson, 1980; and Narayana et al., 1987). The two most commonly 
used functions are Lognormal and Pareto distribution functions which 
belong to the family of non-intersecting Lorenz curves (Kakwani, 1980b). The 
fit of the Lognormal distribution to the upper income levels, and the fit of the 
Pareto distribution to the lower income levels are far from satisfactory (Singh 
and Maddala, 1976). The fit of any particular distribution used by this 
approach is questionable, and should be checked by a test such as Chi-square 
or Kolmogorov-Smimoff. With a large number of observations, as in the case 
of SES 1988, it is more likely that the fitness of the data to the distribution will 
be rejected by the test, even when it is true. The smoothness of a parametric 
distribution also ignores the actual differences amongst income positions. 
However, the attractiveness of this approach is its ability to capture the 
impact of policy on poverty incidence through a change in income in relation 
to a change in the poverty line. The second approach divides consumers or 
households into a number of income/expenditure classes (e.g., Coxhead and 
Warr, 1991b) and assumes that the within class distribution of income is 
uniform. This approach ignores the actual distribution of income within each 
class. However, it conforms with the assumption that the within group 
distribution is unaffected by policy shock. This implicitly assumes that all 
members of each class own the same proportion of factors of production. The 
greater the number of classes, the smaller the error that arises from this 
assumption.
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TABLE 6.2: Population, Income, and Expenditure Shares, by Community
and Region: 1988.
Community
and
Region
Share (%)
Population Income Expenditure
WHOLE KINGDOM 100.00 100.00 100.00
Urban 28.02 49.73 47.12
Rural 71.98 50.27 52.88
North 19.72 17.24 16.81
Northeast 34.27 20.95 21.89
Central 18.51 18.47 18.18
South 13.00 11.43 12.29
Bangkok 14.50 31.91 30.83
Note: Bangkok includes Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut Prakam.
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
This thesis employs a non-parametric density estimation of income 
distribution within each expenditure class. It incorporates the strengths of the 
two approaches described above in that 1) it does not ignore the actual 
difference amongst income positions and 2) it does not ignore the actual 
distribution of income within each class. Moreover, it can be used to study 
policy impacts on income inequality as well as poverty incidence. This kind 
of density estimation was first proposed by Fix and Hodges (1951, quoted in 
Silverman, 1986) and has been widely used in the area of statistics. In his 
introduction, Galton put forward his view that, in some cases, the geometric 
mean is to be preferred to the arithmetic mean as a measure of location 
(Galton, 1879 quoted in Aitchison and Brown, 1957). Thus, in terms of the 
position of each individual in the distribution of income, log per capita 
expenditure seems to be a better alternative than per capita expenditure. This 
is true in the case of the SES data set used in this thesis. Because of time and 
resource constraints, the number of classes is limited to ten. The per capita 
household expenditure was first transformed into a natural logarithmic form. 
The density function of each of the ten classes was then estimated by using
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the Kernel function. The Kernel function is Gaussian, and page width is 
calculated from variance of data1). The property of the density function is 
such that for every per capita household expenditure Y there is f(X) = f[ln(Y)] 
and F(X) = F[ln(Y)]. When X = ln(Y), f(X) is the density of X, and F(X) is the 
cumulative density of X.
The combined density estimates of per capita household expenditure 
for the ten classes are presented in Figures 6.1-6.2 (urban and rural density 
functions). Even in logarithmic form, the shapes of the distributions are 
skewed to the right and tend to be normally distributed. These characteristics 
are treated as exogenous factors to the CGE model and are not within the 
scope of this thesis. They are assumed to be unaffected by protection policy. 
Figures 63-6.4 present the cumulative density functions of urban and rural 
per capita household expenditure.
FIGURE 6.1: Density of Log of Per Capita Urban Household Expenditure.
1) The theoretical background of the technique is well-discussed in 
Silverman (1986).
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FIGURE 6.2: Density of Log of Per Capita Rural Household Expenditure.
FIGURE 6.3: Cumulative Density of Log of Per Capita Urban Household
Expenditure.
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FIGURE 6.4: Cumulative Density of Log of Per Capita Rural Household
Expenditure.
As in Equation 6.1, the slope of a cumulative density, at a particular 
level of log per capita expenditure, indicates a change in the proportion of 
people whose expenditure is below (or above) that level. This important 
information can be used to measure the effects of population and income 
(expenditure) changes on poverty incidence. It can also be used to evaluate 
the effect of price change on poverty incidence.
(6.1) F(X).dX = F[ln(Y)].y,
when X = log of Y,
y
F(X) 
F (X)
= percentage change in per capita household expenditure Y, 
= cumulative density function of X, and 
= the slope of F(X).
The income distribution impact of a policy can be analysed by various 
measurements of income inequality and poverty incidence. Conventionally,
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income inequality is a relative measure and poverty incidence is an absolute 
measure. Their weaknesses and strengths are well-discussed in the literature, 
e.g., Seers (1972), Sen (1973), Meier (1976), and Sharif (1986). Additionally, 
among absolute measures and relative measures, there is both support and 
criticism. None contains all the desirable properties. This thesis opts for two 
measurements of poverty incidence - the head-count ratio (HCR) and the 
Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) Index; and one measurement of income 
inequality - the Square of Coefficient of Variation (SCV). The following two 
sections discuss these indices and their application to the case of Thailand 
poverty incidence and income inequality in 1988.
6.4. Poverty Line and Poverty Incidence
This section is in four parts. The first presents the basic definition of a 
poverty line. The second presents the basic properties of poverty measures. 
The third discusses some measurements of poverty incidence. Two measures 
are used in this thesis - the HCR, which indicates the proportion of people 
whose income falls below a poverty line, and the FGT index, which measures 
the intensity of poverty and allows for different degrees of emphasis on 
poverty alleviation. The two measures contain many desirable properties of 
poverty measures, including the additive decomposable property. The final 
part of this section presents the contribution of poverty incidence at 
community and regional levels to national poverty incidence.
6.4.1. Poverty Line
A poverty line or subsistence expenditure can be defined in various ways 
(see Sharif, 1986 for a survey of the literature on the concept of subsistence). 
At least three approaches have been used widely. The first observes a 
standard of living directly from the social prescription. The second 
determines a standard of living from the declaration of members or 
representatives of a society. These are both criticised as being relative criteria. 
The third approach is based on a scientific estimation of physiological and
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mental requirements. This approach is supported by a World Bank study on 
Brazil, which indicates that the elimination of malnutrition through the 
provision of subsistence can lead to substantial gains in labour productivity 
and overall economic growth (World Bank, 1979, quoted in Sharif, 1986). In 
this context, both the concept of growth and distribution are justified. The 
poverty line for Thailand in this thesis is based on this approach.
The nutrition approach has some weaknesses (see Sharif, 1986). 
Nutritional requirements vary across age, sex, health, environment, activity, 
etc. The most serious criticisms against the nutritional approach are those of 
inter-personal and inter-regional variability of nutritional requirements, and 
the existence of adaptive mechanisms operating over time for the same 
person (Sukhatme, 1977; Sukhatme, 1978; Srinivasan, 1979; and Rein, 1970; 
quoted in Sharif, 1986). Therefore, there would be differences in estimated 
nutritional requirements amongst researchers which will affect the 
measurement of poverty incidence. There is also the question of conversion 
from nutritional requirements into a low cost basket of goods. In general, cost 
minimisation technique is used under nutritional requirement constraints. 
This method is criticized for excluding from the calculation taste and cultural 
traits, which are very difficult to determine. An additional problem arises 
from specifying subsistence in terms of income or expenditure. Finally, there 
is the lack of treatment of other factors, such as physical rest or leisure. 
Although some studies (e.g. Durnin and Passmore, 1967, quoted in Sharif, 
1986) show that leisure is needed for both physical and mental efficiency, 
there has been little attempt to incorporate this need into a subsistence basket 
(Sharif, 1984, quoted in Sharif, 1986). The World Bank has a living standard 
measurement study program, which suggests the estimation of subsistence 
directly in terms of physical, mental, and social attainments, but little 
progress has been made (Chander et al., 1980; Sullivan et al., 1982; Grootaert, 
1982; and Acharya, 1982; quoted in Sharif 1986). Another effort which 
attempts to include life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and literacy, has 
been developed (Morris, 1979, quoted in Sharif, 1986). Moreover, there are 
different treatments of non-food items in the nutritional approach. Some 
economists use a constant proportion of non-food items, and some include
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them in the minimisation process. An international comparison of poverty 
incidence must take into account these differences.
Thailand's national subsistence bundle or poverty line, as presented in 
Table 6.3, is based on Medhi, Pranee, and Suphat (1991). It is based on the 
energy required to maintain the functioning of all organs in the body, at 
work as well as at rest. This poverty line is based on expenditure information 
from the SES 1988, and is also calculated at regional and community levels. It 
includes the minimum income that an average household in the lowest 
quintile needs to buy basic food and non-food necessities, in order to 
maintain a minimal livelihood in society. The proportion of non-food items 
in the poverty line, based on the actual proportion of non-food consumption 
by households in the lowest quintile, is assumed constant. Other factors such 
as leisure, school enrolment rate, and mortality rate are not included.
TABLE 6.3: Composition of Thailand Poverty Line: 1988.
Consumer Goods Value Percent
TOTAL 8210.76 100.00
Food 4671.92 56.90
Rice and Cereals 1395.83 17.00
Meat and Fish 1771.88 21.58
Fruit and Vegetables 777.56 9.47
Other Foods 690.52 8.41
Beverages 36.13 0.44
Non-food 3538.84 43.10
Ratio (Non-Food/Food) 0.75747 -
Source: Medhi, Pranee, and Suphat (1991).
6.4.2. Axioms
Once a poverty line is identified, the next step is the choice of poverty 
measures which possess various properties. Sen (1976) asserts an axiomatic 
approach to evaluate poverty indices. Sen's first two axioms, monotonic and
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transfer axioms, are regarded as important criteria for a poverty index. In 
addition to these two axioms, another Sen's axiom and a Kakwani's axiom 
are also accepted as important properties of a poverty index. The following 
paragraphs summarise these axioms.
Axiom M (Monotonicity): Given other things, a reduction in income of a 
person below the poverty line must increase the poverty index.
Axiom T (Transfer): Given other things, a pure transfer of income from a 
person below the poverty line to anyone who is richer must increase the 
poverty index.
Sen’s third axiom: A change in non-poor income leaves the poverty index 
unchanged (Sen, 1976 quoted in Foster, 1984), i.e. the poverty measure 
should capture only the change in income of the poor. This axiom overlooks 
the effect of a change in income of the marginal non-poor. This thesis asserts 
that 'a poverty index should increase if a decrease in the marginal non-poor 
income is large enough to bring them into poverty.'
In general, poverty indices implicitly assign zero weight to the welfare 
of the non-poor. According to Sen's axioms, weights attached to the welfare 
of the poor are equal. Kakwani (1980a) adds another three axioms which 
emphasize the importance of transfer among the poor and, thus, their 
welfare. These three axioms are monotonic-sensitivity axiom, transfer 
sensitivity I axiom, and transfer-sensitivity II axiom. The basic idea of the 
monotonic-sensitivity axiom is that the increase in overall deprivation should 
be higher if the same amount of money is taken from a poorer person. The 
transfer-sensitivity I axiom states that 'when the number of positions 
between the transferor and the transferee is fixed, the sensitivity of a poverty 
index should depend on the position of the transferor in the ranking of poor 
people.' The following transfer-sensitivity II axiom, implicitly summarises 
the first two axioms, and gives a higher weight to the transfer of income at
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the lower end than at the upper end of income distribution, i.e. higher weight 
to the welfare of the poorest poor.
Axiom TSII (Transfer-Sensitivity II): If a transfer of income take place from 
the i™ poor, with income Yix to the poor with income Yi+h, then for a given h 
> 0, the magnitude of increase in the poverty index decreases as i increases.
Apart from these four axioms, there are many other axioms, including 
1) Sen's other three axioms which link the level of welfare to the level of 
income and weight the poverty of each poor by their rank orders; and 2) 
Kakwani (1980b)'s axioms, an alternative for 1), which weight a poverty gap 
by a proportion between the income of the poor and the poverty line. 
Interested readers are referred to the original papers. The following 
paragraphs evaluate two poverty indices by the above four axioms.
6.4.3. Measurement of Poverty
In terms of the above four axioms, there are pros and cons for every index. 
However, given the methodology of this thesis, an important property is the 
additive decomposability which allows quantitative, as well as qualitative, 
assessment of the effect of changes in sub-group poverty on overall poverty. 
This section discusses the properties of two indices used in this thesis, the 
head-count ratio (HCR) and the FGT index. They show two important sides 
of poverty incidence. The HCR presents the number of poor as a proportion 
of the total population, and the FGT reflects the intensity of poverty.
Head Count Ratio (HCR): HCR is a crude measure which simply counts the 
number of poor as a percentage of the total population. Every poor is equally 
measured by this index, no matter how poor they are, having nothing or only 
one Baht less than the poverty line. Between the poor and the non-poor, the 
index is not sensitive to a sharp fall of income of the poor or a pure transfer 
of income from the poor to the non-poor. Thus, it violates axioms M, T, and 
TSII. Despite its weaknesses, HCR is a very simple index and easy to
157
understand. In terms of mobility analysis, any in-migration or out-migration 
of poor and non-poor can be detected by this index. Moreover, it is additive 
decomposable.
The definition of HCR is as follows. Let P(Yi<Z) be a probability that 
the income of the ith poor is less than Z, and F(Z) be the cumulative density 
function that individual incomes will be less than Z. If Z is defined as a 
poverty line then the HCR and its decomposed form can be defined as 
follows.
(6.2) H = Q/NorP[ln(Yi)<ln(Z)]or
F[ln(Z)].
(6.3) H = Z(Ng/N).Hg, or
8
D(Ng/N).Pg[ln(Yj)<ln(Z)], or 
8
= 2(Ng/N).Fg[ln(Z)],
8
when
H the head-count ratio of the total population,
Hs = sub-group g's head-count ratio,
Q the total number of poors,
Qg = the number of poors in sub-group g,
N the total number of population, and
Ng = the number of population in sub-group g.
When lower cases represent the percentage change form of the upper 
cases, the percentage change form of (6.3) can be written as
(6.4) h = Z(NgHg/NH)(wg-w+/ig).
8
Provided that the within sub-group income distribution is fixed, two 
changes can cause an equivalent change in sub-group HCR (Hg), i.e. an equal
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/ig. These are a change in the poverty line (2 ) and an opposite change in the 
subgroup's mean income or expenditure (mg). The movement of the poverty 
line is the effect of changes in prices. Therefore, if
Fg = the probability that an individual in sub-group g will be
in poverty, as defined by Equation 6.1, and
Fg = the first derivative of Fg at ln(Yj) = ln(Z), then
dHg = F'g(z-mg), and
(6.5) hg = (z-mg)F g/H g.
The FGT Class: Another index which is used widely is the FGT class of 
poverty index, developed by Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984). This index 
satisfies Sen's first two axioms and Kakwani's axiom TS2. It has three 
advantages. First, it can capture the intensity of poverty. Second, in terms of 
an analysis on the distribution impact of a policy, it allows different degrees 
of emphasis on poverty alleviation (by varying a parameter a). Third, it is 
well-suited for sub-group poverty analysis. Similar to the HCR, the overall 
FGT index is equal to the population share weighted sum of sub-group 
indices. The FGT class of index, its decomposition, and its percentage change 
forms are defined by the following Equations 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8.
(6.6) Pa(y,z) = (l/N)Z[Gj/Z]a,
i
(6.7) Pa(y,z) = I(N g/N).P«g(y,z),
8
(6.8) pa(y,z) = I[(NgP«g/NPa).(Mg-n+p«g)],
8
where
Pa(y,z) = FGT index of order a,
Gi = Z-Yj,
Yj = income of the ith household, and, in the context of this thesis, is 
the percentage change in sub-group i's mean income or expenditure, for all i,
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a  = the coefficient of poverty aversion, a larger a  gives a greater 
emphasis to the poorest poor,
Pag(y,z) = sub-group g's FGT index of order a, and
(6.9) Pag(y,z) = (l/NgJIIGi/Z]«
Equation 6.10 shows that the percentage change in sub-group FGT 
index of order a  (pag) can be written in terms of sub-group FGT index of 
order a  and a-1 (Pag and Pa_1g), and percentage changes in sub-group 
mean income or expenditure (mg), poverty line (z), sub-group HCR (/ig), and 
the number of poor in the sub-group (ttpg). In the absence of mobility, npg is 
zero. The derivation of (6.10) from (6.9) is detailed in Appendix 6.1.
(6.10) p“ , = o[(P“-1g/P ag)-l].(z-mg)+ftg-npg.
Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) claim that: 
if a  > 0, the monotonic axiom holds; 
if a  > 1, the transfer axiom also holds;
if a  > 2, the transfer-sensitive II axiom also holds. Much of the literature
uses the second order of FGT index (a=2).
Despite many strengths, the FGT class possesses a property which can 
be misinterpreted. It does not properly measure the effect of mobility of poor 
and non-poor between sub-groups. This is proven in Appendix 6.2. Poverty 
in a sub-group, measured by the FGT index, can be easily reduced by adding 
one less poor person into that sub-group.
6.4.4. Poverty Incidence in 1988
The characteristics of poverty incidence in Thailand can be discussed in 
many aspects. The decompositions of poverty incidence by community and 
region are presented in the following paragraphs. These decompositions are 
based on Equations 6.3 and 6.7, and statistics in Tables 6.2 and 6.4.
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The poverty line used in this chapter is based on the new concept of 
the poverty line (8210.76 Bahts/person/year) which is higher than the old 
concept. Therefore, poverty incidence is also higher. A different choice of 
poverty line creates different results. Based on the old concept, poverty lines 
move in line with the change in consumer price indices. While the new 
poverty line moves in line with the changes in food prices and, assumes 
constant ratio between non-food and food expenditures. The major 
advantage of using this new poverty line is the availability of its composition, 
which allows tracing back the effects of various price changes on poverty 
incidence.
The composition of the national poverty line in Table 6.3 states that 
56.90% of the poverty line (8210.76 Baht per year) will be spent on food. Non­
food expenditure is only about 76% of food expenditure. Among food, meat 
and fish has the highest share (21.58%); followed by rice and cereals (17.00%), 
fruit and vegetables (9.47%), other foods (8.41%), and beverages (0.44%). 
Different changes in prices of these foods have different impacts on poverty 
incidence. The bigger share means more impact on poverty.
Table 6.4 shows that the number of poor is higher in rural areas (65%) 
than urban areas (20%). Bangkok has the lowest number of poor. On average, 
only 6 of every 100 people in Bangkok are in poverty, while 76 out of every 
100 people in the Northeast are in poverty. Table 6.5 shows that rural areas 
contribute nearly 90%, and the Northeast contributes nearly half of the 
national HCR. Any policy impact on these two areas could have significant 
consequences for national poverty incidence.
In terms of poverty intensity, the FGT^ index shows similar rankings. 
The intensity is very low in Bangkok, and urban areas, and very high in 
regional and rural areas. The intensity in the Northeast, 0.1603, is 
exceptionally high, when compared with 0.0032 for Bangkok. The Central 
region, which is the closest to Bangkok, has the second lowest intensity of 
0.0477, followed by the South (0.0621), and the North (0.0914). The 
decomposition of the FGT^ index shows the same ranking, but to a stronger 
degree. Poverty intensities in rural areas, and the Northeast contribute more 
than 90% and 60% of the country's poverty intensity, respectively.
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TABLE 6.4: Poverty Incidence, by Community and Region: 1988.
Community Head Count Ratio FGT2
alltl
Region Index Rank Index Rank
WHOLE KINGDOM 0.5258 - 0.0903 -
Urban 0.2014 2 0.0211 2
Rural 0.6521 1 0.1173 1
North 0.5788 2 0.0914 2
Northeast 0.7610 1 0.1603 1
Central 0.4224 4 0.0477 4
South 0.4891 3 0.0621 3
Bangkok 0.0623 5 0.0032 5
Note: Based on national poverty line in Table 6.3.
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
TABLE 6.5: Decomposition of Poverty Incidence, by Community and
Region: 1988.
Community Head Count Ratio FGT2
t l l l U .
Region % Rank % Rank
WHOLE KINGDOM 100.00 - 100.00 -
Urban 10.77 2 6.57 2
Rural 89.23 1 93.43 1
North 21.71 2 19.95 2
Northeast 49.61 1 60.82 1
Central 14.87 3 9.78 3
South 12.09 4 8.94 4
Bangkok 1.72 5 0.51 5
Note: Based on poverty incidence in Table 6.4.
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
As discussed in Chapter Three, poverty in Thailand is a rural 
phenomenon. The diference in poverty incidence across region is the 
consequence of the size of the rural sector within each region. For example,
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nearly 90% of the Bangkok population live in urban areas, while nearly 90% 
of the Northeast population live in rural areas. The disaggregation of urban 
and rural households into ten quintiles allows more emphasize on poverty 
incidence in the areas. The aggregate decomposition of the HCR and the FGT 
class (Equations 6.5, 6.8, and 6.10) can be used to analyse the income 
distribution impacts of trade liberalization through changes in income and 
prices. Moreover, data in Tables 6.7, 6.11, and 6.12 can be used to impute the 
distribution impacts of trade liberalization at regional levels, as well as at 
community and national levels. An assumption is that income distribution 
within each quintile is the same across regions.
6.5. Income Inequality
The previous section discusses the measurement of poverty by which 
weights of the non-poor are zero. This section discusses the measurement of 
inequality, which takes into account both poor and non-poor. In terms of 
distribution impact of policy shock, two important types of transfer could 
affect income inequality: 1) a transfer at the end of an income distribution, 
and 2) a transfer at the mode of the distribution. For example, a more equal 
distribution of income could be the effect of either a transfer from the rich at 
the upper end, or a transfer from people at the mode to people at the lower 
end. The index used in this thesis, the square of coefficient of variation (SCV), 
is more sensitive to a transfer at a lower income level, i.e. higher weight to 
the welfare of the poorer people.
There are three parts in this section. The first presents various axioms 
which are accepted as standard properties of inequality measures. The 
second discusses the properties of the SCV, and the third discusses income 
inequality in Thailand, and its decomposition by region, community, and 
class.
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6.5.1. Axioms
The Standard properties of income inequality measures are clearly influenced 
by the work of earlier writers in the field of income distribution, such as 
Pigou and Dalton (1912 and 1920, quoted in Sen, 1973 and Atkinson, 1983). In 
order to provide a framework for inequality comparison, a set of properties 
which should be satisfied by an inequality measure is proposed in the form 
of axioms by Kakwani (1980b). Some of these axioms are similar to 
conditions suggested by others (Dalton, 1920 quoted in Sen, 1973; and 
Shorrocks and Foster, 1987). The following paragraphs summarise these 
axioms.
Let Y = (Y1,Y2,Y3,...,Yn) be a set of an ordered income distribution 
among n individuals. An inequality measure (I) should satisfy the following 
axioms
Axiom S (Scale Independence): If Y = aX (a > 0), then I(X) = I(Y)2\
This axiom makes the measure scale independent. Without this 
property, the elimination of inequality can be done by simply changing the 
unit of measurement. An example of measures that violate this property is 
variance which depends on mean income level and is scale dependent.
This axiom is debatable when sources of income are considered. 
Inequality can be separated into two parts, the within source inequalities, 
and the between source inequalities (see for example, Shorrocks, 1980). An 
equal increase in the total income of two individuals may lead to differences 
in inequalities. Kolm (1976) points out the effects of the change in individual 
incomes from various sources, which may lead to a change in income 
inequality dissatisfying this axiom. In practice, most empirical studies of 
income inequality still assume this property (Aitkinson 1989).
2) This axiom contradicts Dalton's suggestion that an equal 
proportionate addition (subtraction) to all income should diminish 
(increase) inequality (quoted in Kakwani, 1980b). However, he also 
adds that the unit of measurements used by any measure satisfying 
his condition should have the same purchasing power. Therefore, 
international comparison is possible.
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Axiom A (Addition): If a new distribution Y is obtained from X by adding to 
incomes of all individuals a constant amount d, it follows that
a) if d > 0, ICY) < I(X);
b) if d < 0,1(Y) > I(X)3>.
Axiom P (Proportionate Growth): Inequality remains unaffected if a 
proportionate number of persons are added at all income levels.
Axiom T (Transfer): If a transfer of income d < h/2 takes place from a person 
with income X to a person with lower income (X-h), the inequality measure is 
strictly diminished. The restriction, d < h/2, ensures that the amount of 
transfer is not big enough to reverse the relative position of any two 
individuals in the distribution3 4^ .
Some of the literature implicitly focuses on the welfare of the poor by 
giving higher weight to the transfer of income at lower levels of income. An 
example is Shorrocks and Foster (1987), who define two levels of transfer 
sensitivity, weak and strong. The weak transfer sensitivity gives a higher 
weight to a transfer at a lower income level than at any higher income level. 
The strong transfer sensitivity adds that the variance of the distribution 
should not be changed and the rank order should not be reversed5^ .
For convenience, Kakwani adds that the value of any inequality 
measure should lie between zero and one (axiom 5.6, Kakwani, 1986b). 
Perfect inequality (measure = 1) is the situation in which one person gets all
3) This axiom is equivalent to Dalton's principle of addition 
(Kakwani, 1980b).
4) This axiom is similar to the first of two minimum requirements 
for the inequality measure suggested by Sen (1973). The first 
requirement is the Pigou-Dalton condition, or Dalton's principle of 
transfer (Dalton, 1920, quoted in Sen, 1973 and Kakwani, 1980b) in 
which Dalton asserts that any income inequality measure must satisfy 
this minimal property. This condition states that 'any transfer from 
a poorer person to anyone who is richer, other things remaining the 
same, always increases the measure (index).' Another condition is 
the relative sensitivity, which is the property of being sensitive 
to income transfer at all levels of income.
5) Shorrocks and Foster (1987) also state that the two conditions 
are equivalent.
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income, and perfect equality (measure = 0) is the situation in which 
everybody has equal income.
6.5.2. Measurement of Inequality
Sen (1973) divides income inequality measures into two classes. Measures in 
the first class, normative measures, are based on the explicit formation of 
social welfare and the loss incurred from an unequal distribution of income. 
Three well-known measures in this class are Dalton's measure, Atkinson's 
measure and Sen's measure. The concept of using welfare function in these 
measures is economically interesting but, as Sen (1973) argues, the idea of 
inequality depends on the form of utility function6*. The use of utility 
function leads to an unattractive property, being scale dependent. Although, 
this dependency can be avoided by the normalization of every individual's 
income by mean, other properties, such as axiom A, are not clearly satisfied 
by these measures. As a result, this class of measures will not be used.
Positive measures in the second class make no explicit use of the 
concept of social welfare. Most of them are statistical measurements by 
nature. Examples are range, relative mean deviation, variance, coefficient of 
variation, standard deviation of logarithm, relative mean difference, Gini 
index, Kakwani's measure, and Theil's entropy measure. Although these 
measures do not explicitly incorporate social welfare function, their implicit 
incorporation of welfare function is acceptable. Detailed discussion on the 
properties of these measures can be found in Sen (1973). Two of these 
measures, the Gini index and the square of coefficient of variation, are widely 
used. However, the use of the Gini index is limited to the case of intersecting 
Lorenz curves, and its non-additive decomposability. The square of 
coefficient of variation, of which properties are more attractive, is addressed 
in the following discussion.
6) Sen develops his own measure, which does not rely on the form of 
utility function and carries an egalitarian view. However, he does 
not show how his measure can be used without assuming a form of 
welfare function or utility function.
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The Square of Coefficient of Variation (SCV): Three measures - variance, 
the coefficient of variation, and the square of coefficient of variation- are 
developed from statistical variance. The square of coefficient of variation 
satisfies all axioms - scale independence, addition, proportionate growth, and 
transfer sensitivity. It is more sensitive to transfer at lower levels of income. 
As it is also additive decomposable, it allows for the analysis of the effects of 
subgroup inequalities on overall inequality.
Consider variance as the origin of a class of measures. Variance, 
although simple, is scale dependent. Dividing standard deviation by mean, 
gives CV which satisfies the transfer axiom, and equally captures the 
sensitivity of transfers at every income level. But, it is not additive 
decomposable. The square of CV (SCV), which can be considered as the 
variance of income normalized by mean, possesses all of the desired 
properties.
Let Y =(Y1,Y2,Y3,...,Yn) be a set of an ordered income distribution 
among n individuals whose mean is M. A set of income normalized by M can 
be defined as
Y* = (Y1/M,Y2/M,Y3/M,...,Yn/M),
whose mean is equal to one.
The variance of this normalized income (V*), which is the total 
percentage variation of income, can be calculated from the following 
equation.
(6.11) V* = (1/N) Z[(Yj/M)-l]2 = (CV)2
This is exactly the same as the square of CV (SCV) and twice of order 
two of an entropy index I2 (Shorrocks, 1980). It can be shown that the value 
of V* lies between 0 and (N-l). In order that V* will have a convenient 
property of lying between 0 and 1, it is divided by (N-l). This adjustment 
does not affect any other properties and the adjusted V* becomes
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(6.12) V" = [l/N(N-l)]Z[(Yi/M)-l]2,or
i
(6.13) V”  = [1/(N-D] J [(Yi/M)-l]2f(y)dy.
The satisfaction of V* and V** to every property is implied by the 
properties of I2 and their proofs are shown in Appendix 6.3. These properties 
are 1) scale independence, 2) variant to equal addition (subtraction), 3) 
invariant to proportionate growth, and 4) transfer sensitivity. In the case of 
single intersecting Lorenz curve, V* can represent all inequality measures, 
satisfying property 1,3, and 4 (corollary 1, Shorrocks and Foster, 1987).
V* can also be used to analyse the effects of sub-group inequalities on 
an overall inequality. Let
Ng = the number of population in sub-group g,
N = the number of total population,
Vg* = inequality of sub-group g,
W g = (SgMg)/M ,
Sg = income or expenditure share of sub-group g which is
equal to (NgMg)/ (NM),
Mg = mean income (expenditure) of sub-group g,
M = mean income (expenditure) of total population.
The overall V is equal to 
V* = LWeVe*+LWe-l,g  ö  5 g  5
(6.14) V
£WeV *+LSeMe/M-ZSe, andg O O g O O  g O
IW gVg*+ISg(Mg/ M -l).
8 8
The first term in Equation 6.14 represents the effect of sub-group 
inequalities on the overall inequality. The second term represents the inter­
group effect due to the average position of each sub-group in the overall 
distribution of income. The term (Mg/M)-1 shows the difference between the
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position of sub-group mean income (expenditure) and the position of the 
overall mean income (expenditure). In percentage change form, Equation 
6.14 can be rewritten as
(6.15) (1+ v)  = Z[lWg(l+Vg*)/(l+V*)Mo;g-a+üg*)}].
8
Where (1+v) = d(l+V*)/(l+V*)
= »V /(1+V *); and 
(1+vg) = d(l+Vg*)/(l+Vg*)
=Vvg‘/(1+V-
Given the assumption that the within sub-group distribution is 
unaffected by policy being analysed, the changes in sub-group SCV (Vg) and 
(1+vg) are zero. The term Wg can be expanded as ng-n+2nig-2m. Thus, 
Equation 6.15 is reduced to Equation 6.16, which shows that the change in an 
overall SCV depends on the change in sub-group population and 
expenditure share.
(6.16) i?W(l+V*)= Z [{Wg(l+Vg*)/(l+V*)}.(ttg-H+2mg-2ra)]
&
6.5.3. Inequality in 1988
Based on per capita household expenditure, inequality was highest in rural 
areas and the Northeast. The unequal distribution of income in Thailand is 
indicated by the decomposition of SCV by community and region. The 
decompositions show that the main source of national inequality is the 
within group inequality (Table 6.6). The contribution of inequality within 
urban areas, and inequality within rural areas, are more than 46% and 45%, 
respectively. While the inequality between urban and rural areas contributes 
only about 8% to national inequality. Similarly, the total contribution of 
inequalities within each region to national inequality is nearly 90%.
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TABLE 6.6: Inequality and Decomposition of Inequality, by Community
and Region: 1988.
Community
and
Region
SCV Rank
(i/j)
Decomposition (%)
b c Total
WHOLE KINGDOM 2.1562 - 91.72 8.28 100.00
Urban 1.2616 2,1 46.32 14.81 61.13
Rural 2.5129 1,2 45.40 -6.53 38.87
WHOLE KINGDOM 2.1562 - 89.18 10.82 100.00
North 1.4743 2,3 9.80 -1.15 8.65
Northeast 5.1085 1,2 33.12 -3.67 29.45
Central 0.9234 5,4 7.65 -0.15 7.50
South 1.2785 3,5 6.89 -0.31 6.58
Bangkok 1.0435 4,1 31.72 16.10 47.82
Notes: a. Rank i for sub-group inequality and rank j for sub-group’s contribution to national 
inequality.
b. From Equation 6.14, the effect of sub-group inequalities on national inequality.
c. From Equation 6.14, the inter-group effects due to the position of sub-group mean 
incomes on national inequality.
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
Based on the assumption that the within group income distribution is 
exogenous to the model, in terms of inequality, the power of the model in 
explaining national inequality depends on the contribution of inequalities 
between groups which contribute only 8.28% to national inequality. Table 6.9 
shows that, when urban and rural households are disaggregated into ten 
quintiles, the contribution of between group inequalities increases to nearly 
40%. Thus, the power of the model increases as well. The greater the 
disaggregation of households in urban and rural areas, the greater the power 
of the model in explaining national inequality. Because of time and resource 
constraints, this thesis cannot go beyond this. In addition, based on 
population and expenditure shares in Tables 6.11 and 6.12, the same 
methodology can be used to impute the impact of policy shock at the 
regional level, as well as at community and national levels. Similarly to the
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case of poverty incidence, an assumption is made that income distribution 
within each class is the same across regions.
TABLE 6.7: Poverty Incidence and Inequality, by Household: 1988.
Household HCR FGT1 FGT2 SCV
Urban Quintile
1. 0.9427 0.2563 0.0986 0.0605
2. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0160
3. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0092
4. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0157
5. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6009
Rural Quintile
1. 1.0000 0.5686 0.3316 0.0451
2. 1.0000 0.3329 0.1146 0.0086
3. 0.8167 0.0969 0.0146 0.0079
4. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0118
5. 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8670
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
6.6. Conclusion
This chapter presents the methodology to transform the functional and class 
distributions of income into the size distribution of income in two main steps. 
The first estimates the density and cumulative density of the log of 
household per capita expenditure within each of the ten classes. The estimate 
is less restrictive than any other estimates used in the area of income 
distribution and CGE modelling. The second decomposes the overall poverty 
incidence, HCR and FGT2, and SCV into sub-group measures. These 
decompositions are also derived in percentage change form, which can be 
easily added to the Johansen type CGE developed in Chapter Four.
The incidence of poverty and inequality, in the base year 1988, are 
discussed by using the decomposition. The finding is an exceptionally high 
contribution of poverty incidence in the Northeast and rural areas to national 
poverty. The main causes of national inequality are the within-group
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inequalities, and not the inter-group inequalities. The major contribution is 
the inequality amongst the rural population and the Northeast population. 
The expenditure gap between urban and rural areas, and between Bangkok 
and regional areas, is a minor contribution.
TABLE 6.8: Population and Expenditure Shares, by Household: 1988.
Household
Share (%)
Population Expenditure
Urban Quintile
1 . 5.99 3.05
2. 5.87 5.23
3. 5.85 7.66
4. 5.48 10.40
5. 4.84 20.78
Rural Quintile
1 . 19.23 5.68
2. 16.23 7.41
3. 14.03 8.72
4. 12.11 10.53
5. 10.37 20.54
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
The disaggregation of households into ten classes increases the power 
of the model in explaining the distribution impact of policy shocks in the 
general equilibrium framework. The poorer classes are understood to have 
less capital income and more labour income than the richer classes. It is 
implicitly assumed that all members of each class own the same proportion 
of factors of production. Any error that arises from this assumption can be 
reduced by increasing the degree of disaggregation. However, because of 
time and resource constraints, the number of classes is limited to ten. Further, 
by assuming that the within class income distributions are homogeneous 
across regions, the additive decomposability of poverty measures and
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inequality measure can be used to analyse income distribution at regional, as 
well as at national and community levels.
The frameworks developed in Chapter Four, and in this chapter, are 
used to simulate the distribution impacts of a move from the 1987 system of 
industrial protection toward free trade. Generally, a reduction in protection 
affects income of various households through the returns to factors of 
production and household ownership of these factors. Changes in prices and 
household income affect poverty incidence and inequality (Appendix 6.4). 
The following chapter discusses results of the simulations.
TABLE 6.9: Decomposition of Inequality, by Household: 1988.
Household scv
Decomposition (%)
a b Total
WHOLE KINGDOM 2.1562 60.39 39.61 100.00
Urban Quintile 1.2616 25.09 36.16 61.25
1 . 0.0605 0.04 - 0.69 -0.65
2. 0.0160 0.04 - 0.26 -0.22
3. 0.0092 0.04 1.10 1.14
4. 0.0157 0.14 4.32 4.46
5. 0.6009 24.83 31.69 56.52
Rural Quintile 2.5129 35.30 3.45 38.75
1 . 0.0451 0.04 - 1.85 - 1.81
2. 0.0086 0.01 - 1.86 - 1.85
3. 0.0079 0.02 - 1.53 -1.51
4. 0.0118 0.05 -0.64 -0.59
5. 1.8670 35.18 9.33 44.51
Notes: a. From Equation 6.14, the effect of sub-group inequalities on national inequality.
b. From Equation 6.14, the inter-group effects due to the position of sub-group mean 
expenditure on national inequality.
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
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TABLE 6.10: Decomposition of Poverty Incidence, by Household: 1988.
H ousehold
D ecom position (%)
HCR FGT2
W HOLE KINGDOM 100.00 100.00
U rban Q uintile
1 . 10.74 6.54
2. 0.00 0.00
3. 0.00 0.00
4. 0.00 0.00
5. 0.00 0.00
Rural Q uintile
1 . 36.58 70.60
2. 30.88 20.59
3. 21.80 2.27
4. 0.00 0.00
5. 0.00 0.00
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
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TABLE 6.11: Population Share, by Household and Region: 1988.
Household
Row % (Column %)
North Northeast Central South Bangkok
Urban Quintile
1 . 25.37 29.78 23.08 10.30 11.47
(7.70) (5.20) (7.46) (4.74) (4.74)
2. 15.63 17.23 24.10 10.74 32.30
(4.65) (2.95) (7.64) (4.85) (13.07)
3. 9.17 9.97 16.85 10.43 53.58
(2.72) (1.70) (5.32) (4.70) (21.62)
4. 9.71 8.13 11.31 8.99 61.86
(2.70) (1.30) (3.35) (3.79) (23.38)
5. 7.45 5.86 6.70 6.05 73.93
(1.83) (0.83) (1.75) (2.26) (24.69)
Rural Quintile
1 . 18.38 65.54 7.53 8.55 0.00
(17.93) (36.80) (7.83) (12.66) (0.00)
2. 23.93 47.53 15.14 12.84 0.57
(19.69) (22.51) (13.27) (16.04) (0.64)
3. 21.69 34.53 24.32 17.69 1.76
(15.43) (14.13) (18.43) (19.10) (1.70)
4. 24.55 24.97 26.94 19.06 4.48
(15.07) (8.82) (17.62) (17.76) (3.74)
5. 23.36 19.03 30.93 17.69 8.99
(12.28) (5.76) (17.32) (14.11) (6.43)
Note: Bangkok includes Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut Prakam.
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
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TABLE 6.12: Expenditure Share, by Household and Region: 1988.
Row % (Column %) 
Household ------------------------------------------------------
North Northeast Central South Bangkok
Urban Quintile
1. 24.33 28.19 23.96 10.68 12.84
(4.42) (3.93) (4.02) (2.65) (1.27)
2. 15.21 17.09 23.98 10.52 33.19
(4.74) (4.09) (6.91) (4.48) (5.63)
3. 9.10 9.79 16.58 10.34 54.18
(4.15) (3.43) (6.99) (6.45) (13.45)
4. 9.51 8.04 11.27 8.97 62.20
(5.88) (3.82) (6.45) (7.59) (20.97)
5. 7.22 5.35 6.51 5.93 74.98
(8.92) (5.08) (7.44) (10.03) (50.49)
Rural Quintile
1 . 18.83 64.41 7.71 9.05 0.00
(6.37) (16.73) (2.41) (4.19) (0.00)
2. 23.86 47.15 15.38 13.03 0.58
(10.52) (15.96) (6.27) (7.86) (0.14)
3. 21.64 34.34 24.49 17.70 1.83
(11.23) (13.68) (11.75) (12.56) (0.52)
4. 24.32 24.78 27.38 18.90 4.62
(15.24) (11.93) (15.86) (16.20) (1.58)
5. 23.35 22.76 28.23 16.73 8.93
(28.53) (21.36) (31.91) (27.98) (5.95)
Note: Bangkok includes Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut Prakam.
Source: Calculated from the SES 1988.
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Appendix 6.1: Percentage Change Form of FGT Class of Index
Given the density function of sub-group g, the FGT can be written in terms of 
the density function (Fg) or sub-group HCR (Hg), the total poverty intensity 
E(Gi/Z)a, and the number of poors in this sub-group (Npg).
Pag = (Hg /  Npg) E(G i /  Z)a
Using a partial differentiation, therefore
dPag = (Hg/N pg) dS(Gi /  Z)a +Z(Gi/Z )ad(H g/Npg) 
i£g
== (He/N pJZd(GyZ)a+(H /N pJZ(Gi/Z)«dln(He/N DJ
O  i  O  j £ g  O  I  O  j £ g  o  r o
= (a Hg /  N pg) X(G i /  Z)a_1 d (GI /  Z) 
+(Hg/N pg)E(Gj/Z)ad(lnHg-lnNpg)
= (aHg/N pg^(G i/Z)«-ld[l-(Yi/Z)] 
+(Hg/N pg)E(Gi/Z )“.(/!g-«pg)
= (aHg/N pg)I(G |/Z)a''d(-Yj/Z)
+pcW ”pP
= (aH g/Npg^(G i/Z )“-l.(-Yi/Z)dln(Yi/Z)
+p<W ”pP
= (aHg/N pg^(G i/Z)«-l.(-Yi/Z).d[ln(Yi)-ln(Z)]
+pW ”pP
= (aHg/N pg)I(Gi/Z )“-l.(-Yi/Z)(yr z)
+P<VV?W
= (aHg/N pg)£(Gi/Z )“-l.[-l+l-(Yi/Z)](yrz)
+pW ”pP
= (oHg/N pg)»G i/Z )“-l.[-l+(Gi/Z)](yrz)
+p<W ”pP
= (aHg/N pg^IUGi/Z )a-(Gi/Z)a'1](y,-z)
+P<W"pP
= a[P“g-P“-1g](j/rz)+P“g(^-nps)
= a[Pa_1 g-P“g] (z-y;)+Pag(/ig- Mp£>
By assuming that the within-group income distribution (the within- 
group density function) is exogenously fixed, the percentages change in 
income (expenditure) of all members of the group are equal. Thus, the 
percentage change in the sub-group FGT index can be written as
(6.10) p“g = o[(P«-'1g/P ag)-l].(z-mg)+/ig-«pg.
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Appendix 6.2: Population Mobility and FGT Class of Index
In terms of dynamic analysis which is characterized by population growth 
and mobility, the following property, poverty and non-poverty growth, is 
suggested by Kundu and Smith (1983).
Axiom G (Poverty and non-poverty growth): Other things being equal, if a 
new person below (above) the poverty line is added to a society, the degree 
of poverty in the society should thereby increase (decrease).
This axiom is not satisfied by the FGT class. Poverty in a society, 
measured by the FGT index, can be easily reduced or increased, by an in- 
migration of a less poor person or an out-migration of a more poor person, 
respectively. This property limits the use of FGT index when the population 
is mobile.
The proof is as follows: Suppose that a group of m persons migrate 
into a group which previously has
pa = (l/N ) K G j /Z ) “  
i i = 1,..,Q,
= A/N,
when A = E (G j/Z )a
i
i = 1,..,Q.
The FGT index of the in-migrating group is equal to
pma = (l/M)S(Gi/Z)“ 
j ’ j — l/’vQrry
B/M,
when B = Z (G j/Z )a j = l^vQnv
)
After this in-migration, the new FGT index is
P*a = [l/(N+M)]Z(Gi/Z)a k =1,...,(Q+Qm),
k
[l/(N+M)][Z(Gi/Z)a+Z(Gi/Z)a],
• i ’
= (A+B)/(N+M).
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The expectation is that P a would be greater than Pa, i.e.,
(A+B)/(N+M) > A/N
or B/M > A/N
The above inequality means a higher FGT index for the in-migrating 
group than the FGT index for the existing population. The same condition is 
also applied to the case of out-migrating poors from a group, where we 
expect a decrease in poverty incidence. Thus, a government can simply 
reduce poverty incidence, as measured by the FGT index, by allowing 
emigration of groups whose poverty intensity is lower than the national 
figure.
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Appendix 6.3 : Proof of the Properties of SCV
We define the square of coefficient of variation (SCV) or variance of
normalized income as
V* = (1/N)L[(VM )-1]2
i
(CV)2
Various properties of this measure can be tested as follows:
1. Axiom S (Scale Independence): For a set of income Y
V(Y)*= (1/N) X[(Yj/My)-l]2
If X = aY (a > 0), then Mx =aMy and
V (X f=  (1/N) Z[(Xj/Mx)-l]2
i
(1/N) X[(aYj/aMv)-l]2 
i 1 y
= V(Y)*
2. Axiom A (Addition): For a set of income Y
V(Y)*= (1 /N ) I[(Y j/M y)-l]2
(1/N) X[(Yj-My)/M y]2
If X = Y+d, then Mx = My+d and
V(X)*= (l/N )I[(X i/M x)-l]2
i
(1/N ) I[(Yj+d) / (My+d)-l ]2
(1/N) E[(Yi+d-My-d)/(M y+d)]2
(1/N) I[(Yr My)/(M y+d)]2
which is < V(Y)* if d > 0,
= V(Y)’ if d = 0, 
and > V(Y)‘ if d < 0.
181
3. Axiom P (Proportionate Growth): The proof of this axiom is implied by the 
definition of SCV in Equations 6.12 and 6.13.
4. The satisfaction of axiom T (Transfer), Pigou-Dalton condition and the 
relative sensitivity can be proven at the same time:
For a set of income Y
m r  = ( l/N ) L [(V M y)-i]2,
9V(Y)79Yj =(2/NMy).[(Yi/My)-l],
9V(Y)’/3Yj =(2/NMy).[(Yj/My)-l],
9V(Y)*/3Yj-3V(Y)’/9Y j, the effect of an income transfer on V(Y)*,
(2/NM y) [(Yj/MyMYj/My)]
= (2/NM y) [(Yj-YjVMy]
= (2/NM 2y)(Yj-Yj)
Thus, it satisfies axiom T and is sensitive to transfer at every income 
level. The effect of transferring one unit of income on V(Y)* depends on 
income differential between the transferer and the transferee, i.e. the same 
income gap means the same change on the measure. Thus, this measure is 
more sensitive to transfer from the upper end of income distribution to the 
lower end than from the middle to the lower end.
5. Additive Decomposability: If V* is the overall inequality of a population 
size N with mean income M then
V’ = (l/N)£[(Yj/M)-l]2,
i
= (l/N)S[(Yj/M)2-2(Yj/M)+l],
i
= (l/N)S(Yj/M)2 -(1/N)Z[2(VM)-1],
i i
= (l/N)I(Yi/M)2-(l/N)[2NM/M-N],
i
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= (1/N )L (Y ;/M )2-1,
i
= (l/N )[X (Y i/M)2+E(Yi/M )2+ ...]-l, 
ieg=l ieg=2
= (l/N)[XX(Yei/M )2]-l, 
g i  6
where Ygi = income of individual i in any subgroup g. Thus
V* = (1 /N )[ X(M„/M)2x(YEi/M „)2]-l,
g 6 ieg & b
= [X (l/N )(M e /M )2K Y £i/M e)2]-l/ 
g 6 ieg 6 &
= [K M „/M )(M „/N M )X (Y ei/M „)2]-l,g O O j£g o o
= [X(M£r/M )(N „ M „ /N M )( l/N e)X(Yei/M „)2 ]-l/g O O O O j£g o o
= [X(Me/M )(Se)(l/N g )K Y ei/M „)2]-l,g 6 & ö jeg 6 &
= X(SgMg/M )(l/N g)[X (Y gi/M g)2]-l/ 
g 1£g
= X(SgMg /  M) ((1 / N g)X( Ygj /  Mg)2 -1 + lJ-l, 
g 1£g
= X(SgM g/M ){[(l/N g)X (Y gi/M g)2 -U+1J-1, 
g 1£g
= X(SgMg/M )(V g*+l)-l,
8
= [X(SgMg/M)].Vg*+X(SgMg/M )- l / 
g g
,i.e., V* = i w X + s w . - i ,
g 5 6 g &
= XWgVg*+XSg[(Mg/M )-l] , 
g g
where Sg = expenditure share of subgroup g, and
Wvvg = SgMg/M .
Dividing by N -l, then their value lie between 0 and 1, i.e.,
[ZWeV *+LWe-l)]/(N -l). 
g h 5 g 5
V7(N-1)
1 8 3
Appendix 6.4: Link between the Model and the Measurement of
Income Distribution
Reduction in the Nominal Rate of Protection
Main CGE Model
Y
Changes in Endogenous Variables such as 
Poverty Line Household Income
Equations 
(6.4) and (6.5)
Equations 
(6.8) and (6.10)
Equations 
(6.15) and (6.16)
Head Count Ratio FGT Index SCV Inequality Index
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- CHAPTER 7 -
IMPACT OF A MOVE TOWARDS 
FREE TRADE
7.1. Introduction
The patterns of industrialisation, industrial protection, and income 
distribution are clearly related. All three reflect the regional bias of economic 
policies in Thailand. Basically, industrial protection affects income 
distribution through the returns to factors of production. Because of the 
regional bias of industrial location, especially those of the highly protected 
industries, it seems possible that the problem of income distribution is 
accentuated by the system of protection.
This chapter analyses the income distribution impact of the move from 
the 1987 system of protection towards free trade. The 1987 nominal rates of 
protection are summarised in Table 7.1 by producer good. The system 
favoured manufacturing while disadvantaging agriculture. On average, 
import competing manufacturing industries received higher rates of 
protection than export oriented manufacturing industries. Protection for 
import competing industries generally includes import duties and import 
surcharge. Protection for export oriented industries is the sum of tax rebates 
(less export tax and royalty) - an exemption of import duty for exporters who 
import intermediate inputs used in the production of their exports. This is 
equivalent to an export subsidy.
Based on the general equilibrium framework developed in the 
previous chapters, the income distribution impact of a move towards free
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trade is examined by reducing all nominal rates of protection by 10%. The 
10% reduction means that all nominal rates of protection are lowered by 10% 
of their base values. Thus, protection for other export products is reduced 
from 1.49% to 1.34%. Protection for import competing products is reduced 
from 18.93% to 17.04%, and so on.
Table 7.1: Nominal Rate of Protection (NRP), by Producer Good: 1987
Producer Good NRP (%)
1. Paddy 0.00
2. Maize, Cassava, and Sugar-cane (MCS) 0.19
3. Rubber 0.00
4. Other Agricultural Products 7.74
5. Agro-industry Products 0.13a
6. Other Export Oriented Products 1.49a
7. Petroleum Products 1.40
8. Other Import Competing Products 18.93
9. Electricity, Water Supply,
Transport, and Communication (EWTC) 0.00
10. Services 0.22
Note: a. Adjusted rates (see Section 4.4.1).
Source: Weighted average from figures given in Table 3.13, Paitoon et al. (1989).
The reduction alters directly the demand for, and domestic prices of, 
all imports and exports, and indirectly those of all other parts through 
quantity and price adjustment in factor and goods markets. The adjustment 
in the supply and returns to factors of production affects household income. 
These are captured by the CGE model developed in Chapter Four.
The move towards free trade also has some impact on the government 
budget. When protection for an import competing good is reduced, the 
government revenue from trade taxes will decrease if import volume remains 
the same. However, because of cheaper domestic prices, imports will
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generally increase and raise more revenue from trade taxes. Thus, the move 
towards free trade will lead to a change in the government budget, deficit or 
surplus. If the first effect outweighs the second, the government budget 
moves into deficit, and vice versa if the second effect outweighs the first.
Generally, trade theory argues that tariff reduction will lead to 
efficient allocation of resources and higher economic welfare. One of the 
basic assumptions behind this argument is that a change in government 
revenue from trade taxes is equally redistributed back to the public. 
However, the means of redistribution, taxation, has a distortionary effect and 
requires proper care. This is discussed in the literature (e.g. Hatta, 1986). 
Indirect taxation has a distortionary effect because it causes households to 
adjust their consumption patterns and leads to a consumption loss. Direct 
taxation distorts the choice between work and leisure, and because of the 
differences amongst the base year direct tax rates on households, it also 
distorts household demand for consumer goods. Lump-sum taxes such as a 
poll tax, which has no distortionary effect, are not being implemented in 
Thailand.
The methodologies developed in Chapter Six are used to analyse the 
impact of the move on poverty incidence and income inequality. Following 
the changes in household income and purchase prices, poverty incidence is 
measured by the number of poor (HCR) and the intensity of poverty (FGT2). 
HCR indicates how many people are brought into or out of poverty, as a 
result of the move towards free trade, while FGT2 measures the change in 
poverty intensity rather than the number of poor. An income inequality 
index (SCV) measures the impact of the move in income inequality. These are 
examined at the national, regional, and community level.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 
summarises the economic environment of the simulations carried out in this 
thesis - the macro-economic closure of the model, factor market, trade 
orientation of each producer good, and policy variables. Emphasis is on the 
income distribution aspects of each choice of closure and exogenous 
variables. Section 7.3 discusses the impact of the move, from the 1987 system 
of protection towards free trade. The decrease in all nominal rates of
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protection brings about a government deficit, which is financed by an across 
the board increase in all direct tax rates. Both the pre-tax and post-tax income 
distribution impact is investigated. The deficit can also be financed by some 
other means, e.g. borrowing or an increase in indirect taxes. Section 7.4 
explores the impact of different government instruments to redistribute the 
adverse effect of the move towards free trade on the government budget 
deficit. The instruments are external financing, and an across the board 
increase in all indirect tax rates. Section 7.5 discusses a sensitivity analysis, 
and compares the results of an alternative assumption with the one used in 
the previous sections. Section 7.6 summarises this chapter.
7.2. Closure of the Model
As shown in Chapter Four, the total number of equations in the model is 
1616, and the total number of variables is 1747. By Walras law, one equation 
can be excluded from the model. The model is closed by having a set of 132 
exogenous variables. The following paragraphs discuss the choice of macro- 
economic closure and the set of exogenous variables. They provide an 
economic environment in which simulations have been carried out.
7.2.1. Macro-economic Closure
The importance of macro-economic closure is debated among CGE 
modellers. Kehoe and Sierra-Puche (1983) found that the treatment of 
government deficits was crucial for their results, while Adelman and 
Robinson (1987), cited in Adelman and Robinson (1989), found that the 
impact of shock on the size distribution is virtually identical and small under 
all closures. However, Robinson (1989) asserts that three macro-economic 
closures are involved in the SAM-based model. These are savings-investment 
balance, trade balance, and government budget deficit. In the context of 
income distribution, the same study adds that the savings-investment 
balance is crucial. Most CGE modellers achieve equilibrium either by having 
investment adjust to savings, or by having savings adjust to the exogenous
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levels of investment. Both mechanisms rely on a shift between household 
demand and investment demand, which may have apriori distribution 
impact. In a full intertemporal or a long run model, changes in savings and 
investment induce changes in the ownership of factors of production and, 
thus, income distribution.
In the short run, the presence of real savings and investment 
underestimates the distribution impact of the move towards free trade, since 
a short run model cannot capture the future benefit of real savings and 
investment allocation. The inclusion of the net inflow of real foreign savings 
distorts the distribution impact, since it incurs future debt payment which is 
not captured by the model.
This thesis focuses on the short run income distribution impact of a 
change in industrial protection policy. The impact of the move is converted 
to present consumption. By assuming that the change has no impact on 
savings-investment decisions of economic agents, there is no real change in 
aggregate savings and investment (v is zero), or in any components of 
domestic savings and net inflow of foreign savings (v\ v&, and are
zero). Consequently, since the balance of payments is assumed to remain 
constant, the current account deficit is equal to the net inflow of nominal 
foreign savings, i.e. direct foreign investment plus external financing of a 
government budget deficit. This assumption is discussed in Sub-section 4.2.3.
7.2.2. Factor Markets
The period of time, about 2-3 years, is assumed to be sufficiently long for 
relative prices, consumption, and demand and supply of factors and goods to 
reach a new equilibrium, but sufficiently short for ignoring the impact of 
shocks on investment allocation, and each industry specific capital stock. 
Thus, the supplies of industry specific capital are assumed constant.
Land is also specific to each multi-output industry, because it is 
geographically defined. Although, it is well known that the past increase in 
agricultural outputs was based on the expansion of agricultural land; it is 
also recognised that the expansion has reached its frontier (Ammar, 1987,
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and Jeerakiat and Chucheep, 1987). This is the basis for the assumption that 
land are in fixed supplies.
Theoretically, the supply of labour is based on workers’ trade off 
between leisure and wage rates in order to maximise their utilities. Labour 
supply depends on how leisure is valued and, therefore, on the degree of 
workers' responses to a change in the return to labour. By assuming an 
unlimited supply of labour, the income distribution impact of a policy shock 
could be more favourable. However, it could also be over-estimated due to 
the value of forgone leisure, which is not taken into account. The issue 
becomes more complicated when income tax is included.
Labour supplies can be set exogenously in the model, while real wage 
rates are endogenous. Alternatively, if labour supplies are endogenised in the 
model, real wages are exogenously set. The total returns to other factors are 
influenced by the way labour responds to the move towards free trade. In the 
limited supply case, skilled labour absorbs the benefit of the move through 
higher real wages, instead of through an increase in employment as in the 
unlimited supply case. Returns to other factors are affected accordingly.
This thesis assumes that supply of skilled labour is fixed, while that of 
unskilled labour is perfectly elastic. Income tax will have no impact on the 
supply of both types of labour, since skilled labour supply is fixed and 
unskilled labour income is lower than the income tax-free threshold. The 
assumption of the unlimited supply of unskilled labour is based on evidence 
of variable participation rates by youngsters, and female members of rural 
households, who can be drawn into the labour force in response to peak 
season demand (Bertrand, 1980). The shortage of skilled labour, and the 
inadequacy of labour skill upgrading, are widely accepted in the literature 
(for example Sirilaksana, 1992). This implicitly points to the scarcity and 
limited supply of skilled labour, which is one of the main concerns of the 
seventh development plan (1992-1996).
Another set of exogenous variables is wage differential variables, 
which is outside the scope of this thesis. They are set at zero, i.e. the move 
has no impact on wage differential, for the same skill category, across 
industries.
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7.2.3. Foreign Trade
By small country assumption, Thailand is a price taker in world markets. The 
volume of Thai imports has no impact on world prices. The world prices of 
imports are exogenously determined and are assumed constant (pw & are 
zero). The exchange rate (numeraire price) is also fixed.
In the case of exports, the relationship between Thai exports and 
world prices is governed by the price elasticity of world demand for Thai 
exports, which indicates the market power of Thai exports. This is discussed 
in Chapter Four. The sensitivity of simulation results to the market power of 
Thai exports will be reviewed in Section 7.5. The export of exportable 
producer goods (i = 5 and 6) is endogenously determined by the model, 
while those of import-competing and non-traded producer goods are 
exogenously fixed. The shift variable (g4^) is set at zero for export producer 
goods. For non-export producer goods, it is allowed to adjust in such a way 
that the domestic prices of these goods are not directly related to world 
prices, i.e. they are determined by domestic conditions. The shock of world 
demand for Thai exports (f*-) is assumed zero, i.e. no exogenous change in 
world demand for Thai exports.
7.2.4. Policy Variables
Trade taxes, direct taxes, and indirect taxes are policy variables. They can be 
exogenously determined in this model. This thesis simulates the income 
distribution impact of a 10% across the board reduction in all nominal rates 
of protection, i.e. all tariff variables are exogenously set at -10. An exception 
is the rate of subsidy for export of agro-industry and other export oriented 
producer goods, which is endogenously determined by Equation 4.52. All 
other tax variables (t i d t b a r is, and t d $  are exogenously set at zero, i.e. other 
tax rates are fixed. As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the 
uniformity change in all rates of direct or indirect tax (t b a r or tbar**) can be 
policy instruments to redistribute the effect of the move towards free trade 
on the government budget deficit (lOOdG = 0). Alternatively, the government
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budget deficit can be endogenised in the model, i.e. the deficit is financed by 
some external source, and debt repayment is not included in this model.
7.3. Trade Liberalization and Direct Taxation
This section focuses on the simulation results of the move from the 1987 
system of industrial protection towards free trade, by the reduction of all 
rates of protection by 10%. Following the move towards free trade, which 
leads to a government budget deficit, the government decides to redistribute 
the deficit by an across the board increase in direct tax rates. The simulation 
assumes market power for agro-industry exports, and small country 
assumption for all other exports. It also assumes the supply of unskilled 
labour is perfectly elastic, while that of skilled labour is perfectly inelastic.
Tables 7.2-73 present some important data drawn mainly from the 
1988 Social Accounting Matrix which was discussed in Section 4.3.
Table 7.2: Primary Factor and Intermediate Input Shares, by Producer 
Good (%)
Primary Intermediate Input
Producer Good Factor ---------------------------------
Domestic Import
Paddy 79.06 15.65 5.29
MCS 65.93 29.10 4.97
Rubber 85.95 7.28 6.77
Other Agriculture 62.61 32.12 5.27
Agro-industry 19.94 79.58 0.48
Other Export Oriented 37.64 53.40 8.96
Petroleum 9.22 22.13 68.65
Other Import Competing 34.88 40.56 24.56
EWTC 42.73 41.49 15.78
Services 66.03 29.92 4.05
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Table 7.3: Primary Factor Cost Share, by Producer Good (%)
Labour
Producer Good ------------------------------- Capital Land
Skilled Unskilled
Paddy - 58.87 17.03 24.10
MCS - 66.43 11.19 22.38
Rubber - 66.83 9.49 23.68
Other Agriculture - 63.00 15.80 21.20
Agro-industry 8.21 11.07 80.72 -
Other Export Oriented 25.91 11.73 62.36 -
Petroleum 28.83 2.16 69.01 -
Other Import Competing 12.10 17.01 70.89 -
EWTC 10.85 34.42 54.73 -
Services 17.10 30.78 52.12 -
Table 7.4: Cost Shares of Domestic and Imported Inputs, 
Good
by Consumer 
(%)
Consumer Good
Intermediate
Domestic Import
Rice and Cereals 99.15 0.85
Meat and Fish 96.67 3.33
Fruit and Vegetables 96.90 3.10
Other Foods 95.32 4.68
Non-alcoholic Beverages 99.90 0.10
Clothing and Footwear 97.81 2.19
House and Housing Expenditure 88.88 11.12
Transport and Communication 88.68 11.32
Medical Expense, Education, and Entertainment 82.24 17.76
Other Non-foods 94.08 5.92
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TABLE 7.5: Base Year Direct Tax Rate, by Household (%)
Household Direct Tax Rate
Urban 1 0.7728
Urban 2 1.0392
Urban 3 1.8434
Urban 4 3.1336
Urban 5 6.9700
Rural 1 0.0966
Rural 2 1.0297
Rural 3 0.0971
Rural 4 0.5594
Rural 5 1.6444
Source: Socio-economic Survey 1988, NSO.
Tables 7.6-7.14 summarise the simulation results of the move towards 
free trade when a government budget deficit is financed by an increase in all 
rates of direct taxes by 8.37%. The nature of direct taxes in Thailand is 
progressive and targets urban households. This is well-discussed in the 
literature (e.g. Chongrak, 1981, Chalongphob, Pranee, and Tienchai, 1988). 
Table 7.5 summarises the direct tax rates on each type of household1 K By 
increasing all direct tax rates by the same proportion, the new direct tax 
structure, particularly on urban households, becomes more progressive.
The move towards free trade lowers import prices in relation to 
domestic prices of all import competing products. Buyers will find it cheaper 
to substitute imported goods for domestic goods. Thus, the move generally 
leads to an increase in imports, and a contraction in demand for outputs and 
employment of all import competing industries. All export oriented 
industries can attract more resources and, thus, expand. The effect on non- 
traded industries, which mainly service the domestic market, is dependent
1) It should be noted that the information from the SES 1988 is 
apparent anomaly since the rate on Rural 2 is higher than those on 
the richer rural households (Rural 3 and Rural 4).
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on how the industries are related with the export oriented and import 
competing industries.
Since the move leads to cheaper imports, it also permits domestic 
firms to produce at a lower cost, through purchasing imported inputs at 
lower domestic prices. Thus, the first round effect is offset, to some extent, by 
the reduction in production cost which benefits all domestic industries.
The increase in all direct tax rates directly diverts resources from 
households to government, and also indirectly influences how resources are 
reallocated among industries. The economic rationale for the adjustment is 
that an increase in the direct tax burden on households leads to a decrease in 
household consumption expenditure, which, in turn, induces a change in 
demand for each consumer good. Since the consumer demand system in this 
model does not allow inferior goods, the change is simply a decrease in 
demand. Based on their expenditure elasticity of demand, household 
expenditure for various consumer goods is reduced accordingly until their 
budget balances. The induced decrease in demand for consumer goods, in 
turn, stimulates changes in demand for, and prices of, producer goods used 
as inputs in the production of consumer goods.
From this point, the resource allocation impact plays its role through 
changes in output, employment, wage rates, and returns to industry specific 
factors. These changes induce second round changes in household income, 
through their ownership of factors of production. The process will continue 
until all markets are in equilibrium.
7.3.1. Macro Impact
The simulation results project that, following the move towards free trade, 
nominal GDP decreases by 0.21%. This reduction is accompanied by a 
decrease in almost all components of GDP, except exports and imports. 
Overall household consumption (C) decreases by 0.43%, while investment (I) 
and government expenditure (G) decrease by 0.65% and 0.47%, respectively. 
Net exports increase, since exports (X) expand by 0.24% while imports (M) 
increase by 0.14%.
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Table 7.6: Macro Impact of the Move Towards Free Trade and Direct 
Taxation
Industry Change (%)
GDP (Nominal) -0.2149
Consumption -0.4312
Investment -0.6461
Government -0.4706
Export3 0.2403
Import3 0.1405
Price Indices
Consumer -0.4670
Capital -0.6461
Government Revenue
Trade Taxes -9.7693
Indirect Taxes -0.6557
Direct Taxes 8.1418
Property -0.2388
Tax Rate
Direct Taxes 8.3669
Indirect Taxes -
Unskilled Labour Employment 0.2916
Nominal Wage
Skill -0.3036
Un-skilled -0.4670
Note: a Valued at world prices.
Despite the decrease in nominal GDP, the move towards free trade 
leads to an increase in real GDP. The simulation results project that real GDP, 
as indexed by the CPI, increases by about 0.25%. The increase in total exports 
of about 0.24% appears to be the major force behind this growth. This leads 
to a 0.29% increase in employment of unskilled labour. A 0.04% increase in 
real consumption points to an overall welfare gain after the move towards 
free trade. Since investment and government expenditure are assumed 
constant in real terms, their nominal falls are explained by the fall in prices, 
e.g. the capital price index falls by 0.65%.
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The decrease in government revenue is mainly caused by a dramatic 
fall in revenue from trade taxes of about 9.77%, followed by a fall in revenue 
from indirect taxes and property income by 0.66% and 0.24%, respectively. In 
order to finance its budget, the government has to raise more revenue from 
direct taxes by an across the board increase in all direct tax rates by 8.37%, 
which results in an increase in revenue from direct taxes of about 8.14%.
7.3.2. Production Impact
Table 7.7 shows that other import competing industries, protected at 18.93%, 
are most adversely affected by the move towards free trade. With less 
protection, these industries become less competitive and cannot compete 
with similar products from world markets. The contraction of output by 
about 0.05% is mainly explained by an increase in the import of imported 
counterparts by more than 0.23% (Table 7.8). As a result, employment of 
skilled and unskilled labour in these industries decreases by 0.27% and 
0.11%, respectively. The expansion of another import competing industry, 
petroleum, is mainly because the industry has been relatively efficient and 
competitive. Nominal protection for the industry was very low (1.40%) while 
effective protection was -6.8% (Table 3.14, Paitoon et al., 1989). Thus, the 
adverse impact of the move towards free trade is very small, and is offset by 
benefits from the reduction of imported inputs which account for nearly 70% 
of the industry's total cost (Table 7.3). The industry is able to attract more 
labour out of the highly protected industries. Skilled and unskilled labour 
employment in the industry increases by 0.79% and 0.95%, respectively. The 
results project that, following the move towards free trade, the industry will 
expand by 0.25%. The expansion is induced by an increase in total demand 
for domestic petroleum products and a 0.45% decrease in demand for 
imported petroleum products (Table 7.8).
Other beneficiaries are other export oriented industries, agro-industry, 
and agriculture. By attracting more skilled and unskilled labour, a rise of 
about 0.50% and 0.66%, other export oriented industries expand at the rate of 
0.21%. The expansion of the industries is dominated by a more than 0.67%
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increase in world demand for their exports (Table 7.8). Similarly, another 
export oriented industry, agro-industry, also expands by 0.21%, world 
demand for agro-industry exports increases by 0.36%, and labour 
employment in the industry increases by more than 1% (Tables 7.8 and 7.9).
TABLE 7.7: Impact of the Move Towards Free Trade and Direct Taxation 
on Output Supply and Employment, by Industry (%)
Labour Employment
Industry Output ---------------------------------------------
Total Skilled Unskilled
ESAN (Northeast) 0.3066 0.4937 - 0.4937
Non-ESAN 0.0911 0.1458 - 0.1458
Agro-industry 0.2147 1.1140 1.0201 1.1836
Other Export Oriented 0.2060 0.5475 0.4965 0.6600
Petroleum 0.2476 0.7990 0.7856 0.9511
Other Import Competing -0.0520 -0.1786 -0.2741 -0.1106
EWTC 0.0201 0.0445 -0.0798 0.0837
Services 0.0509 0.1063 0.0012 0.1647
The impact on non-traded industries is dependent on the relationship 
between these industries with expanding and contracting industries. EWTC 
and services are also encouraged by the move towards free trade. The 
expansion of the two agricultural industries, ESAN and non-ESAN, is driven 
by the relationship between these industries and agro-industry. Since 
agriculture supplies much of the intermediate inputs of agro-industry, the 
expansion of agro-industry induces demand for the outputs of agriculture, 
especially paddy, MCS, and rubber.
The expansion of ESAN industry (0.31%) is more than that of non- 
ESAN industry (0.09%). The explanation lies mainly in the fact that, between 
the two agricultural industries, the share of paddy, MCS, and rubber in total 
output of ESAN industry is higher than that of non-ESAN industry. On the
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other hand, the share of highly protected other agricultural products is lower 
in ESAN industry than in non-ESAN industry. Based on their output 
combination, ESAN industry is less protected than non-ESAN industry. 
Therefore, ESAN industry is less adversely affected by the move towards free 
trade.
TABLE 7.8: Impact of the Move Towards Free Trade and Direct Taxation 
on Trade, by Producer Good (%)
Producer Good
Export Import
Quantity Price3 Quantity Price3
Paddy - -0.4053 0.1560 0 .0 0 0 0
MCS - -0.3890 - -
Rubber - -0.3711 - -
Other Agriculture - -0.4677 0.0349 -0.6674
Agro-industry 0.3588 -0.1911 0.3331 -0.6600
Other Export Oriented 0.6701 -0.1488 0.2614 -0.5720
Petroleum - -0.9259 -0.4484 -0.1156
Other Import Competing - -0.6955 0.2307 -1.2892
EWTC - -0.5196 0.0073 -
Services - -0.4457 0.0234 -0.0214
Note: a Domestic price, i.e. p4 for export and p° for import.
Since the prices of other agricultural products decrease in relation to 
those of paddy, MCS, and rubber, agricultural industries find it more 
profitable to produce paddy, MCS, and rubber, and are expected to reallocate 
their resources towards the production of these crops (Table 7.9). The output 
of other agricultural products would increase to a lesser degree. Thus, the 
total outputs of paddy, MCS, and rubber, increase by 0.22%, 0.21%, and 
0.16%, while that of other agricultural products increases by 0.10%. However, 
the decision of ESAN and non-ESAN industries also depend on their 
production transformation possibilities, which are governed by irrigated area
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and land quality. The benefit to ESAN industry is less than that to non-ESAN 
industry, for which land quality and irrigation are better. The expansion of 
ESAN industry is relatively less efficient, since it is constrained to allocate too 
many resources to increase the output of the less profitable other agricultural 
products by 0.25%. Non-ESAN industry increases the output of other 
agricultural products by only 0.05%.
TABLE 7.9: Impact of the Move Towards Free Trade and Direct Taxation 
on Domestic Supply and Basic Price, by Industry and Producer Good (%)
Industry and Producer Good Output Basic Price
Total Agriculture
Paddy 0.2170 -0.3787
MCS 0.2111 -0.3819
Rubber 0.1615 -0.3711
Other Agriculture 0.1016 -0.4689
ESAN (Northeast)
Paddy 0.3771 -0.3787
MCS 0.3483 -0.3819
Rubber - -0.3711
Other Agriculture 0.2530 -0.4689
Non-ESAN
Paddy 0.1474 -0.3787
MCS 0.1237 -0.3819
Rubber 0.1615 -0.3711
Other Agriculture 0.0548 -0.4689
Agro-industry 0.2147 -0.1383
Other Export Industry 0.2060 -0.1233
Petroleum Industry 0.2476 -0.9769
Import-competing Industry -0.0520 -0.7304
EWTC 0.0201 -0.5196
Services 0.0509 -0.4457
Note: Following ORANI's definition, the basic price is equal to the average cost of all inputs 
used in the production of one unit output, i.e. the price received by industry.
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7.3.3. Factor Market Impact
Changes in the returns to industry specific factors (hereafter referred to as 
rent) are related to changes in employment and other domestic conditions, 
such as output and price. The reallocation of labour is induced by the 
assumption that change in the real wage of each type of labour, as indexed 
by CPI, is equal across industries. With the immobility of specific factors, the 
expansion of industries is obtained by hiring more labour, and the 
contraction of industries by reducing labour. With an increase (decrease) in 
employment, specific factors become relatively scarce (abundant) and rents 
are bid up (depressed). Therefore, as shown in Table 7.10, the average unit 
return to labour in expanding industries decreases in relation to the rent. In 
the other import competing industries, the rent decreases in relation to the 
unit return to labour in general. An exception is the expanding petroleum 
industry where rent decreases in relation to wage. This can be explained by 
the fact that the industry is relatively intensive in skilled labour in relation to 
unskilled labour. In order to attract skilled labour, which is in limited supply, 
the industry has to offer high wages and, thus, press down rent. These 
changes in returns to primary factors - the functional distribution of income - 
eventually affect the size distribution of income, and poverty incidence and 
inequality.
Table 7.10 also shows that, except in the ES AN industry, the rent in 
non-export oriented industries decreases while those of export oriented 
industries increase. The change in agricultural and non-agricultural rents are, 
on average, very significant. The 0.03% increase in the rent of ESAN industry 
is very impressive in relation to the 0.32% decrease in the rent of non-ESAN 
industry. Nominal wage rates for skilled and unskilled labour decreases by 
0.30% and 0.47%, respectively while unskilled labour employment increases 
by 0.29% (Table 7.6). The decrease in the nominal wage rate for unskilled 
labour is the result of the assumption that the real wage for unskilled labour, 
as indexed by the CPI, is fixed.
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Table 7.10: Impact of the Move Towards Free Trade and Direct Taxation on 
Return to Primary Factor, by Industry (%)
Industry
Return to
Labour3 Capital Land
ESAN -0.4670 0.0267 0.0267
Non-ESAN -0.4670 -0.3213 -0.3213
Agro-industry -0.3974 1.0878 -
Other Export Industries -0.3545 0.3754 -
Petroleum Industry -0.3149 -0.7503 -
Other Import-competing Industries -0.3991 -0.6372 -
EWTC -0.4278 -0.3834 -
Services -0.4086 -0.3024 -
Note: a For ESAN and non-ESAN industries, this is unskilled labour. For the remaining 
industries, this includes skilled and unskilled labour.
7.3.4. Income Distribution Impact
There are many features of the factor ownership matrix that explain different 
changes in household income and thus income distribution (Table 7.11). 
Income from skilled labour is a relatively more important part of the income 
of urban households, especially in the middle quintiles, than that for rural 
households. Income from unskilled labour is an important source of income 
for most types of households, especially poor and rural households. The 
higher the quintile, the lower the share of income from unskilled labour in 
total household income. The share of income from non-agricultural capital in 
total household income varies with the household's position in the 
distribution of income. Rich households earn more from non-agricultural 
capital than poor households. The share of non-agricultural capital in urban 
household income is greater than in rural household income. Although 
agricultural capital is not a very important source of income, it is relatively 
more important for rural households than for urban households. Income
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from land is mostly owned by rural households. However, poor quality land 
in the Northeast is a relatively more important source of income for poor 
rural households than for rich rural households, while income from land in 
other regions is a more important source for households at the mode of the 
rural income distribution than for other households.
Table 7.11: Factor Ownership Matrix Row % (Column % )
Household
Labour Capital Land
S US A NA NE NON
Urban 1 14.2 47.6 1.0 35.2 0.4 1.6
(3.0) (4.5) (1.4) (2.2) (1.5) (1.9)
Urban 2 16.5 38.1 0.4 44.3 0.0 0.7
(5.8) (6.0) (0.8) (4.6) (0.3) (1.3)
Urban 3 17.2 34.7 0.2 47.6 0.0 0.3
(8.5) (7.6) (0.7) (7.0) (0.1) (0.7)
Urban 4 17.0 30.7 0.2 51.7 0.0 0.4
(10.8) (8.6) (0.6) (9.7) (0.3) (1.4)
Urban 5 15.3 14.0 0.2 69.7 0.1 0.7
(21.2) (8.6) (1.9) (28.5) (1.3) (5.2)
Rural 1 15.6 62.9 3.3 7.4 6.0 4.8
(5.2) (9.3) (6.7) (0.7) (32.5) (9.0)
Rural 2 10.3 59.8 4.7 13.7 4.2 7.3
(4.9) (12.7) (13.9) (1.9) (32.4) (19.7)
Rural 3 11.4 49.9 5.1 25.3 1.9 6.4
(7.0) (13.6) (19.3) (4.6) (18.5) (22.1)
Rural 4 13.9 38.1 4.0 39.2 0.5 4.3
(11.4) (13.8) (20.2) (9.5) (7.2) (19.7)
Rural 5 13.7 21.2 3.4 59.4 0.2 2.1
(22.2) (15.3) (34.5) (28.5) (5.9) (19.0)
Govt. - - - 100.0 - -
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) (2.8) ( - ) ( - )
N o te :  S S k illed  L abour. U S U n sk ille d  L abour.
A A g r icu ltu ra l C ap ita l. N A N o n -a g r ic u ltu r a l C a p ita l.
N E ES A N  (N o r th ea st)  L an d . N O N N o n -E S A N  L an d .
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As a result, the move towards free trade tends to relatively favour 
rural households, especially those in the lower quintiles. The move towards 
free trade leads to a general reduction in prices and nominal income. 
However, Table 7.13 shows that the income of households in the lower 
(poorer) quintile decrease less than those of households in the upper (richer) 
quintiles. Income of rural households decreases less than those of urban 
households in the equivalent quintile. Most importantly, the reduction in 
income for households in all quintiles are lower than that of the poverty line 
(0.35%). These features point to the favourable distributional impact of the 
move towards free trade. Similar features can be found for household 
consumption expenditure. However, since the government has to raise 
revenue by direct taxation, the progressive nature of direct taxes tends to 
bring more urban people into poverty.
The income distribution impact is summarised in Table 7.12. HCR 
shows a change in the number of poor, FGT2 a change in the intensity of 
poverty, and SCV a change in inequality. As already discussed in Chapter 
Six, these measurements are based on household per capita expenditure. 
However, in order to separate the progressive effect of direct taxation, Table 
7.12 also compares the change in poverty and inequality in two dimensions, 
pre-tax and post-tax analyses. The pre-tax results are based on household 
income, and the post-tax results are based on household consumption 
expenditure. A common characteristic of the pre-tax and post-tax cases is that 
reductions in poverty intensity (FGT2) are more than reductions in the 
number of poor (HCR). This indicates that the move towards free trade not 
only brings some people out of poverty, but also reduces the hardship of 
people who are still in poverty.
Table 7.12 shows that, before tax, the income distribution impact of the 
move towards free trade is very favourable. The number of poor, poverty 
intensity, and inequality decreases at national level, in every region, and 
community. The decrease in poverty is substantial, although not dramatic. 
The striking characteristics of the results are that the reduction in the number 
of poor and poverty intensity is more in the urban areas and Bangkok, and is 
smallest in the poorest region, the Northeast. The decrease in inequality is
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not substantial. The reduction in national inequality is a result of decreased 
inequality within urban areas and rural areas, and a decrease in inequality 
between urban and rural areas.
Table 7.12: Income Distribution Impact of the Move Towards Free Trade
and Direct Taxation, by Community and Region (%)
Income Distribution Pre-tax Post-tax
Overall HCR -0.1520 -0.1674
Urban -0.2331 -0.1480
Rural -0.1423 -0.1697
North -0.1561 -0.1699
Northeast -0.1034 -0.1150
Central -0.2464 -0.2724
South -0.2071 -0.2352
Bangkok -0.2970 -0.2611
Overall FGT2 -0.4077 -0.3567
Urban -0.7250 -0.4605
Rural -0.3853 -0.3493
North -0.4370 -0.3717
Northeast -0.3458 -0.3109
Central -0.5816 -0.4930
South -0.5159 -0.4500
Bangkok -1.3862 -0.9778
Overall SCV -0.0307 -0.5203
Urban -0.0215 -0.7244
Rural -0.0369 -0.1714
North -0.0496 -0.5264
Northeast -0.0224 -0.1593
Central -0.0525 -0.6041
South -0.0453 -0.5759
Bangkok -0.0172 -0.6044
Note: HCR is the number of poor over the total population, FGT2 is the measurement of 
poverty intensity, and SCV is the measurement of income inequality.
Direct taxation diverts household income to government. In the post 
tax situation, the distribution of income has become somewhat more equal. 
National inequality decreases by about 0.52% which is more than the 0.03%
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decrease of the pre-tax case. As a result of progressive tax rates, decreases in 
inequality in both urban and rural areas are also much more than those in the 
pre-tax case. As expected, the expenditure gap between urban and rural 
households has also narrowed. Again, the Northeast records the lowest 
improvement in inequality. The decreases in the overall poverty, especially 
FGT2, are smaller, since both the non-poor and the poor are subjected to the 
8.37% increase in all direct tax rates. Bangkok is most adversely affected by 
the direct taxation since poverty intensity decreases by 0.98%, which is much 
less than the 1.39% of the pre-tax case.
7.3.5. Consumption Impact
Household income is affected by the move towards free trade, through a 
change in unskilled labour employment, changes in wage rates, and changes 
in the returns to industry specific factors. Based on the changes in their 
income constraints, and relative prices, households adjust their consumption 
patterns. Accordingly, a change in overall domestic consumption alters 
domestic demand, output, and employment.
The 8.37% increase in all the rates of direct taxes diverts resources 
from households to government. It allows the government to maintain its 
existing level of spending and investment, in real terms. At the same time, it 
squeezes overall household consumption expenditure. The benefit of 
imported price reduction is offset by the burden of the increase in direct taxes 
to finance the government budget.
Table 7.13 points out that the system of industrial protection is 
equivalent to a subsidy for the well off households, especially in the urban 
areas. Despite the overall welfare gain, indicated by the 0.04% increase in real 
national consumption, the same table shows that the favourable impact of 
income distribution is not costless. Changes in real consumption of 
households in various quintiles are different. Although, real consumption of 
urban households in the three lower quintiles, and all rural households, 
increases, that of households in the other quintiles decreases. The move 
towards free trade allows most households to buy imported and domestic
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varieties at lower prices and most households get back some of their 
deadweight loss.
Table 7.13: Impact of the Move Towards Free Trade and Direct Taxation on 
on Income and Consumption, by Household (%)
Household Income Consumption Real Consumption3
Urban 1 -0.2007 -0.2569 0.1923
Urban 2 -0.2130 -0.2929 0.1767
Urban 3 -0.2172 -0.3690 0.1103
Urban 4 -0.2191 -0.4895 -0.0042
Urban 5 -0.2311 -0.9384 -0.4366
Rural 1 -0.1795 -0.1727 0.2455
Rural 2 -0.1887 -0.2533 0.1707
Rural 3 -0.1998 -0.1698 0.2651
Rural 4 -0.2111 -0.2089 0.2383
Rural 5 -0.2245 -0.3336 0.1489
Note: a Consumption expenditure deflated by household consumption price index, the price 
of consumer goods weighted by the share of each good in household consumption basket.
Based on their response to change in consumption expenditure and 
prices, households unequally adjust their demand for various consumer 
goods. With general decreases in prices, and increases in real consumption 
expenditure of most households, their demand for consumer goods is 
expected to increase. However, this increase is partly offset by a decrease in 
demand from richer households in higher urban quintiles who experience a 
fall in real consumption expenditure. Since these richer households share 
much of the national private consumption expenditure, total household 
demand for all consumer goods increases very slightly (Table 7.14). This 
slight increase in real national consumption indicates that the economy 
allocates resources towards production for export which leads to economic 
growth.
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Table 7.14: Impact of the Move Towards Free Trade and Direct Taxation on
Consumer Goods <%)
Consumer Goods Quantity Price
Rice and Cereals 0.0844 -0.3200
Meat and Fish 0.0227 -0.2877
Fruit and Vegetables 0.0759 -0.4576
Other Foods 0.0736 -0.4660
Non-alcoholic Beverages 0.1840 -0.6580
Clothing and Footwear -0.0856 -0.1902
House and Housing Expenditure 0.0588 -0.5064
Transport and Communication -0.0418 -0.5801
Medical Expenses, Education, 
and Entertainment 0.2087 -0.6384
Other Non-foods 0.1704 -0.5653
7.4. Trade Liberalisation and Redistribution Impact
Having examined the impact of the move towards free trade when the 
government raises more revenue through direct taxation, the focus now 
moves to external financing and redistribution of the government deficit 
through indirect taxation. The government may choose to cut its expenditure 
on goods and services, or on public investment spending. But the cut in 
expenditure on goods and services can have a dramatic impact on the 
prosperity of all producing industries, while the cut in investment spending 
can severely impair the long-term benefit of investment projects which are 
not presented in the model. In the following discussion, the government may 
decide to raise more revenue through an across the board increase in all 
indirect tax rates. Indirect taxation will create another distortionary effect, 
since each producer good is subject to different indirect tax rates. The 
government may also choose to borrow from some external source to finance 
the deficit. Because such external financing may lead to long term damage to
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the fiscal system and create a burden for future generations, not well- 
captured in the model, any favourable impact should be viewed with 
caution.
7.4.1. Indirect Taxation and Distortionary Effect
This simulation allows the Government to finance its budget deficit by a 
2.59% increase in all the base year rates of indirect taxes as shown in Table 
7.15. The indirect taxes exclude trade taxes and subsidies. The increase is 
across the board, on all producer goods, and on both domestic and imported 
goods. As shown in Table 7.15, industries subjected to the two highest rates 
are the petroleum industry (18.30%), and other import competing industries 
(8.97%). A 2.59% increase means a rise in the indirect tax rate on petroleum 
goods from 18.30% to 18.77%, on other import competing goods from 8.97%
to 9.20%, and so on.
TABLE 7.15: Indirect Tax Rate, by Producer Good <%)
Producer Goods Indirect Tax Rate
Paddy 0.42
MCS 0.36
Rubber 7.71
Other Agricultural Products 0.49
Agro-industry Products 1.20
Other Export Oriented Products 2.80
Petroleum Products 18.30
Other Import Competing Products 8.97
EWTC 1.60
Services 2.16
Source: Input-Output Table of Thailand 1985, NESDB.
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The increase is neither progressive nor regressive in the sense that it 
raises all indirect tax rates by the same proportion. However, through the 
different rates at the base year, the share of intermediate inputs in total cost, 
and the cascading effect of indirect taxes, it alters the price of all producer 
goods differently. While the move towards free trade leads to a more efficient 
allocation of resources, the increase in the indirect tax rates leads to a more 
inefficient reallocation of resources, and redirects resources out of highly 
taxed industries. The higher the base year indirect tax rate, the greater the 
adverse effect on demand and supply of producer goods. This is the direct 
dead-weight loss to producers and consumers due to the increase in indirect 
tax rates.
The increase in indirect tax rates also alters the purchase prices of 
consumer goods differently, since each good uses different proportions of 
various producer goods. Accordingly, the upward shift in the supply of each 
consumer good, induced by higher input cost, reduces the consumer and 
producer surplus of these goods. The burden of indirect taxes on households 
depends on the share of each consumer good in their consumption budget.
Under the same economic environment, Table 7.16 compares the effect 
of financing the government budget deficit through an across the board 
increase in all indirect tax rates with those of direct tax rates. The first and 
second column are the simulation results of the cases of direct and indirect 
taxation. The third column shows that the distortionary effect of indirect 
taxation is dramatic. It obstructs all the favourable impact of the move 
towards free trade, especially the improvement in income distribution.
Indirect taxation leads to a rise in prices which offsets the fall in prices 
caused by the move towards free trade. The inefficiency caused by indirect 
taxation leads to a contraction in the economy, with a decrease in nominal 
GDP of about 0.44% and, as indexed by the CPI, a decrease in real GDP of 
about 0.07%. Aggregate welfare loss is indicated by a fall in real consumption 
of about 0.08% and a decrease in unskilled labour employment of more than 
0.27%. Based on the change in the CPI, changes in household consumption 
show that the loss is mainly a burden on rural households and urban 
households in the three lower quintiles.
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Table 7.16: Comparison between Direct and Indirect Taxations (%)
Industry Direct Indirect Distortion3
GDP (Nominal) -0.2149 -0.4418 -0.2269
Consumption -0.4312 -0.4590 -0.0278
Investment -0.6461 -0.5348 0.1113
Government -0.4706 -0.3895 0.0811
Exportb 0.2403 0.1354 -0.1049
Importb 0.1405 0.0599 -0.0806
Price Indices
Consumer -0.4670 -0.3752 0.0918
Capital -0.6461 -0.5348 0.1113
Poverty Line -0.3548 -0.3157 0.0391
Government Revenue
Trade Taxes -9.7693 -9.8477 -0.0784
Indirect Taxes -0.6557 1.8644 -
Direct Taxes 8.1418 -0.4747 -
Property -0.2388 -0.5516 -0.3128
Tax Rate
Direct Taxes 8.3669 - -
Tax Rates - 2.5919 -
Un-skilled Labour Employment 0.2916 0.0188 -0.2728
Nominal Wage
Skilled -0.3036 -0.4953 -0.1917
Un-skilledc -0.4670 -0.3752 0.0918
Overall Income Distribution
HCR -0.1674 0.0831 0.2505
FGT2 -0.3567 0.1459 0.5026
SCV -0.5203 -0.0999 0.4204
Household Consumption Expenditure
Urban 1 -0.2569 -0.4348 -0.1779
Urban 2 -0.2929 -0.4710 -0.1781
Urban 3 -0.3690 -0.4805 -0.1115
Urban 4 -0.4895 -0.4821 0.0074
Urban 5 -0.9384 -0.5135 0.4249
Rural 1 -0.1727 -0.3569 -0.1842
Rural 2 -0.2533 -0.3681 -0.1148
Rural 3 -0.1698 -0.3936 -0.2238
Rural 4 -0.2089 -0.4301 -0.2212
Rural 5 -0.3336 -0.4881 -0.1545
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Table 7.16: (Continued) (%)
Industry Direct Indirect Distortion3
Industry Output
ESAN 0.3066 0.0977 -0.2089
non-ESAN 0.0911 0.0104 -0.0807
Agro-industry 0.2147 0.1254 -0.0893
of which Export 0.3588 0.3214 -0.0374
Other Export Oriented 0.2060 0.0250 -0.1810
of which Export 0.6701 0.3151 -0.3510
Petroleum 0.2476 0.1180 -0.1296
Other Import Competing -0.0520 -0.1479 -0.0959
EWTC 0.0201 -0.0564 -0.0765
Services 0.0509 -0.0200 -0.0709
Notes: a. Column two (indirect tax) less column one (direct tax).
b. Valued at world prices.
c. By assumption, this is equal to the percentage change in the consumer price index.
The performance of all industries is poorer than those in the direct tax 
case, especially for EWTC and services industries. These industries expand 
by about 0.02% and 0.05% in the direct tax case, while they contract by 0.06% 
and 0.02% in this case. The contraction of other import competing industries 
increases from 0.05% in the direct tax case to 0.15% in this case. Export 
performance of agro-industry and other export oriented industries is also 
squeezed by the distortionary effect of indirect taxation, from 0.36% and 
0.67% to 0.32% and 0.32%, respectively. The expansion of agro-industry, 
other export industries, and agriculture are also depressed by indirect 
taxation. The adverse effect on agriculture, especially ESAN industry, has a 
dramatic impact on income distribution.
The employment of unskilled labour, an important source of income 
for poor households, slightly increases by 0.02% while skilled labour wage 
rates decrease by 0.50%. As indexed by a decrease in the CPI of about 0.38%, 
real wages for skilled labour falls. Thus, the contraction of the economy leads 
to a fall in labour's real income. The increase in all indirect tax rates impedes 
the impact of the move towards free trade on domestic price reduction. 
Consequently, poverty increases, both in the number of poor and poverty
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intensity. Inequality also decreases in this case, however, in a smaller degree 
than for the direct taxation case. This indicates that the burden of indirect 
taxation is greater on the poor than on the non-poor.
7.4.2. External Financing and Dutch Disease
Empirical studies on the effect of trade liberalization show that many 
developing countries experience average annual positive growth rates in the 
post-liberalization era (Michaely et al., 1991). However, liberalization in 
many countries also came with a net capital inflow, especially external 
financing of the government budget deficit, that aimed to permit import 
liberalization (e.g., Garcia, 1991, and Cuadra and Hachette, 1991). One 
question on the findings of these studies asks what would have been the 
impact if there had been no extra income flow to these countries.
This sub-section discusses the impact of the move towards free trade, 
when the government budget deficit is financed by some external source. 
This is similar to a gift from foreigners, in the sense that its repayment is not 
covered by this model. Any present benefit of such government external 
financing, if it exists, should take into account the future burden in terms of 
debt repayment.
Under the same economic environment, Table 7.17 compares the effect 
of external financing with those of direct taxation. The first and second 
column are the simulation results of the cases of direct taxation and external 
financing. The third column shows the difference between the two 
alternatives of financing government budget deficit. This is referred to as 
another form of Dutch Disease, because external financing leads to an 
increase in the availability of foreign exchange and real exchange rate 
appreciation. A comparison between this case - external financing - and the 
direct taxation case, points to the benefit and adverse effect of external 
financing (third column, Table 7.17). The benefit is mainly in terms of income 
and consumption, while the adverse effect is mainly in terms of losses in 
employment and outputs of agriculture and export oriented industries.
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Table 7.17: Comparison between Direct Taxation and External Financing.
(%)
Industry Direct Tax Financing Dutch Disease3
GDP (Nominal) -0.2149 -0.0114 0.2035
Consumption -0.4312 0.0595 0.4907
Investment -0.6461 -0.4560 0.1701
Government -0.4706 -0.2415 0.2291
Exportb 0.2403 -0.2729 -0.5132
Importb 0.1405 0.2748 0.1343
Price Indices
Consumer -0.4670 -0.2941 0.1729
Capital -0.6461 -0.4560 0.1901
Poverty Line -0.3548 -0.2198 0.1350
Government Revenue
Trade Taxes -9.7693 -9.5969 0.1724
Indirect Taxes -0.6557 -0.4736 0.1821
Direct Taxes 8.1418 -0.0016 -8.1434
Property -0.2388 0.0025 0.2413
Direct Tax Rates 8.3669 - -8.3669
External Financing (million Bahts) 3794 3794
Un-skilled Labour Employment 0.2916 0.2583 -0.0333
Nominal Wage
Skilled -0.3036 0.0600 0.3636
Un-skilledc -0.4670 -0.2941 0.1729
Overall Income Distribution
HCR -0.1674 -0.2286 -0.0612
FGT2 -0.3567 -0.5397 -0.1830
scv -0.5203 0.0990 0.6193
Household Consumption Expenditure
Urban 1 -0.2569 0.0162 0.2731
Urban 2 -0.2929 0.0330 0.3259
Urban 3 -0.3690 0.0456 0.4146
Urban 4 -0.4895 0.0633 0.5528
Urban 5 -0.9384 0.1362 1.0746
Rural 1 -0.1727 -0.0024 0.1703
Rural 2 -0.2533 -0.0054 0.2479
Rural 3 -0.1698 0.0125 0.1823
Rural 4 -0.2089 0.0468 0.2557
Rural 5 -0.3336 0.0654 0.3990
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Table 7.17: (Continued)
Industry Direct Tax Financing Dutch Disease3
Industry Output
ESAN 0.3066 0.2555 -0.0511
non-ESAN 0.0911 0.0084 -0.0827
Agro-industry 0.2147 0.1336 -0.0811
of which Export 0.3588 0.1525 -0.2063
Other Export Oriented 0.2060 -0.1450 -0.3510
of which Export 0.6701 -1.0353 -1.7054
Petroleum 0.2476 0.3638 -0.1162
Other Import Competing -0.0520 -0.0286 0.0234
EWTC 0.0201 0.2077 0.2597
Services 0.0509 0.1248 0.0739
Notes: a. Column two (external financing) less column one (direct tax).
b. Valued at world prices.
c. By assumption, this is equal to the percentage change in the consumer price index.
The simulation results project that, because of the extra income from 
external financing, the economy will grow at a faster rate than in the direct 
tax case. As indexed by the CPI, real GDP increases by about 0.28%. An 
increase in household welfare is indicated by an increase in nominal and real 
consumption of 0.06% and 0.35%, respectively. Other components of GDP 
decrease, including a 0.24% decrease in government expenditure, a 0.46% 
decrease in investment, and a 0.27% decrease in total exports. Total imports 
increase by 0.27%. These changes point out that economic growth is led by 
the tremendous increase in household consumption, implicitly financed by 
the extra income injected into the economy.
Unskilled labour employment increases only by about 0.26%, 
compared with the 0.29% in the direct tax case. A comparison between the 
the direct tax case and this case shows that, while agriculture, the petroleum 
industry, and all export oriented industries are squeezed by external 
financing, all other industries are supported. This points to the reallocation of 
resources towards import competing industries and non-traded industries at 
the expense of agriculture, the petroleum industry, and the export oriented 
industries.
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Following the move towards free trade, the decrease in total exports is 
paradoxical. However, it can be explained by the fact that agro-industry, and 
and other export oriented industries, are squeezed by the deterioration of 
international competitiveness. The major consequence is the exports of other 
export oriented industries, which decrease tremendously (1.04%). Despite an 
overall increase in domestic demand, the 1.04% fall in export demand 
outweighs the increase in domestic demand, and results in a 0.15% 
contraction of the industries. Agro-industry are also adversely affected by the 
external financing. In comparison to the direct tax case, the increases in 
output and export of the industry fall from 0.21% to 0.13% and from 0.36% to 
0.15%, respectively. Consequently, the preformance of both agricultural 
industries are pressed down.
The major cause of the deterioration is the 3,794 million Bahts of 
government external financing. The tremendous capital inflow, in terms of an 
increase in extra government revenue, creates demand for domestic and 
imported goods. Since the balance of payments is assumed to be zero, 
external financing also puts pressure on Thai exports. Although the actual 
exchange rate is fixed, the external financing results in a real exchange rate 
appreciation and, therefore, a deterioration in international competitiveness. 
These are indicated by an increase in real wages in general, and the 
expansion of non-traded industries, especially EWTC and services. This 
results in a contraction in Thai exports and the outputs of all export oriented 
industries (Table 7.17). Therefore, resources are diverted from export 
oriented industries towards non-traded industries. At the same time, 
demand for imports also increases, since imports become cheaper. Taking 
into account the fact that the income effect increases domestic demand for the 
outputs of import competing industries, the improvement of the industries 
by external financing indicates that the income effect outweights the price 
effect. Thus, in comparison to the direct tax case, import competing 
industries are encouraged by external financing.
Table 7.17 shows that the income distribution impact is favourable. 
Poverty incidence significantly decreases, both in terms of the number of 
poor and poverty intensity. The reduction in poverty is nation wide.
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However, the increase in inequality points out that the benefits of 
government external financing is mostly absorbed by the better-off 
households. Therefore, inequality increases nation wide, in every region and 
community.
7.5. Sensitivity Analysis
Having examined the impact of a 10% reduction in all rates of protection, this 
section focuses on the reliability of the model and the sensitivity of the 
impact on the choices of parameters and assumptions. The simulation results 
of the model are based on the model's structure, as well as its parameter 
settings, which are subjected to estimation errors.
The reliability of the model is tested by the homogeneity property, i.e. 
a 10% increase in the exchange rate will increase all the nominal variables by 
10%, while all the real variables remain the same. The income distribution 
model is also tested, by the axioms discussed in Chapter Six.
Sensitivity of the results on the imputed value of each parameter can 
be tested and, in most cases, are found to be negligible. A sensitivity analysis 
of the results on all parameters is complicated by the fact that changes in the 
value of different parameters may produce a different impact which may 
cover up each other. Thus, the analysis requires a much more comprehensive 
technique. This is discussed in the literature (e.g., Pagan and Shannon, 1989). 
Generally, it involves a large number of simulations and incurs limited time 
and resources.
One of the arguments in support of protection is the optimum tariff 
argument. If a country is large enough in world markets, its tariff can 
improve its terms of trade. Although, tariff reduces trade volume and 
generates production and consumption losses, a moderate tariff could benefit 
a large country, because the favourable terms of trade effect offsets the 
unfavourable production and consumption cost. Therefore, a move towards 
free trade could bring about an unfavourable impact to the economy.
The market power assumption for Thai exports plays its role through 
this argument. Two agro-industry products - rice and processed rubber -
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have substantial shares in the world markets. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
this is the ground for an assertion that the export volume of these products 
could have some impact on world prices. Thus, the reciprocal of price 
elasticity of world demand for Thai exports of agro-industry products is not 
zero, and is set at 0.5. For other manufacturing exports, the reciprocal is set at 
0.0001.
Moreover, the intermediate inputs of agro-industry products, such as 
paddy (rice) and rubber, are important sources of farm income and 
employment, which can affect income distribution, this sub-section examines 
the differences in the simulation results when Thailand is assumed to be a 
small country in international trade. A change in its export or import volume 
has no impact on the world prices and free trade is theoretically optimum, 
i.e. the reciprocal of price elasticities of world demand for all Thai exports are 
zero.
Table 7.18 summarises and compares the simulation results of a move 
towards free trade based on the market power and small country 
assumptions. The effect of the move on a government budget deficit is re­
distributed by an across the board increase in all rates of direct taxes. Fixed 
supply of skilled labour and infinite supply of unskilled labour are assumed. 
The only difference is the reciprocal of elasticities of world demand for Thai 
exports. Results in the first column are based on the market power 
assumption. Results in the second column of the table are based on the small 
country assumption for all Thai exports, i.e. all the reciprocal of elasticities is 
set at 0.
In brief, the most striking feature of the results, based on the two 
different assumptions, is their similarities. But the absence of market power 
for the export of agro-industry products magnifies the favourable impact of 
the move towards free trade. In comparison to the market power assumption, 
the growth of real GDP (0.29%) is higher in this case and an increase in real 
national consumption by 0.07% is also higher. Due to the perfect elasticity of 
world demand for Thai exports, a 0.25% increase in exports, valued at world 
prices, is also slightly higher., while imports increase slightly, about 0.16%.
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Table 7.18: Comparison between M arket Power and Small Country
Assum ptions (%>
Industry Market Power Small Country
GDP (Nominal) -0.2149 -0.1361
Consumption -0.4312 -0.3605
Investment -0.6461 -0.6060
Government -0.4706 -0.4247
Export*5 0.2403 0.2524
Import*5 0.1405 0.1557
Price Indices
Consumer -0.4670 -0.4257
Capital -0.6461 -0.6060
Poverty Line -0.3548 -0.3038
Government Revenue
Trade Taxes -9.7693 -9.7446
Indirect Taxes -0.6557 -0.6246
Direct Taxes 8.1418 8.8129
Property -0.2388 -0.1681
Direct Tax Rates 8.3669 8.9629
Un-skilled Labour Employment 0.2916 0.3548
Nominal Wage
Skilled -0.3036 -0.2313
Un-skilledc -0.4670 -0.4257
Overall Income Distribution
HCR -0.1674 -0.2077
FGT2 -0.3567 -0.4588
scv -0.5203 -0.5668
Industry Output
ESAN 0.3066 0.3781
non-ESAN 0.0911 0.1112
Agro-industry 0.2147 0.3157
of which Export 0.3588 0.5721
Other Export Oriented 0.2060 0.1352
of which Export 0.6701 0.3278
Petroleum 0.2476 0.2566
Other Import Competing -0.0520 -0.0547
EWTC 0.0201 0.0338
Services 0.0509 0.0625
Notes: The same as in Table 7.17.
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Since an increase in the export of agro-industry products does not 
drive down its world price and, thus, encourages agro-industry to expand 
faster. More resources are attracted into agro-industry, at the expense of 
other export oriented and other import competing industries. In comparison 
to the market power assumption, the impact on other industries is also 
favourable, but the degree of impact depends on their linkages with agro­
industry. Typical is ES AN and non-ESAN agricultural industries - the major 
suppliers of inputs to the agro-industry. The performance of agricultural 
industries, the biggest pool of unskilled labour employment, is also enhanced 
by the small country assumption.
The expansion of industries leads to an increase in demand for both 
types of labour. In order to attract more skilled labour, which is nationally 
scarce, industries bid up their wage. Thus, real wages for skilled labour, as 
indexed by the CPI, increase more in this case (0.19%) than in the market 
power case (0.16%). At the same time, the employment of unskilled labour 
also expands more in this case, 0.35% compared to 0.29%. Rent is affected 
accordingly. Since the absence of market power for Thai exports of agro­
industry products leads to a more favourable effect on both types of labour 
income, much of which is owned by poor households, this leads to a more 
favourable income distribution impact than the market power assumption 
does. The decrease in the number of poor, poverty intensity, and inequality, 
is more substantial. Thus, the increases in real GDP and real consumption, as 
indexed by the CPI, and the improvement in income distribution confirm the 
argument in support of free trade on the ground of more efficiency and 
higher welfare.
7.6. Conclusion
This chapter discusses the distribution impact of the move towards free 
trade. Based on the assumption that the government prepares to raise 
revenue by direct taxation, the simulation results indicate that, without 
industrial protection, Thailand could have achieved more efficient allocation 
of resources through the benefits of import price reduction, and higher real
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GDP as indexed by the CPI. Since the benefits of economic growth can be 
trickled down to people at the lower end of income distribution, especially 
those in rural areas, the simulation results project that poverty incidence 
could have been reduced faster. However, the increase in all rates of direct 
tax, which diverts resources from households to government, reduces the 
benefits of the move towards free trade. This leads to a lesser decrease in 
poverty, especially in urban areas and Bangkok.
The income distribution impact is not dramatic. The impact is affected 
by the way the government finances its budget deficit. In sum, direct taxation 
is preferred to indirect taxation and external financing. However, there 
would be a welfare effect of direct taxation through work-leisure substitution 
which is not taken into account in this thesis. The choice of indirect taxation 
is not desirable, since it has a second round effect which leads to further 
inefficient allocation of resources. External financing has a very desirable 
impact, and would receive support from the public in the short run. 
However, the long term consequences of external financing of the deficit, 
means the repayment of the debt would be a burden for future generations. 
The overall favourable impact of direct taxation is hampered by the decrease 
in real consumption of households in the higher income quintiles, and may 
be opposed by the public, especially the lower income households in 
Bangkok and urban areas.
When the model departs from one critical assumption, the market 
power for Thai export of agro-industry products, the results indicate that 
there will be no different conclusion. Moreover, it strengthens the argument 
in support of free trade, since the simulation results become more favourable, 
e.g. higher real GDP, as indexed by the CPI, and more equal income 
distribution, when a small country assumption is employed.
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- CHAPTER 8 -
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
SUGGESTIONS
8.1. Summary
Chapters Two and Three of the thesis examine the historical background of 
industrialization, protection, and income distribution during the past three 
decades. The analyses of the chapters indicate that the degree of industrial 
protection has been increasing. It also indicates that there is some 
relationship between industrial protection and factor intensity, resource 
allocation, and changes in productivity.
The analyses point to striking similarities between the protection 
systems and income distribution. Chapter Two points out that the systems of 
industrial protection have a regional bias, especially towards Bangkok and 
the Central region. The reason for this is the bias of the system towards 
import competing industries and the manufacturing sector, which are mainly 
located in Bangkok and the Central region. Empirical studies show that the 
degree of bias has been increasing during the past three decades. Chapter 
Three shows that poverty incidence and income inequality also have regional 
and sectoral dimensions. Moreover, they are directly related to the 
performance of the agricultural sector and market conditions for agricultural 
products.
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Based on a general equilibrium framework, this thesis has attempted 
to answer the question: What would he the income distribution impact of a 
move from the 1987 system of industrial protection towards free trade? To 
answer this question, a general equilibrium analysis is required, because it 
allows multi-market analyses, and takes into account the way in which the 
prices of all factors and goods in an economy adjust simultaneously. It can 
also incorporate certain factors affecting income distribution.
The structure of the computable general equilibrium model developed 
in Chapter Four contains many important features in terms of industrial 
protection and income distribution - the classification of industries, factors of 
production, and the disaggregation of households. Most importantly, the 
disaggregation of agriculture and land into ESAN (Northeast) and non- 
ESAN implicitly takes into account the difference in land quality and 
irrigated areas between the Northeast, the poorest region, and other regions. 
The exclusion of agro-industry from other export industries, is based on the 
fact that it has very strong linkages with agriculture, especially through main 
crops such as paddy, maize, cassava, sugar-cane, and rubber. Similarly, the 
petroleum industry is separated from other import competing industries, 
because it provides important inputs for other industries and is relatively less 
protected, and highly import dependent.
In Chapter Four, a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is constructed. 
The matrix gives an integrated and consistent picture of the Thai economy. It 
provides share parameters for the base year 1988, including input-output 
production technology for producer and consumer goods, functional 
distribution matrix, and factor ownership matrix.
Except for SAM, consumer demand, and income distribution 
parameters, most other parameters are imputed from past studies. Where 
estimates from Thai data are not available, estimates from relevant studies, 
based on other country data, are employed. This practice is inevitable for a 
general equilibrium analysis which demands a considerably large number of 
parameters.
The consumer demand system, estimated in Chapter Five, allows 
different changes in demand of various households in response to changes in
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relative prices and total household consumption expenditure. The estimates 
are based on the well known Linear Expenditure System (LES). Data used in 
the estimation contain ten households and ten consumer goods, enriched by 
price information, instead of assuming one price, as in most past studies. In 
addition, the chapter proposes a modified version of the LES, in order to 
capture the role of household size and composition in the consumer demand 
system.
Many features of the estimates indicate how the move towards free 
trade indirectly affects demand for various households. The clear distinction 
between the behaviour of households in the top urban and rural quintiles, 
and other households, indicates that they will differently perceive the 
consequences of a move towards free trade. The estimates generally exhibit a 
clear distinction between demand for food commodities, house and housing 
expenditure, and other commodities. As expected, food commodities, and 
house and housing expenditure are shown to be necessities, and changes in 
household income will not significantly alter demand for these goods. Non­
alcoholic beverages and other non-foods are shown to be luxuries, for which 
a 1% increase in income will generate a larger than 1% increase in demand. 
Own price elasticities of demand are negative as predicted by economic 
theory. However, the elasticity of foods is generally weaker than those of 
non-alcoholic beverages and non-foods. Weak complimentarity is shown 
between most pairs of commodities, especially foods.
Chapter Six discusses the concept of poverty and income inequality. 
The discussion focuses on the concept of the subsistence bundle, and various 
important properties of poverty and inequality indices. Based on these 
properties, this thesis selects three indices - HCR, FGT2, and SCV. The indices 
are incorporated into the general equilibrium framework and are used to 
measure the impact of the move towards free trade on the number of poor, 
poverty intensity, and income inequality, at national, regional, and 
community levels. It can be disaggregated further into other dimensions such 
as socio-economic class. In the presence of population mobility, the model 
proposed in this chapter can also be used to measure the effect of mobility on 
poverty incidence and inequality.
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By using a Kernel function, the chapter also estimates non-parametric 
density functions of household per capita expenditure in both urban and 
rural areas. The density functions provide parameters for the measurement 
of poverty - HCR and FGT2 - in the general equilibrium model. This is the 
first time that this technique has been used to estimate the size distribution of 
income, and is incorporated into a general equilibrium framework. It allows 
the model to capture an increase or decrease in poverty caused by a change 
in consumer or household income, and prices. Both are driven by the 
mobility and household ownership of factors of production.
Chapter Seven presents the simulation results of a move towards free 
trade by a 10% reduction in nominal rates of protection. This has been 
designed to demonstrate the difference in the pattern of change that arises 
when the government raises more tax revenue or borrows from overseas to 
finance its budget deficit, caused by the move.
With the government budget deficit financed by direct taxation, the 
results point to a benefit of a move towards free trade. The results project 
that, within a period of 2-3 years, the move will lead to higher economic 
growth, and also indicate that there is no trade-off between economic growth 
and income distribution, since overall poverty incidence and income 
inequality improve. Especially for urban areas and Bangkok, poverty 
decreases in all regions and communities. Inequality decreases nation-wide, 
in every region and community.
Alternatively, in financing the budget deficit, the government may 
choose to borrow or to increase indirect tax rates. The distortionary effect of 
indirect taxation offsets the efficient resource allocation impact of the move 
towards free trade. It pushes resources out of highly taxed industries. In 
comparison to direct taxation, it decreases employment, squeezes all 
industries, and leads to a decrease in real GDP as indexed by the CPI. Since 
more people are brought into poverty, inequality decreases. The choice of 
external financing, although leading to a more favourable impact, benefits 
the present generation at the expense of future generations. The extra income 
injected into the economy leads to a deterioration of competitiveness and 
squeezes all export oriented industries. The income distribution impact,
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although favourable in terms of poverty, mostly benefits those who are 
better-off, and leads to a nation-wide increase in inequality.
8.2. Conclusions
The simulation results call into question the role of industrial protection, 
which has been part of modern industrialisation in Thailand for more than 
three decades. The results suggest that a move towards free trade leads to a 
more efficient allocation of resources and a more equal distribution of 
income. However, there are several points that can be made from the results.
The conventional wisdom on the impact of industrialisation on 
income distribution is that the movement of labour out of agriculture into 
non-agriculture is too sluggish in relation to GDP. But, following a move 
towards free trade, the decrease in employment in the highly protected other 
import-competing industries indicates that, even if it has been sluggish, the 
structural change in employment has been towards inappropriate sectors, at 
the cost of efficiency and employment elsewhere in the economy.
The simulation results depend on how the government budget deficit 
is financed. This thesis analyses three alternative methods of financing the 
deficit. The 8.37% increase in all rates of direct taxes leads to a more efficient 
resource allocation and, therefore, higher economic growth. The results 
project that the majority of the population will experience higher real 
consumption. However, because richer households are heavily taxed to 
finance the government budget deficit, their real consumption decreases 
substantially. Since these richer households share much of national 
consumption, national consumption increases slightly. The income 
distribution impact is very favourable.
The 2.59% increase in all rates of indirect taxes produces a second 
round resource allocation. While a move towards free trade leads to more 
efficient allocation, the indirect taxation leads to inefficient allocation. This 
alternative presses down the performance of all industries and results in 
negative growth and less inequality at the cost of more people in poverty.
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In comparison to direct taxation, the choice of external financing is 
preferable. It leads to higher economic growth, higher nominal and real 
consumption of all households, and favourable income distribution. 
However, since all debt has to be repaid in the future, unless the external 
financing is a gift, this is not the first best alternative.
Direct taxation tends to be a preferred alternative, since it leads to 
more efficient resource allocation, less income inequality, and less poverty, 
especially in rural and regional areas. This is not to say that direct taxation is 
better than indirect taxation. This thesis simply states that, between an 
increase in all direct tax rates and all indirect tax rates, the former is more 
favourable. Certainly, these results are based on certain assumptions 
employed by the thesis. A strong assumption is that there is no collection 
cost. With a high collection cost, direct taxation may not be a feasible choice. 
There are also many other alternatives which could produce totally different 
results. This issue requires further analysis.
The impact of the move towards free trade is notable. With the 
government budget deficit financed by direct taxation, the efficient 
reallocation of resources leads to an increase in employment and higher real 
GDP, as indexed by the CPI. Highly protected import competing industries 
shrink, while other export oriented industries expand. The increase in 
exports is the major source of the growth in GDP. The increase in 
employment and the expansion of agriculture leads to higher household 
income, especially those of poor and rural households, and a favourable 
income distribution impact.
Assumptions underlying the model also affect the way value added is 
redistributed and, thus, the distribution of income.
Because of the immobility of capital, capital owners receive whatever 
is left after industries pay their wages bill. The immobility constrains labour 
to work with the available capital, and also obstructs an increase in labour 
productivity by the reallocation of capital. It also allows the owners of scarce 
capital to earn more than average and squeezes the rent of capital that 
becomes excess.
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Return to land shares much of the income of the poor in the Northeast. 
But, because of the poor quality of paddy land, farmers in ESAN industry do 
not fully benefit from the move towards free trade. Although the industry 
can attract more resources, farmers cannot efficiently allocate these resources 
towards the production of the most beneficial crops such as paddy, maize, 
cassava, and sugar-cane, and continue to inefficiently increase production of 
other agricultural products, which become less profitable after the move 
towards free trade. If the quality of land in the Northeast was not so poor, the 
improvement in both poverty incidence and inequality in the region would 
be more substantial.
The results indicate that agro-industry products tend to be another 
source of foreign exchange and a means towards more equal distribution of 
income. Because of the linkages between agro-industry and agriculture, the 
results also indicate that agriculture would not shrink as fast as it actually 
has, but expand and employ more labour. The distribution of income would 
have been better.
The methodological contribution of this thesis is the incorporation of 
poverty incidence and income inequality into a general equilibrium model. 
Despite the overall improvement in poverty and inequality, the methodology 
has shown that, at disaggregated levels, improvement is less impressive. A 
detailed analysis, based on the proposed methodology, confirms the 
argument in Chapters Two and Three that protection and income 
distribution are related through regional bias. In comparison to other regions, 
the impact on poverty in the Northeast, the poorest region, is least, and the 
impact on inequality is very low. The results indicate that there are still some 
other factors, affecting poverty and inequality in the region, which require 
further attention. On the other side, in urban areas and Bangkok, poverty has 
been found to be very responsive to a move towards free trade, while 
inequality is less responsive. However, direct taxation adversely affects 
households in the area. It brings less number of people in Bangkok and urban 
areas out of poverty and, at the same time, reduces inequality substantially.
Although the income distribution impact has been examined at 
national level, by region, and in both urban and rural areas, there are still
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many other dimensions, such as socio-economic class and sector of 
production, which have been found to be important in terms of income 
distribution. The methodology proposed in Chapter Six can be used to 
examine the impact in those dimensions.
The favourable impact of the move towards free trade on income 
distribution is not reversible by any change in the major assumption - from 
market power to small country. The analysis unambiguously supports the 
conclusion that a move towards free trade leads to higher economic growth 
and a more favourable distribution of income.
Considering that the absence of market power for Thai exports leads 
to a more favourable impact on income distribution, the findings of the thesis 
are rather impressive. Because of differences amongst countries with regard 
to industrial structure, production technology, regional imbalances, various 
government policies, and household ownership of factors of production, the 
results of this theses are only specific to Thailand.
8.3. Suggestions
8.3.1. Policy Implementation
There are several ways in which trade can be liberalized. This thesis suggests 
that, in easing the adjustment process, trade should be liberalized gradually 
rather than suddenly. The contraction of other import competing industries 
will lead to a movement of labour. Thus, schemes to inform workers, and to 
facilitate the movement of labour to available jobs, are required. An 
improvement of productivity can also be achieved through skill upgrading. 
At the same time, the expansion of agriculture will need some support in 
terms of infrastructure.
Unless the government budget deficit can be financed by financial 
support from overseas, and there is no future repayment, the simulation 
results project that direct taxation has more favourable results. Due to the 
nature of direct taxes, the imposition of higher direct tax rates to finance the
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budget deficit should also be gradual, since they could be effectively 
administered, and easily accepted by the public.
Farmers in the Northeast, the poorest region, have the highest land 
ownership. However, the quality of land is very poor and irrigation 
insufficient. An extensive technological development program in the region 
may benefit these poor farmers and, to some degree, remedy the poverty 
problem. In addition, a more efficient alternative is to promote the 
development of labour intensive industries in the region.
Politics also has a role to play. Where the government uses direct taxes 
to raise revenue to finance its budget deficit, it is likely that the move 
towards free trade would be supported, provided that people are well 
informed about the benefits of the policy. The main reason is that those who 
gain from the move towards free trade in real terms are the poorest 60% of 
urban households, and all households in rural areas. Since the rural 
population shares more than 70% of the total population, this group forms 
the majority of Thais.
However, even in a democracy, the will of the majority does not 
always form the basis for government decisions. It may be that the potential 
gainers and losers do not fully comprehend the benefits of trade 
liberalization and the cost of protection. In addition, those who would feel 
the effect of the move towards free trade much more directly, could engage 
intensively in the political debate, thereby, placing some pressure on the 
policy makers, and possibly influencing the final decision of government.
It is hoped that this thesis can provide an additional and useful basis 
for policy decisions. However lessons from the past suggest that there is a 
glaring gap between theory and reality. Narongchai and Juanjai (1986) point 
out that, after two decades of protection, the economic inefficiency generated 
by protected industries, and the effort from some economists, has prompted 
the Thai government to shift the policy to a more liberal regime. However, 
Chapter Two has shown that the move is still far from a reality. Many 
industries have been highly protected for almost the entire three decades of 
industrialisation. On average, the degree of protection has been increasing 
during the 1980s.
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8.3.2. Future Research
This thesis has attempted to capture the impact of the move from the 1987 
system of protection towards free trade - the 10% reduction in all nominal 
rates of protection - by a general equilibrium model. Various important 
features of the Thai economy are reflected by the structure of the model. 
Special emphasis is placed on the impact of the move towards free trade on 
poverty and income inequality. However, there are still many ways in which 
improvements can be made.
Empirical evidence shows that, in the past, changes in tariff in 
Thailand was in the order of around 50%. However, the linearization of the 
model constrains this thesis to focus on a small reduction (10%). A greater 
reduction of 50% can be simulated, but incurs computational error caused by 
the linearization of nonlinear relationships. Although this error can be 
solved, it requires time and resources.
The power of the income distribution model depends on the number 
of classes, i.e. types of households. Although this thesis limits the number to 
ten, within the same framework, more accurate results could be obtained by 
increasing the number of classes in the model and in the factor ownership 
matrix. As shown in Chapter Six, the greater the number of classes, the 
smaller is the error that arises from the methodology proposed in this thesis.
A focus on the impact of the move towards free trade in a shorter 
period of time, about one year, would provide another insight into the 
question. This period is long enough for prices, demand, and supply of 
factors and goods to reach new equilibrium after a policy shock. However, it 
is too short for some types of labour - e.g. skilled labour - to move. This type 
of labour is tied to certain industries due to reasons such as industrial 
location and specific skill. This specific labour will have common interest and 
collude with the owners of specific capital in any move, either in support of 
or against the move towards free trade.
Alternately, a medium to long run model will allow the reallocation of 
the newly created capital. This will directly affect the return to capital and 
other factors of production. The reallocation of household expenditure
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between consumption and savings also affects investment and household 
ownership of factors of production and has important consequences in terms 
of income distribution.
The relationship between protection and foreign capital inflow is one 
of many challenging questions. During the late 1980s, there was a 
tremendous influx of direct foreign investment from Japan and the 'Gang of 
Four'. Direct foreign investment in 1988 and 1989 was more than the total 
direct foreign investment for the preceding ten years. Corden (1974) asserts 
that there are two important effects of protection on foreign capital inflow. 
The direct effect, due to an increase in potential profit in the protected 
industries, where protection attracts domestic capital out of un-protected 
industries and induces the inflow of foreign capital into the protected 
industries. The most important indirect effect is where, under full 
employment, the return to other factors is bid up and investment in the un­
protected industries becomes less profitable because of higher costs. Both 
effects also have interesting income distribution consequences.
The analysis in this thesis also points to the importance of technology 
and quality of agricultural land, which exhibits its role in the adjustment of 
supply in response to the move towards free trade. Typical is ES AN industry 
which has been constrained by the quality of land.
Although there are two agricultural industries, the model developed 
in this thesis still needs further development in terms of spatial dimension. 
The model implicitly assumes that a tradable good is tied to the same 
transport margin. However, some agricultural products, e.g. paddy, can be 
produced both in the North, the Northeast and the Central plain. A 
difference in distance from the three regions to Thai ports could lead to a 
difference in transport margin. Higher transport margin presses down farm 
gate prices, return to agricultural specific factors, and, thus, adversely affects 
income distribution.
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